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ABSTRACT 
Thompson, Sam. “Hindutva Nationalism and Civil Government in India: Towards a 
Theology of Engagement from Luther’s Two Realm Perspective.” Ph.D. diss., Concordia 
Seminary, 2016. 225 pp. 
The task undertaken by this dissertation is to offer a theological response to Hindutva 
nationalism and its challenges to Christians in India.  The particular focus is to understand and 
critique Hindutva conception of the State and its failure to work towards the common good of 
all. Towards that end this dissertation expounds a theological frame work in light of Luther’s 
Two Realm theology to help Christians take their Christian faith seriously (exclusive in nature) 
while embracing an inclusive paradigm (inclusive in nature) which enables Christians to work 
together with people of different faiths or no faiths for the common good. This dissertation 
affirms that, Luther’s Two Realm theology provides an analytical tool to understand and 
distinguish between the concerns, activities, and mode of God’s rule in relation to God’s two 
realms of life, which is fundamental to any theology of engagement. In light of the principles 
explicated, this dissertation affirms the state to be an instrument of God in the left-hand realm for 
the maintenance of external peace, justice, and the common good for all.  Such an affirmation 
helps Christians in India to affirm the Indian constitutional version of the state and government 
which seeks to represent and accommodates every one irrespective of one’s caste, creed, 
language or culture over against the Hindutva vision of a monolithic Hindu state where people 
belonging to non-Hindu religions do not have a legitimate space in the nationhood. In our effort 
to find a common ground with people of different faiths or no faiths, this dissertation emphasizes 
the importance of two foundations for our common existence, namely common Creatureliness 
and common morality based on natural law and human wisdom. This dissertation explores a 
Christian’s social engagement in the public square, through their vocational call to be a citizen 
and/or as political authority. Finally this dissertation examines how the Church as an institution 
in the left-hand can carry out its divine mandate towards the extension and welfare of all under 
law in the temporal realm. This dissertation is written as a faithful confession of God’s word 
within the Lutheran doctrinal tradition with an intention to provide a resource to help and equip 
the church, and Christians in India, to continue to be faithful in the midst of Hindutva challenges 
in the public square towards the common good for all.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION   
“Intolerance Debate” is an ongoing debate which is very much live across India, one 
regularly featured in public forums, social, mass media. The fear and suspicion that the Hindutva 
government, in power since May 2014, might impose a majoritarian agenda on the country, is the 
driving factor behind this debate. The anti-conversion laws (active in five States),1 Beef Ban 
(active in twenty-two States),2 Ghar Vapsi movements (Re-Conversion from other religions to 
Hinduism),3 increasing violence and intolerance against religious and ethnic minorities,4 hate 
speeches against religious minorities,5 instances of media control (which includes ban on Wendy 
Doniger's book “The Hindus: An Alternative History, 2011”6,  BBC Documentary, India’s 
Daughter, 20157 and, shooting and subsequent death of  Malleshappa Kalburgi, an academic, for 
                                                 
1 Shanoor Seervai, “The Arguments For and Against a National Anti-Conversion Law,” The Wall Street 
Journal, January 9, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/01/09/the-arguments-for-and-against-a-national-
anti-conversion-law (accessed November 20, 2015). 
2 “The States Where Cow Slaughter is Legal in India,” The Indian Express, October 8, 2015, 
http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-no-beef-nation (accessed November 20, 2015). 
3 Lalmani Verma, “Ghar Wapsi, Conversion Tools of Politicians for Political Purposes,” The Indian Express, 
February 1, 2015), http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/lucknow/ghar-wapsi-conversion-tools-of-politicians-for-
political-purposes (accessed November 20, 2015). 
4 R. Sahayadhas, Hindu Nationalism and the Indian Church: Towards an Ecclesiology in Conversation with 
Martin Luther (New Delhi: Christian World Imprints, 2013), 67–71. 
5 Ram Puniyani, “One Year of Modi Sarkar: Hate Speech Galore,” Central Chronicle, May 16, 2015.   
6 Doniger's critics, among many other things points out that this book insults  the religious feeling of the 
Hinduism by discussing the sexual desires of figures in Hindu mythology and describing Mahabharata, one of the 
Hindu epic as a fictional work. See Shashank Bengali and Juan Perez Jr, “India Bans 'Vulgar' Book by University of 
Chicago Scholar,” Chicago Tribune, February 13, 2014, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-02-13/news/chi-
india-book-ban-wendy-doniger-20140213_1_penguin-group-hinduism-chicago-scholar (accessed November 21, 
2015). 
7 India’s Daughter was a documentary film based on the twenty three year old medical student Jyoti Singh, 
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his criticism of Hinduism) and the returning of the National Academy of Letters by at least forty 
Indian novelists, poets and playwright, in protest over alleged Hindutva encroachment towards 
freedom of speech and other secular rights,8 are few of those instances which kept people 
concerned about Hindutva in the recent past. Hindutva sympathizers try to downplay these 
instances of communal violence as sporadic and unrelated. Critiques of Hindutva finds this 
common thread as part and parcel of the Hindutva world view and agenda to establish a Hindu 
Rashtra (country) in India.     
What then is Hindutva? Although we shall answer this question in much detail, a brief 
definition is all that is presently needed. Hindutva is an ideology involving ethnic/cultural 
nationalism which seeks to create a Hindu nationhood in India. Having its roots in Brahmanical 
Hinduism, the concrete and comprehensive project of Hindutva either absorbs religious and 
cultural minorities into its ideology or eliminates them through systematic discrimination and/or 
violence. Through its selective and reductionist use of Hindu religion, Hindutva proponents 
picture the nation as a manifestation of the Supreme Being and equate patriotism to religious 
duty which could help earn one’s salvation. In this shrinking of religious and political space to a 
single reality, a person’s citizenship in the country is based on membership in the Hindu fold.  
All those who do not belong to Hinduism and/or have left the Hindu fold for other religions are 
unpatriotic and should return to their original fold. Thus as Sahayadhas rightly notes “Hindu 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
who was gang raped and murdered in Delhi. This documents contains interviews from the rapist and the lawyer who 
justifies the act representing the typical male chauvinistic attitude. This documentary was banned from airing in 
India through governmental intervention alleging that it is an international conspiracy to defame the nation. See 
“Silencing India’s Daughter: Why has the Indian government banned the Delhi Rape Film?” Newstateman, March 5, 
2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/03/silencing-india-s-daughter-why-has-indian-government-
banned-delhi-rape-film (Accessed November 21, 2015). 
8 Rishi Iyengar, “Top Indian Scientist Returns Prestigious Award to Protest ‘Attack on Rationalism’,” Time,   
October 29, 2015, http://time.com/4092177/india-scientist-award-return-bhargava-padma-bhushan/ (accessed 
November 21, 2015). 
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nationalism in India represents a deliberate use of the dominant religion laced with an extremist 
mode of discourse in order to impose a corporatist religious/cultural identity on all those who 
inhabit this land, which dumps pluralism as an impediment to realization of a strong and unified 
nation.”9 In Hindutva schema, State/government has an important role to play towards the 
realization of a Hindu nationhood. The purpose of the state is to defend and establish Hindu 
Dharma and to actively use various power structures and channels available to translate its 
homogenizing religiocultural agenda into a reality. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to help Christians in India to critically assess, respond 
and live responsibly in the context of increasing Hinduisation of public sphere in India. The 
questions to which answers are sought in this dissertation are (1) can Christians argue that the 
purpose of the society/government is to look after the common good of all irrespective of caste, 
culture, and religion? (2) Can Christians argue that Hindu nationalism as envisaged by Hindutva 
ideology runs counter to God’s purpose of common good for all? If so, what are the theological 
resources available to make such an argument? (3) Can Christians join with others and actively 
support the cause for justice, peace, and common good for all, avoiding the danger of Christian 
nationalism and upholding the Christian Gospel and witness? The answer to these questions is 
sought as a faithful confession of God’s word within the Lutheran doctrinal tradition from 
Luther’s Two Realm theology.10 
                                                 
9 Sahayadhas, Hindu Nationalism and the Indian Church, 5. 
10 Luther’s understanding of two realms is also alternatively known as the doctrine of the two kingdoms or 
the twofold rule of God. John R. Stephenson points out that in Luther’s usage one cannot find a clear-cut distinction 
between Reich and Regiment, regnum and regimen. As Robert Kolb elaborates, Luther did not know that he was 
inventing technical vocabulary when he spoke of “two kingdoms,” so he rather casually used the language to mean 
at least three concepts. Namely the realm of God and Satan in conflict with each other, the two dimensions of 
inseparable but distinct spheres of human relationships or existence, i.e., in relation to God and in relation to all 
other creatures and occasionally, the institution of Church and state. So he suggests the usage of (1) “two kingdoms” 
in reference to the kingdoms of God and Satan in conflict, (2) two “institutions” in reference to that of the Church 
and secular government, and (3) two “realms” or “governments” for the relationship to God and other creatures. See 
John R. Stephenson, “The Two Governments and the Two Kingdoms in Luther’s Thought” Scottish Journal of 
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  The Thesis 
This dissertation will argue that Luther’s teaching on the Two Realms can provide the 
theological and ethical rationale for Christians in India to support actively a society/government 
that looks after the wellbeing of all people regardless of caste, religion, or cultural identity. This 
stands over and against an exclusive Hindu nationhood promoted by Hindutva ideology. The 
Lutheran Christian alternative does so by grounding the left-hand realm of God in God’s work as 
creator, and it sees the purpose of the State/government as an instrument of God, the creator, to 
ensure the common good, justice, prevention of evil, and external peace for all, irrespective of 
one’s religious, caste, class, cultural, or linguistic identity.  
The Dissertation in the Context of Current Scholarship 
The challenges posed by Hindutva have led several Indian Christian theologians to respond 
to it from their distinctive perspectives. Some of these approaches can be broadly categorized 
under an inculturation approach, a secular approach, an inter-religious approach, a liberation 
approach, an evangelical approach, and a Lutheran critique from Luther’s ecclesiological 
perspective. We shall go into each of these approaches in greater depth in chapter three of this 
dissertation. Although all these responses dismissed Hindutva as an illegitimate politicization of 
religion, they made genuine and thorough attempts to understand Hindutva. Most of these 
responses were marked with a great amount of self-criticism, but also confrontation where it was 
due.     
One of the serious drawbacks latent in these approaches is the pursuit of a solution at the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Theology 34 (1981): 6 and Robert Kolb, Martin Luther: Confessor of the Faith (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 176–77. Cargill Thompson further clarifies the relationship and the inner connection between God’s 
two realms and God’s two fold rule or two government thus: “God has instituted two realms (“Reiche”).In this 
dissertation, I will be using the term two “realms” wherever possible to denote heavenly and earthly spheres of 
human life and two modes of rule in its respective sphere.  
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expense of the basic Christian faith and identity. Most of these approaches were in some sense 
one dimensional, whether neglecting social concerns at the cost of Christian faith or vice versa. 
In order to move forward with our theological engagement with the challenges raised by  
Hindutva nationalism, an approach is needed that has the strength to take seriously our Christian 
faith (exclusive in nature) but at the same time embrace all humanity, both Christian and other, 
(inclusive in nature) as we live and work together for the common good.  
Therefore, in the context of an alarming militant Hinduisation of the public square this 
dissertation seeks to undertake two tasks. One is to develop a theological approach that would 
avoid the methodological pitfalls of the above-mentioned approaches. The other is to employ that 
methodology to reflect upon the theological significance of the government/state and Christians 
as responsible citizens of the country in the context of Hindu nationalism in India. 
This dissertation will argue that a critical interaction with Martin Luther’s understanding of 
the two realms will help Christians in India shape a theological framework that would avoid the 
danger of neglecting the Christian faith and identity and, at the same time, foster an inclusive 
theological rationale for cooperating with others towards the common good. Moreover, Luther’s 
understanding of God’s left-hand realm and God’s work as creator helps us understand the 
purpose of the State/government as an instrument of God the creator to ensure the common good, 
justice, prevention of evil, and external peace for all irrespective of one’s religious, caste, class, 
cultural, or linguistic identity. 
The Methodological Procedure to Be Employed 
The method used in this research is descriptive, analytic, and evaluative. In order to present 
an ideological framework of Hindutva, I will interact with the original writings of two premier 
Hindutva thinkers and their major works, namely, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966), 
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Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (1923) and Hindu Rattrap Dashing: A Collection of the Presidential 
Speeches Delivered from the Hindu Mahasabha Platform (1949), and M. S. Golwalkar (1906–
1973), We or Our Nationhood Defined (1944); Bunch of Thoughts (1966).  I will rely on 
scholarly consensus to interpret their thoughts and to bring out the central features of this 
ideology. Some of the modern scholars I will be interacting with are Chetan Bhatt, T. Madan, 
Christophe Jaffrelot and the like who interprets Hindutva nationalism as the Brahmanical 
assertion of power and illegitimate politicization of Hinduism.  
In order to develop Luther’s understanding of the two realms I will make use of primary 
sources from Luther as well as secondary sources. The primary sources include but not limited to 
Temporal Authority: To What Extend It Should Be Obeyed, (1523), Commentary on Romans 
(1531), Commentary on Galatians (1531),  Commentary on 1 Peter (1522), Commentary on 
Psalms 82 (1530), Commentary on Psalms 101 (1534), Lectures on Genesis (1535-1545), 
Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Saved (1526), Luther’s exposition of the Lord’s Prayer, Sermon on 
Two Kinds of Righteousness (1518). I will also be relying on scholarly consensus as found in the 
writings of following scholars, namely, Robert Kolb, Charles P. Arand, Joel Biermann, and 
Oswald Bayer. By interacting with these scholars, I will be placing two-realms perspective as 
Luther’s basic framework in understanding Christian reality or, as William J. Wright put it, as his 
reformation worldview or Weltanschauung, which is essential for clarifying all of his views.11 
This is over against some interpretations that place Luther’s two-kingdom perspective as his 
political theology or reduce it to a Church-and-state theology.  
In order to critique and argue for the untenability of Hindutva ideology, I will rely on the 
two-realm perspective on state, natural law, human reason and the importance of affirming our 
                                                 
11 William J. Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding of God’s Two Kingdoms: A Response to the Challenge 
of Skepticism (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 15. 
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common Creatureliness in the left-hand realm. This provides a common ground for all humanity 
to talk about a common good and can help Christians critique Hindutva and appeal to India’s 
constitutional vision of the state/government and common good for all, irrespective of caste, 
culture, religion, or linguistic background. Finally, in order to develop the contours of a Christian 
response and action in the hostile atmosphere saturated by Hindutva, I will rely largely on the 
distinction of two-kinds of righteousness and vocational call of a Christian as citizen and/or as a 
political authority.  Robert Benne’s four connections, namely, indirect and unintentional 
influence, indirect and intentional influence, direct and unintentional influence, direct and 
intentional action will clarify the Church’s response in the public square.  
The Outcome(s) Anticipated 
This dissertation will help Christians in India critically interact with the basic tenets of 
Hindutva ideology in light of Luther’s understanding of God’s two-realm theology. In doing so 
this dissertation seeks to provide a conceptual clarity with regard to the distinct concerns and 
activities of God as understood by two-realm framework. Such clarity will contribute to ongoing 
theological scholarship in India to embrace a theological approach that takes seriously our 
Christian faith (exclusive in nature) but at the same time embraces an inclusive attitude 
(inclusive in nature) towards all as they address various challenges that comes from Hindutva 
nationalism. From this vantage point this dissertation seeks to provide a theological reflection on 
the nature, place, and role of state/civil government as a God-given institution in the left-hand 
realm to work towards external peace, justice, and wellbeing for all, irrespective of caste, class, 
culture, or ethnic background. This reflection, in the context of alarming rise of militant 
Hindutva nationalism seeks to equip Christians with theological, ethical, and conceptual tools to 
engage critically and respond responsibly to the Hindutva version of nationhood and civil 
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government that is threatening the temporal and religious life of Christians and other 
ethnocultural and religious minorities in India.  In this regard my goal is to help the Church in 
India to be faithful in the face of this particular political situation. This dissertation provides a 
resource intended to teach and guide the Church and her response. The answers are sought as a 
faithful confession of God’s word within the Lutheran doctrinal tradition. 
Structure of this Dissertation  
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter provides a brief 
introduction to the area of research, which includes the thesis of this project, the methodological 
approach and structure of this entire dissertation. The second chapter will present a detailed 
theoretical and philosophical frame work of Hindutva nationalism in India. The third chapter will 
outline and analyze various Indian Christian responses given to political Hinduism from different 
theological orientations. The forth chapter provides a general introduction to Luther’s Two 
Realm perspective outlining its basic contours. An attempt has also been made to understand the 
Sitz im Leben of Luther’s Two Realm thought and address some the misinterpretations came to 
be associated with this perspective from the interests of the present research. The fifth chapter 
deals with Luther’s understanding of the nature, purpose, and place of the state/civil government 
in the left-hand realm. The importance of natural law and human reason in relation to the 
functioning of the state is explored. Moreover the importance of state’s role in working towards 
the common good for all irrespective of one’s cultural, religious, and ethnic or caste background 
is underlined. The importance of the state’s role in maintaining a conducive atmosphere for 
religious tolerance and possible relationship between Church and state is also discussed. 
 The sixth chapter introduces a Lutheran frame work for Christian engagement in the 
society in light of Luther’s two-realm perspective. The significance of Luther’s understanding of 
 9 
two kinds of Righteousness and the place of Christian vocation in social engagement is 
discussed. Chapter seven occupies an important space in this entire dissertation as the ideas 
presented and principles developed throughout this dissertation are brought together to formulate 
and provide a critique to Hindutva nationalism in India with particular reference to Hindutva 
ideals for a State/Civil Government. This chapter also explores foundations for a common 
ground a Christian has with people belonging to different world views or religious persuasions in 
working together towards the common good. In formulating a proper foundation to work towards 
the welfare of all in the context of Hindutva nationalism, the importance of a Christian’s call to 
be a citizen and/or as leader in political realm, as well as  possible ways in which the Church can 
influence the public square are also discussed. The eight chapter provides a brief summary and 
conclusion to this research. 
      
 10 
CHAPTER TWO 
HINDUTVA NATIONALISM AND ITS CHALLENGES  
What is Hindutva? What are the basic tenets upon which this ideology is built? How does 
Hindu nationalism, driven by Hindutva, fail to promote peace, justice, and the common good for 
the multi-religious, multi-cultural, and multi-ethnic context of India? What is the purpose of the 
state and government in the Hindutva imagination? What are some of the challenges Hindutva 
poses to Christians in India? The purpose of this chapter is to try answer these questions. But 
before I attempt to do this, it is important for us to have conceptual clarity on three major 
concepts namely nation, nationalism and state. This chapter will start by providing a general 
framework on these three key concepts. After that I will begin the discussion by outlining the 
basic contours of Hindutva ideology as articulated by its two chief ideologues namely Vinayak 
Damodar Savarkar and Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar.  My concern in the next part will be to 
bring out the Hindutva conception of State and Government. Here I will discuss briefly, ‘integral 
humanism’, the philosophy of Hindutva political party, the Bharathiya Janatha Party (BJP) as 
articulated by Deendayal Upadhyaya, another important Hindutva political ideologue. In the next 
part I will explain how Hindutva ideology departs from the Indian constitutional conception of 
nationhood and state.  
Conceptual Considerations: Nation, Nationalism and State 
The scope and concern of this dissertation is limited to an in-depth study about the 
concepts of Nation, Nationalism or State. However a basic understanding about the same is 
desirable because we will be relating to these concepts for our theological concerns.  
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To begin with, a nation should be distinguished from an ethnic community. Anthony Smith 
a prominent figure in the field of study of nationalism, defines a nation as “a named human 
community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common 
public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members.”1 Whereas an 
ethnie or an ethnic community could be defined as “a named human community connected to a 
homeland,  possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of 
shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites.”2 The dividing line between 
nation and ethnic community may appear to be blurry at times but it is important for us to note 
that a nation is not an ethnic community. The above definitions clearly points that in order for a 
nation to constitute itself, physical occupation of a territory, a common public culture, along with 
shared history, common myths, common rights and duties are important. Whereas for an ethnie 
or ethnic community, although they may be linked to a physical territory, occupation of its own 
homeland is not important. An ethnic community is also more exclusive in nature and the 
emphasis largely placed on belief in descent from a supposed common ancestor or ancestors. But 
for a nation, the focus is placed on territorial descent. Moreover in a nation one can find different 
ethnic groups. 3 
It is also important to note that a nation is not a state. Anthony Smith makes it clear that a 
state “has to do with sovereignty, with power and authority over a given area and population....”4 
As Steven Grosby puts it, “The state may be loosely defined as a structure that, through 
institutions, exercises sovereignty over a territory using laws that relate the individuals within 
                                                 
1 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 13. 
2 Smith, Nationalism, 13. 
3 Steven Grosby, Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 14. 
4 Smith, Nationalism, 12. 
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that territory to one another as members of the state.”5 In short, state refers to the institutional 
activity responsible for regulating and furthering the life of a nation and is ideally in line with the 
goals and aspiration of a nation.  
The next important concept which needs our attention is Nationalism. Nationalism as 
understood by many scholars is a powerful political and cultural force which binds people 
together and determines the destiny of a nation.6 In broader terms, nationalism can be understood 
as a set of beliefs about a nation7 or an ideology concerned with promoting the wellbeing of a 
nation8. Anthony Smith defines it as “An ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 
autonomy, unity, and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an 
actual or potential ‘nation’.”9 According this definition, three generic goals which concern a 
nationalistic ideology are: national autonomy, national unity, and national identity.10 Towards 
this end, nationalism is a goal oriented movement which prescribes certain kinds of action that 
eventually shape the general character, values, and direction of a nation.   
Two important approaches towards the study of nation and nationalism which are of our 
interest is primordial and modernist approach.11 In addressing the question ‘when is a nation’ the 
                                                 
5 Grosby, Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction, 22  
6 Jonathan Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
9–19.   
7 Grosby, Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction, 5. 
8 Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New Delhi: Sage, 2002), 2.  
9 Smith, Nationalism, 9. 
10 Smith, Nationalism, 9. 
11 Another important approach towards the study of nationalism is Ethno symbolic approach advocated by 
Anthony D. Smith. Ethno symbolism underlines the continuity between premodern and modern forms of social 
cohesion, without overlooking the changes brought about by modernity. According to Anthony Smith “modern 
nationalism did not appear ex nihilo, but has clearly premodern antecedents. For him, the rise of nations is 
predicated on the prior existence of ethnic groups, and nations are formed around ‘ethnic cores’, developed from 
premodern ‘ethnie’ whose members possess a collective proper name, share a myth of common ancestry, possess 
one or more differentiating elements of a common culture, share historical memories, associate themselves with a 
specific ‘homeland’, and have a sense of solidarity for significant sections of the population. It makes no difference 
whether these beliefs are themselves rational or irrational; they exist and are effective.” Spencer and Wollman, 
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primordial approach tends to understand nations as ancient constructs. According to 
primordialism, nations are a natural part of human organization and “they share with God the 
attributes of existing before all things and of originating everything.”12 To primordialists many 
modern nations have evolved continuously out of pre-modern ethnic formations. And to them, 
race, language, culture, region, and religion form integral parts in the existence of a nation.13  
In opposition to this, the modernist approach asserts that nations and nationalisms are 
products of ‘modernization’ that came after industrialization and the French revolution. They 
reject the view that nations are primordial and argue that pre-modern societies lack a common 
culture, political, and democratic citizenship which is essential for a nation to exist. To 
modernists, nations and nationalisms are not ‘given’s but are modern social and political 
constructions.14   
The two types of nationalism which emerge respectively from primordialist and modernist 
approaches are ethnic nationalism and civic/territorial nationalism. Ethic nationalism which 
offshoots from primordialist approach tend to thread people together with emotions of common 
ancestry or race , religion, sacred geography, language and culture and so on. It also often seeks 
to rediscover a significant ethnic past as the golden age and re-appropriate or manipulate it for 
modern political ends. In contrast, civic or territorial nationalism, having roots in modern social 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Nationalism, 28. See also Anthony D. Smith, Ethno Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (New York: 
Routledge, 2009).    
12 Smith, Nationalism, 51. 
13 Two important figures associated with primordial approach are Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann 
Gottfried Herder. Primordialist approach received serious setback after the Second World War with the arrival of 
modernist scholars who argued that nations are modern constructs. See Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism, 20–43.    
14 Some of the important thinkers associated with modernist approach towards nations and nationalism are 
Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Arnold Joseph Toynbee, Talcott Parsons, Ernest Gellner, Anthony Giddens, Eric 
Hobsbawm (1989) and so on. Generally modernists would argue that nationalism, as an ideology and movement, is 
both recent and novel and similarly nations are the same. They both are the products of ‘modernization’ and it is 
futile to seek the roots of nations and nationalism, in pre-modern epochs, that is before the eighteenth century. For 
more discussion see Smith, Ethno Symbolism, 4–7. And Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism, 67–94. 
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contract theories, envisages a nation with citizens having equal political, legal, socio-economic 
rights, duties, and status. Here citizenship and rights are not ascribed through ethnic descent but 
by birth to the national territory and/or voluntary acceptance of political creed/ideology of that 
particular nation.  As we consider both kinds of nationalism, we could discern clear differences 
in their goals and differences that reach back into the underlying conceptual divergence.15   
The Hindutva Nationalism and Its Ideological Fundamentals  
Hindutva—literally translated as “Hinduness”—is an ideology that drives Hindu 
nationalism, which seeks to establish a Hindu state in India. The main goal of this majoritarian 
nationalism is to establish the political, cultural, and religious supremacy of Brahmanical 
Hinduism16 and to create a single, collective identity for Indians under Hindutva. Equating India 
with Hindu society, the political project of Hindutva is to create a Hindu nation. The purpose of 
the state then is to defend and establish Hindu Dharma to purify culture, transform society 
according to its tenets, and eliminate all those factions that do not fit in its grand design.17  
A critical analysis of Hindutva Nationalism reveals that it fulfills the criteria of ethic 
nationalism and the primordial conception of nationhood. In his explanatory model, Anthony 
Smith traces ethnic nationalisms to ‘start from a pre-existent homogeneous entity, a recognizable 
                                                 
15 For more discussion on civic and ethnic nationalism see Spencer and Wollman, Nationalism, 101–05.  
16 Brahmanism may be briefly defined as that system of religious beliefs and practices based on the ancient 
texts knows as the Vedas and their associated literature. Caste system is an integral part of Vedic or Brahmanical 
Hinduism, which hierarchically organizes the society into four main castes, or Varnas: Brahmans (priests), 
Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (farmers) and Shudras (labourers or servants). A fifth group is referred to as outcasts 
or untouchables. This division has its origins in the Vedas, the ancient Hindu scriptures. The caste system is also 
referred to as the oldest form of racial discrimination in the world. For more discussion see Diane P. Mines, Caste in 
India (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 2009).  
17 Dibyesh Anand, Hindu Nationalism in India and the Politics of Fear (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), 1–5. 
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cultural unity;’18 and their primary concern is to ‘ensure the survival of the group’s cultural 
identity.’19 This then necessitates a separate political organization, or state, to ensure their 
political survival.20 In contrast to ethnic nationalism, civic or territorial nationalisms ‘start from 
an imposed entity and possess no common and distinctive cultural identity to protect.’21  
 Anthony Smith’s analysis of the impact of European modernity on the colonial world, 
causing a perceived notion of backwardness among the colonized people, and the subsequent 
attempt of the local elite intelligentsia to reform their traditions to meet the challenges from the 
west, helps to understand the emergence of Hindutva in context. Smith points out that the “main 
concern was to endow that renewed tradition with the sanction of a theoretical ‘Golden Age’, an 
ideological interpretation of the past, perfectly fashioned to meet the challenge of the West.”22 In 
this regard, it is worthwhile to note several Hindutva scholars including Chetan Bhatt and 
Christophe Jaffrelot argue that Hindutva is a recent phenomenon that developed as a reaction to a 
perceived threat from the “other,” to the Brahmanical or Aryan power configuration during the 
colonial period.  
It is important at this point to briefly distinguish Hindutva from Hindu reform movements 
in the nineteenth century, which also to a great extent emerged as a reaction to the challenges 
arose from European colonialism and Christian expansionism. These movements were largely 
led by high caste Brahmins and figures like Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833). Organizations 
like Brahmo Samaj, founded in 1828, are typical examples. Although Hindu reform movements 
                                                 
18 Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London: Harper & Row, 1971), 216.  
19 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 217. 
20 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 217. 
21 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 217.  
22 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), 13. 
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saw Christian proselytizing work and European colonialism as a threat, they never aimed to 
militarize Hinduism. These were largely ideological reaction to reform the Hindu tradition in line 
with European modernity by eliminating superstitious and unethical practices in Hinduism.23  
 Bhatt and Jaffrelot, in their writings, trace several factors that led to the rise of Hindutva 
ideology during the 1920’s. The following are some of the major reasons:  
(1) Nineteenth-century fascination with Aryan supremacy together with European theories about 
Aryanism supported an identification of Aryans, which included the people of Vedic religion. 
This triggered a sense of pride and a need to regain and protect the glory and interests that were 
at stake because of the threat from Islam, Christianity, and British colonizers,  
(2) The caste system and many other oppressive practices coming from Brahmanical Hinduism 
came under attack because of the influence of western education and Christian missionary 
activities,  
(3) Mass conversions to Christianity and Islam combined with a decline in the Hindu population, 
as noted in the British colonial census of 1901, 1911, and 1921, posed a challenge to 
Brahmanical orthodoxy,  
(4) During the colonial period, missionary work considerably improved the socioeconomic status 
of the low castes and untouchables. Consequently, the upper-caste feared reprisal for their long-
standing oppression of the lower castes and untouchables.  
(5) The alleged privileges accorded to the Muslim community in political participation and their 
pan-Islamic tendencies created a perceived need for Hindus to defend their culture and interests 
against an imagined Islamic domination.24  
In the modern times, Hindutva found a revival beginning in the 1990’s. Scholarly 
                                                 
23 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement, 7–9. 
24 Chetan Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths (Oxford: Berg, 2001), 21–48. 
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consensus points towards three major events that have occurred since the 1990s marking this 
phenomenon. They are: (1) the demolition of the Babri Masjid, a Muslim Mosque dating back to 
the sixteenth century, to enable the building of a Hindu temple in 1992, (2) widespread anti-
Christian and anti-Muslim communal violence in Gujarat and Orissa, and (3) the subsequent rise 
of Hindu Right to political power in 1996, 1998–2004 and since 2014. For the past three 
decades, with the active growth and presence of various Hindutva organizations, Hindutva is 
trying to remold the very fabric of India. This resurgence means not only a militant approach to 
reordering India’s sociopolitical composition according to a Hindutva mold but also systematic 
efforts to rewrite school textbooks along Hindutva lines, efforts to forbid religious conversion to 
Christianity, as well as efforts at forceful reconversion to Hinduism, attacks and killings of 
Christians and Muslims, the aggressive assertion of ownership over sites designated as sacred, 
and the like.25 
The Ideological Contours of Hindutva  
Two important ideologues whose work is crucial to understand the basic fundamentals of 
Hindutva ideology are Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966), who first coined the word 
Hindutva and Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar (1906–1973), who further elaborated this ideology. 
These two figures are important to our discussion because they both are credited with 
conceptualizing and systematizing Hindutva thought, which remains unchanged even to the 
present time.  
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who described himself as a Hindu atheist, was a 
Maharashtrian Brahmin. He spent twenty-seven years in prison for his revolutionary activities 
against the British. From the prison he wrote Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? often called the real 
                                                 
25 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies, 168–70 and 179–206. 
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charter of Hindu nationalism.26 His narrative starts with the claim of a glorious and prosperous 
Hindu land existing even before the Egyptian and Babylonian civilizations. The beginning of this 
nation came about in time immemorial with the migration of Aryans or Indo-Europeans towards 
northwestern India. These people made their home in the land of seven rivers, the Sapta Sindhus, 
in Punjab. According to Savarkar, the name Hindu came from the Aryan name for the Sindhu 
(Indus River).27 The land entered by the Aryans was vast and wild but thinly populated. 
However, it was soon converted by the civilizing Aryan spirit whereby “forests were felled, 
agriculture flourished, cities rose, kingdoms thrived—the touch of the human hand changed the 
whole face of the wild and unkempt nature.”28 The spread of Aryans to different parts of the land 
resulted in the development of regional identities and empires. In addition, this “colonization” of 
India concluded with the entry into Ceylon of the Hindu mythical figure called Rama, who 
Savarkar calls “Prince of Ayodhya;” Rama actually brought the whole land from the Himalayas 
to the Seas under one sovereign sway. In addition, Savarkar notes, “It was truly our national day: 
for Aryans and Anaryans knitting themselves into a people were born as a nation.”29 In 
Savarkar’s view, it was this entire geographical territory that was later colonized by the British.  
In Savarkar’s view the relationship between the Aryans and locals was generally 
benevolent, and it was “the commingling of the blood” of the Aryans and the people they 
                                                 
26 Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism, 85. 
27 Vinayak Damodhar Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (1923; repr., New Delhi: Bharatiya Sahitya 
Sadan, 1989), 6.  
28 Savarkar, Hindutva, 6.  
29 Savarkar, Hindutva, 7. The Hindu Epic, Ramayana (5–4th BCE) talks about Lord Rama, the seventh avatar 
or incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu. He entered Ceylon (present Srilanka) to kill a ten headed wicked demon 
king, Ravanna, who managed to kidnap his wife, Sita. Soon after this successful war, he ruled from Ayodhya 
(present Delhi) to usher in a golden age for his people. Savarkar refers to these incidents in his work, to create a 
starting point for the birth of India. For more information on Rama, see Cybelle Shattuck, Hinduism (London: 
Calmann & King, 1999), 35–40.       
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encountered that gave rise to Vedic-Hindu civilization.30 At this point, Chetan Bhatt’s assessment 
of the constituting factor of Vedic-Hindu civilizations is worth looking at. He observes that 
“Savarkar did not discuss any belief systems that may have existed prior to the Aryan migration 
into India, nor how they may have influenced or changed Aryan-Vedic culture”31 and that “it was 
the infusion of Aryan blood, ideas, and culture that provided the basis of Hindu nationhood.”32 
So he argues, “Even if the Hindu owed its origins to Aryan and Anaryan consanguinity, the 
definitive influence on Hindu culture, and therefore the Hindu nation, was Aryan.”33 Chetan 
Bhatt’s assessment resonates with other modern Hindutva scholars including the eminent Indian 
historian Gyanendra Pandey, who observes that Hindu nationalism is nothing but upper-caste 
racism and a Brahmanical assertion of power.34 
The next phase of Savarkar’s Hindutva history starts with the cataloguing of the causes 
responsible for the degeneration of this once-great civilization. The first in his list is Buddhism, 
which caused Indians to swap their swords for rosary. According to him, Buddhism with its 
ideals of love, toleration, and nonviolence made Hindu people weak, vulnerable, defenseless, and 
unsuspecting towards the ferociousness and brutal egoism of other nations. This opened the door 
for Muslims and later Europeans to invade India.35 Therefore, Savarkar concludes, “The only 
safe-guards in future were valour and strength that could only be born of a national self-
consciousness.”36  
                                                 
30 Shattuck, Hinduism, 13.  
31 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies, 87. 
32 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies, 87.  
33 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies, 87. 
34 G. Pandey, “Which of us are Hindus?” in Hindus and Others–The Question of Identity in India Today, ed. 
G. Pandey (New Delhi: Viking, 1993), 252. 
35 Savarkar, Hindutva, 11–12. 
36 Savarkar, Hindutva, 12.  
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Savarkar’s presentation of the Muslim period, which extended from the eleventh century 
until the early decades of the nineteenth century, is one of a single, monumental war between 
“indigenous Hindus,” “Muslim invaders,” and “tyrants.” However, he argues that the presence of 
this common foe provided a powerful stimulus to protect and maintain Hindutva.37 Chetan Bhatt 
notes that Savarkar’s imaginary reconstruction of Hindutva history was twofold: “to present a 
monologic history of the overwhelming innocence and oppression of a monolithic nation of 
Hindus, and of vitality and power of Hindutva as the grand motor force of history.”38 He also 
rightly observes that “later Hindutva writers were to considerably extend Savarkar’s imaginary 
of Muslim invasion, tyranny and persecution to present a predominant vision of Hindu 
victimhood and suffering during the medieval period.”39  
Savarkar’s major contribution towards Hindutva ideology is his conceptualization of Hindu 
nationhood based on his definition of ‘Who is a Hindu?” His basic purpose was to create a 
unified Hindu self in the midst of internal diversity and the perceived external threats from Islam, 
Christianity, and westernization. In Savarkar’s casting, India belongs to Hindus alone, and 
Hindutva national identity rests on three pillars: geographical unity, racial features, and a 
common culture. In defining who is a Hindu, his first premise is that a Hindu is one who regards 
the entire subcontinent as his (or her) motherland/fatherland. Hindus are accorded citizenship by 
paternal descent within this physically bounded territory of India. Along with this common 
fatherland concept, Savarkar adds the concept of racial common bond as the second criterion in 
defining Hindu identity. Hindus are not merely citizens of the Indian state but they are part of a 
                                                 
37 Savarkar, Hindutva, 19. 
38 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies, 93. 
39 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies, 93. 
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race determined by a common origin, possessing a common blood.40 Savarkar notes, “All Hindus 
claim to have in their veins the blood of the mighty race incorporated with and descended from 
the Vedic fathers.”41 Finally, the ultimate criterion that determines the Hindu identity is the 
sharing and bonding with a common culture and civilization that is Vedic in origin. So according 
to him, the Hindu is the one who “has inherited and claims as his own the Hindu Sanskriti, the 
Hindu civilization, as represented in a common history, common heroes, a common literature, 
common art, a common law and a common jurisprudence, common fairs and festivals, rites and 
rituals, ceremonies, and sacraments.”42  
An important question that needs to be asked here is, what is the relationship between 
Hindu religion and Hindu culture? Can a person be called a Hindu by following Hindu culture 
and not Hindu religion? Although Savarkar and his modern-day advocates might argue that 
Hindutva is not identical with Hinduism, it is clear from his articulation that he cannot conceive 
of a Hindu culture without Hindu religion. There exists an intrinsic connection between the two, 
and they cannot be separated. This becomes obvious when Savarkar further defines a Hindu as 
one who follows the religion native to the land and who ceases to own Hindu culture when he 
embraces a religion of foreign origin. Therefore, Christians and Muslims, despite sharing a 
common territory (fatherland) and common blood (race), cannot be considered Hindus because 
“since their adoption of a new cult they had ceased to own Hindu civilization (Sanskriti) as a 
whole. They belong, or feel that they belong, to a cultural unit altogether different from the 
                                                 
40 Savarkar, Hindutva, 30–37. 
41 Savarkar, Hindutva 30. Bhatt notes that the concept of race employed by Savarkar was not strictly speaking 
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42 Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?, 37. 
 22 
Hindu one.”43 Savarkar further notes in this regard, 
That is why in the case of some of our Mohammedan or Christian countrymen who 
had originally been forcibly converted to a non-Hindu religion and who consequently 
have inherited along with Hindus, a common fatherland and a greater part of the 
wealth of a common culture—language, law, customs, folklore and history—they are 
not and cannot be recognized as Hindus, for though Hindusthan to them is fatherland 
as to any other Hindu, yet it is not to them a Holy land too. Their Holy land is far off 
in Arabia or Palestine. Their mythology and Godmen, ideas and heroes are not the 
children of this soil. Consequently their names and their outlook smack of a foreign 
origin. Their love is divided.44  
To Savarkar conversion to Christianity or Islam is highly problematic because it entails 
abandoning one’s culture, which then would weaken national unity and pose a serious threat to 
national security.  
Unlike Savarkar, Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar (1906–1973), was a religious man. He was 
born into a Brahmin family and was attracted to Hindu spirituality and monastic life early in his 
youth. He was a zoology professor at the Benares Hindu University in Varanasi. He was invited 
by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889–1940) to join the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 
the most powerful and important Hindutva nationalist organization in the country, founded by 
him in 1925. Subsequently Golwalkar succeeded Hedgewar as the head of the RSS in 1940 and 
remained at its helm until his death.45 In his important work, “We or Our Nationhood Defined,”46 
he builds upon the contributions of Golwalkar and gives an even more rigid definition of “Hindu 
Rashtra” or Hindu nation.  
Golwalkar’s narration of Indian history corresponds broadly to that which Savarkar 
advanced. He therein mentions or builds upon the major themes of a glorious past with national 
                                                 
43 Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Secularism’s Last Sigh?: Hindutva and the (Mis)Rule of Law (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 37–38. 
44 Savarkar, Hindutva, 42.  
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unity, fragmentation starting with Buddhism, subsequent Muslim invasion, European 
colonization, and resilient Hindu resistance.  However, unlike Savarkar he does not subscribe to 
the theory of Aryan invasion but claims that “we Hindus came into this land from nowhere, but 
are indigenous children of the soil always, from time immemorial and are natural masters of the 
country.”47  
Golwalkar laments that the present-day servitude of the Hindus stems from their lack of 
national consciousness. Thus what is needed is s the restoration of a sense of nationality among 
Hindus.48 In his conceptualization of Hindu nationhood, after analyzing several academic 
definitions of nationality, he puts forth what he called the five “unities” to define a nation. 
According to Golwalkar, “The idea contained in the word Nation is a compound of five distinct 
factors fused into one dissoluble whole the famous five unities: the Geographical (county), 
Racial (race), Religious (religion), Cultural (culture) and Linguistic (language).”49 Golwalkar 
argues that these five together make a homogeneous unity that constitutes a nation. If one of the 
five is missing or destroyed, the nation itself will come to an end.50  
Golwalkar illustrates in detail the idea contained in each of the categories. As far as 
geographical unity is concerned, Golwalkar notes that for “a people to be and to live as a Nation, 
a hereditary territory, a definite home country, relating to which it has certain indissoluble bonds 
of community, is essential.”51 Golwalkar argues that “race is by far the important ingredient of a 
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Nation.”52 Like Savarkar, his definition of race falls more on cultural rather than biological or 
scientific categories. So a race is defined as a “hereditary Society having common customs, 
common language, common memories of glory or disaster; in short, it is a population with a 
common origin under one culture.”53  
 Golwalkar discusses culture and religion together because, according to him, culture and 
religion are often indistinguishable. Thus, he notes, “Where religion forms the very life-breath of 
a people, where it governs every action of the individual as well as of the Society as a whole, it is 
difficult to distinguish these two factors clearly.”54 He understands culture as the “cumulative 
effect of age-long customs, traditions, historical and other conditions and most particularly of 
religious beliefs and their attendant philosophy.”55 He accords a greater place to religion and 
finds culture and even race as the product of religion. Golwalkar notes that “naturally, therefore, 
we are what our great Religion has made us. Our Race-spirit is a child of our Religion and so 
with us Culture is but a product of our all-comprehensive Religion, a part of its body and not 
distinguishable from it.”56 Finally, Golwalkar explains language as an essential factor in the 
making of nationhood. He points out that “every Race, living in its own country evolves a 
language of its own, reflecting its culture, its religion, its history and traditions . . . . It is an 
expression of the Race spirit, a manifestation of the National web of life.”57 In addition, taking 
away language from a nation is fatal because “its whole-literature goes with it—and the Nation 
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as such ceases to be.”58 
Golwalkar argued that Hindus qualify the five “unities” and thus constitute a nation by 
themselves:  
Here is our vast country, Hindusthan, the land of the Hindus, their home country, 
hereditary territory, a definite geographical unity, . . . deserving in every respect to be 
called a Country. . . . Living in this Country since pre-historic times, is the ancient 
Race—the Hindu Race, united together by common traditions . . . a common culture, 
a common mother language, common customs, common aspirations. 59 
And concerning Hindu culture and religion Golwalkar notes, 
This great Hindu Race professes its illustrious Hindu Religion, the only Religion in 
the world worthy of being so denominated, which in its variety is still an organic 
whole, capable of feeding the noble aspirations of all men, of all stages, of all grades, 
aptitudes and capacities . . . Guided by this Religion in all walks of life, individual, 
social, political, the Race evolved a Culture, which despite the degenerating contact 
with the debased “civilizations" of the Mussulmen’s and the Europeans, for the last 
ten centuries, is still the noblest in the world.60 
Golwalkar recognizes the problem with the multilingual context of India in that each region 
having its own language. However, he address this issue by arguing that “there is but one 
language, Sanskrit, of which these many ‘languages’ are mere offshoots.”61 Golwalkar concludes 
his discussion of Hindu nationhood by claiming that  
thus applying the modern understanding of 'Nation' to our present conditions, the 
conclusion is unquestionably forced upon us that in this country, Hindusthan, the 
Hindu Race with its Hindu Religion, Hindu Culture and Hindu Language, (the natural 
family of Sanskrit and her off-springs) complete the Nation concept.62 
Golwalkar makes it clear that all those who fall outside the fivefold limits of Hindu 
nationhood can have no place in the national life unless they adopt the religion, culture, and 
language of the Nation: 
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The foreign races in Hindusthan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, 
must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no ideas 
but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture . . . or may stay in the country, 
wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, 
far less any preferential treatment-not even citizen's right. 63 
Thus, like Savarkar, Golwalkar finds Christians and Muslims as foreign elements in the country. 
Golwalkar also shares Savarkar’s view that religious conversions are undesirable. He notes, 
“Conversion of Hindus into other religions is nothing but making them succumb to divided 
loyalty in place of having undivided and absolute loyalty to the nation. It is dangerous to the 
security of the nation and the country.”64 Moreover, there is no need for a person to convert 
because the best aspects of other religions are already present in Hinduism.  
State in Hindutva Imagination  
The concept of state receives significant attention in ‘Integral Humanism’ (1965) the 
official political philosophy of the Bharathiya Janatha Party (BJP)65, a political party founded in 
1980 to further the cause of Hindutva nationalism in India. ‘Integral Humanism,’ which emerged 
as a political philosophy and program for Hindutva ideology, was conceptualized and articulated 
by Deendayal Upadhyaya (1916–1968), the first General Secretary of Jana Sangh, the 
                                                 
63 Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood, 106. 
64 M. S. Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts (Bangalore: Sahitya Sindhu Prakashana, 1966), 142. 
65 The main carrier of Hindutva ideology is the Hindu cultural organization called the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded in 1925. For decades, the RSS has worked at the grassroots level, recruiting 
children who are taught to fight religions founded outside India and forming new political movements (that include 
student, labor, and peasant groups). The chief organization is a political party called the Bharathiya Janatha Party 
(BJP) founded in December 1980. Few among important organizations which comes under the RSS are Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) Bajrang Dal (Para militant wing), Dharm Jagaran Samiti (Organization for 
conversion of non-Hindus to Hinduism), Ekal Vidyalaya (organization for  free education and village development) 
Vidya Bharati (group of Educational Institutions), ijnana Bharati (Science Forum),  Bharatiya Kisan Sangh( Indian 
Farmers' Association) Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (Indian Labour Association),  Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad 
(All India Students' Forum), Bharatiya Shaikshik Mahasangh (All India Indian Teachers organization), Vit Salahkar 
Parishad (Financial consultants' association), Bharatiya Vikas Parishad (Organization for development & growth of 
India) Vivekananda Medical Mission (Sociomedical Services), Rashtra Sevika Samiti, literally (National Volunteer 
Association for Women), Hindu Vivek Kendra (Center for the promotion of Hindutva Ideology. see C. Jaffrelot, ed., 
The Sangh Parivar: A Reader (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 27 
predecessor organization of the BJP.66 In this section I shall discuss briefly the understanding and 
purpose of the state as envisaged by integral humanism.   
Two key concepts which are crucial in understanding state in Hindutva imagination are 
‘Chitti” or soul of a nation and “Dharma” or fundamental law of nature. Integral Humanism, 
committed to a primordial conception of nation, explicates ‘Chitti’ or soul of a nation as the 
ideals or the very character which constitute a nation. 67 From Hindutva articulations ‘Chitti’ or 
soul of the nation can be largely understood within the framework of the ‘five unities’ which 
constitute the Hindu nation namely - the Geographical (Sacred Hindu Land), Racial (Hindu 
Race), Cultural (Hindu Culture) and Linguistic (Sanskrit Language) all shaped by Hindu 
Religion.  Upadhaya notes that “on the strength of this ‘Chitti’, a nation arises, strong and 
virile”.68  And “‘Chitti’ is the touch-stone, on which each action, each attitude is tested, and 
determined to be acceptable or otherwise.”69 
In Hinduism, the root meaning of the word Dharma means to “uphold, maintain, sustain, 
and keep in balance.”70 Thus Dharma is understood as those principles, duties or the right way, 
which help to maintain order and balance in the universe generally71. But in his Hindutva 
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Each have their own different dharmas. The three higher classes, they are called the “twice-born,” have three kinds 
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political project, Upadhaya makes a selective and reductionist use of this concept.72 Thus 
according to him, Dharma can be understood as those laws that help manifest and maintain Chitti 
of a nation.73 Since dharma is eternal and supreme, the ideal nation Hindutva envisages is a 
‘Dharma Rajya’.74 Upadhaya contends that at the human level, one helps maintain a harmonious 
and integrated Hindu society by  practicing one’s Varna Dharma (caste duties) and that of his 
Ashram Dharma (duties in relation to a person’s station of life).75 And “similarly, the power of 
dharma was reflected in society through a deep love and affinity for the motherland, its common 
history, culture, traditions, values and ideals”.76  Moreover since Hindu society is considered as a 
visible manifestation of Almighty, one can achieve moksha through sacrificial service to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
of dharma in common: study the sacred texts (adhyayana), patronize sacrifices for their own benefit (yajana), and 
generosity toward others. The Brahman or priest have specific dharma includes teaching the Vedic texts, performing 
sacrifices and receiving special gifts to which only Brahmans are entitled.. The Ks.atriya or warrior caste Dharma is 
to maintain law and order inside the territory and defends the country against outsiders. The Vais´ya or business 
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his social class) the boy born in one of the three higher classes undergoes a rite of passage called upanayana. The 
boy is given a sacred thread at this time and becomes a brahmacharin. The main dharma of the brahmacharin is to 
study the sacred texts under the guidance of a teacher (guru), to serve his guru, and to observe strict celibacy 
(brahmacarya). At the end of this stage one is given a choice to take permanently brahmacharin or not.  The second 
stage of life starts with marriage and that of a “householder” or gra’hastha. Here a person establishes and sustains a 
family, including the primary duty of fathering a son who will perform the necessary funeral rites after his father’s 
death.  The third stage of is to retire from active life, and become a vanaprastha or “forest dweller,” The final stage 
of life is to become a sannyasin or “renouncer.”  In Hindu Dharma there is only one rite of passage for women that 
is their wedding. See Rocher, “The Dharmashastras,” 102–4.  
72 Chettan Bhatt notes that representation of Dharma in Hindutva poses a grim challenge to dharma rather 
than its fulfillment. He notes that “Indeed, a vivid characteristic of Hindu nationalism is its reduction of the dense 
and sophisticated metaphysical content of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy to bare Hindu nationalist political slogans 
and mottos that are incapable either of conveying the vast range of speculative metaphysics within the different 
schools of Indian philosophical thought or of challenging Western or Eurocentric philosophical hegemony, aspects 
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nation.77   
Against the backdrop of “Chitti” or soul of the nation and Dharma (innate law of nature 
and nationhood), Upadhaya places the function and purpose of the State. While affirming the 
nation to be self-born, he asserts that the existence of state should be understood in terms of 
social contract theory. According to him state is “brought into existence to protect the nation; 
produce and maintain conditions in which the ideals of the nation can be translated into 
reality.”78   State exists fundamentally to uphold Dharma and thereby maintain and protect the 
“Chitti” or soul of the nation. Unity, Independence, and security are basic Dharma of any nation. 
State is expected to uphold it.79 However, Upadhaya also clearly demarcates the limitation of 
state. He makes it clear that although State is an important institution, it not supreme nor it is 
above all others. State is subject to Dharma and is not absolutely powerful. State is also not the 
sole representative of the nation.80 Upadhaya notes that since nation was sustained by the practice 
of Dharma, “Our national life continued uninterruptedly even after the state went in the hands of 
foreigners.”81 The Hindutva ideologues, in general, are also conscious that power of the state and 
political power is limited in molding the minds of men on the lines of virtue.82 In this line 
Golwalkar has already noted “after all, political power is an external appliance, which cannot by 
itself mould the ‘inner man’ after an ideal.”83  In Upadhyaya’s view the state benefits society 
only so long as it remains as the upholder of dharma and ‘the state could not assume authority or 
powers over the people in contravention of ‘dharma’. In such cases, the people, in so far as they 
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acted in accordance with ‘dharma’, had an obligation to oppose the state.’84 
Indian Secularism and Hindutva Nationalism  
It is important to note that Hindutva nationalism emerged parallel to and oftentimes counter 
to Indian nationalism, which was largely shaped by the Gandhian and Nehruian model of 
nationalism, which aims to accommodate all religions practiced (not necessarily originated) in 
India.85  
One of the important scholars who studied the Gandhian and Nehruian model of 
nationalism and secularism is Triloki Nath Madan, an eminent Indian sociologist. He articulates 
that in a Gandhian conception of nationalism and secularism religion holds a positive role. A 
complete separation of state and religion is neither desired nor necessary.86 Gandhi wrote, 
I cannot conceive politics as divorced from religion. Indeed religion should pervade 
every one of our actions. Here, religion does not mean sectarianism. It means a belief 
in ordered moral government of the universe. It is not less, because it is unseen. This 
religion transcends Hinduism, Islam and Christianity, etc. it does not supersede them. 
It harmonises them and gives them reality.87  
 However, Gandhi’s positive affirmation of religion does not allow him to support a 
concept of a state religion or state support for any religion. As Madan points out, according to 
Gandhi, “A society or group, which depends partly or wholly on state aid for the existence of its 
religion, does not deserve or, better still, does not have any religion worth the name.”88 Gandhi’s 
attitude towards secularism was shaped by the ancient Indian concept called “Sarva Dharma 
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Sambhava,” which denotes equal respect of all religions.89 Christophe Jaffrelot agrees with 
Madan when he rightly points out that “Mahatma Gandhi looked at the Indian nation as, ideally, 
a harmonious collection of religious communities all placed on an equal footing.”90 In addition, 
to Gandhi a nation was to be defined not primarily in terms of cultural features but according to 
territorial boundaries. It encompassed all those who happened to live within in the borders of 
India irrespective of their cultural or religious persuasion.91  
Unlike Gandhi, Nehru was an agnostic and his version of secularism was deeply influenced 
more by “the ideals of the European Enlightenment than the hard facts of society, culture and 
politics of India.”92 He saw religiosity and the attendant conflicts as the badge of social 
backwardness.93 Nehru thought that the hold of religion over the lives of the people would 
disappear with economic affluence, the spread of education, and science and technology.94 
Therefore, Nehru, who was substantively influenced by Marx and Locke, observed that “the real 
thing to my mind is the economic factor. If we lay stress on this and divert public attention to it 
we shall find automatically that religious differences recede into the background and a common 
bond unites different groups.”95 Therefore, he dreamt of an economic nation-space and claimed 
that dams and steel plants were the temples of modern India.96 Although economic precedence 
and scientific temper marked Nehru’s approach to nation building, he did not dismiss religion as 
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the “opium of the people” as Marx had done. Although Nehru’s western enlightenment notion of 
secularism leaned more towards a wall of separation between state and religion, he found value 
in the concept of “Sarva Dharma Sambhava” or equal respect of all religion as a strategy. Nehru 
acknowledged the all-pervasive influence of religion in Indian society because, as Sarvepalli 
Radha Krishnan, philosopher and the first vice president of India, noted, it would be “strange that 
our government should be a secular one while our culture is rooted in spiritual values.”97 
Therefore, the dominant Indian concept of the nation shaped mainly by Gandhi, Nehru, and 
others was an ideology that could encompass, within its parameters, all cultures and religions 
that were practiced within this sub-continent.98 And a distinctively Indian version of secularism 
as expressed in the words of H. V. Kamath, a prominent congressman who has come to dominate 
the legal and political thought of India, is that “the State represents all the people who live in its 
territories, and, therefore it cannot afford to identify itself with any particular section of the 
population. We have certainly declared that India should be a secular State. But . . . a secular 
state is neither a Godless State nor an irreligious, nor an anti-religious, state.”99  
Conclusion  
Our discussion on Hindutva can be summed up thus: Hindutva ideology is of a recent 
origin, having its roots in the colonial period. Hindutva nationalism shaped by primordial 
conception of nationhood, embraces an ethnic nationalism with an agenda to protect 
Brahmanical cultural hegemony over against other ethno-cultural and religious minorities in 
modern India. The Hindutva ideology rejects the constitutional version of secularism that 
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embraces all the citizens of India irrespective of their religious affiliation. Instead Hindutva 
envisions a nation patterned after the majority Hindu religious community. Thus, they assume 
that India’s national identity should be summarized by Hinduism, the dominant creed of the 
country, and Indian culture was to be defined as Hindu culture. In Hindutva imagination, the 
purpose of the state/government is to fashion society according to its tenets where Christians are 
seen as antinational and anti-cultural elements who do not have a rightful place in the 
nationhood. Thus Christians whose faith and culture with its “smell of foreignness” cannot 
expect the rights of citizens unless they embrace Hindutva, i.e., glorify Hindu culture and 
religion. Since conversion to any other religion from Hinduism is seen as an unpatriotic act, 
evangelistic activities of Christians are to be under strict government observation, and Christian 
charitable and social development activities often meet the heavy militant hands of Hindutva 
zealots. Moreover, cultural and political organizations of the Hindutva—with its nexus of state 
and government machinery—aims to curtail social opportunities and religious freedom of 
Christians and other ethno-cultural minorities in India.  With this in view, in the next chapter I 
will look in detail at some of the Christian theological responses made to Hindutva challenges to 
the Christian Church and to the common good. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INDIAN CHRISTIAN RESPONSES TOWARDS POLITICAL HINDUISM    
Since its inception Hindutva nationalism has created several challenges to Christians and 
other ethno-cultural minorities in India. The recent rise of a Hindu nationalist government has 
provided a fresh impetus to the ongoing Hinduisation of Public Square in India.1 Several Indian 
Christian theologians to approach and respond to the challenges posed by Hindutva. Sebastian C. 
H. Kim 2 and his wife Kirsteen Kim 3 noted different approaches taken by Indian Christian 
theologians in responding to Hindu fundamentalism. In this chapter, adapting from their 
respective works, I will map out various Indian Christian Responses towards Hindutva. I shall 
also discuss briefly some of the strengths and weakness inherent in these responses. In order to 
provide a backdrop to various Indian theological responses, a brief summary on some of the 
specific challenges posed by Hindutva nationalism to Christians in India is desirable.  
Hindutva Challenges to Christians: An Overview  
The challenges posed to Christians by Hindutva can be broadly classified under three 
categories. They are the scandal of Religious Conversion, Scandal of Theological Exclusivism 
and a Challenge to Multicultural society.     
                                                 
1 The Bharathiya Janatha Party (BJP), the Hindu nationalist party claimed a historic landslide victory in Lok 
Sabha Elections in May 2014. BJP alone won 282 seats and with their alliance made 336 seats out of total 545.     
2 Sebastian C. H. Kim, In Search of Identity: Debates on Religious Conversion in India (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
3 Kirsteen Kim, “Indian Christian Theological Response to Political Hinduism,” in Nationalism and 
Hindutva: A Christian Response–Papers from the 10th CMS Conference, ed. Mark T. B. Laing (Delhi: 
CMS/UBS/ISPCK, 2005). 
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The Scandal of Conversion  
According to Golwalkar conversion brings about a process of de-Hinduisation which 
makes one abandon Hindu religion and culture. Such an alienation from the native culture with 
an adoption of foreign culture breeds divided loyalties. This is an assault to Hindu nationhood. 
The Hindutva ideologues are quick to dismiss Christians as anti-nationals who have little to 
contribute towards nation’s good.4 Hindutva literature also view religious conversion as a kind of 
religious colonialism or domination 5 and an attempt to convert manifest a ‘fundamental 
contempt for Hinduism.’6   
The modern advocates of Hindutva are also vehement in their attack on conversion. For 
example Sang Parivar finds conversion as “violence against humanity and therefore evil and 
unacceptable.”7 Similarly David Frawley, a Hindu convert from catholic faith insists that 
“conversion is an ‘ideological assault’, a form of ‘religious violence and intolerance’, and an 
‘attempt of one religion to exterminate all others.’” 8   
The Hindutva zealots pitch their attack on the premise that Christians carry out conversion 
through fraudulent means. Golwalkar candidly stated: 
We have nothing against the Christians except their methods of gaining converts. 
When they give medicine to the sick or bread to hungry, they should not exploit the 
situation by propagating their religion to those people. Their only aim is to make this 
Country a province of the Kingdom of Christ. Towards that end they feel that every 
tactics however foul is fair.9  
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Golwalkar further elaborates:  
Conversion of an individual does not take place after a serious and comparative study 
of philosophies by him. It is by exploitation of poverty, illiteracy and ignorance, 
offering of inducements and by deceptive tactics that people are converted. It is but 
right that this unjust activity is prohibited. It is a duty we have to discharge towards 
protecting our brethren in ignorance and poverty.10 
There can be identified at least three ploys employed by Hindutva proponents to contain 
religious conversion from Hinduism. They are legislative measures, re-conversion movements, 
and persecution. The legislative measures includes anti-conversion laws and selective 
discrimination based on religion. The anti-conversion laws in India found their impetus from a 
governmental enquiry on Christian mission activities in Madhya Pradesh in 1954. The committee 
formed to produce the enquiry findings, called the “Niyogi Report’ named after its chairman 
Bhawani Shankar Niyogi, a retired Chief Justice, mainly consisted of Hindus except one 
Christian, whose selection was highly criticized by Catholic Church, objecting that he is not a 
true representative of Christians in India.11 The committee was “commissioned to enquire into 
any ‘political and extra-religious objectives’ in the missionary work and to make necessary 
recommendations to the government for necessary action”.12 The commission accused Christian 
mission agencies for using various means like schools, hospitals and orphanages for the sole 
purpose of proselytization.     
Although the commission acknowledged the Christian claim that conversion is an act of 
God, still they objected on the premise that the majority of conversions are not genuine but were 
wrought through material inducements and false promises.13 The report accused missionary 
activities for producing communal disharmony, and disrupting the convert’s sense of unity and 
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solidarity with the society. The commission observed that Christians hold supranational loyalty 
to Christ and that the strategy of the missionaries is to “to detach the Indian Christian from his 
nation”14 and that a Christian’s loyalty to the nation is questionable. The report also noted that 
the intention behind evangelization in India is not spiritual but should be considered a part of 
“the uniform world policy to revive Christendom for re-establishing Western supremacy and to 
create Christian minority pockets with a view to disrupting the solidarity of non-Christian 
societies.”15 The Niyogi commission’s recommendations included withdrawal of foreign 
missionaries from the country, strict measures to monitor inflow of foreign funds for evangelism 
activities, prohibiting use of any professional services as means for conversion, and suitable 
control over conversion brought through fraudulent means, if necessary through legislative 
measures.16 
The Niyogi commission’s findings were significant for Hindutva proponents because it 
helped to crystalize and verbalize their accusations of Christians with an official study. Since 
then the Niyogi Report has been widely used by the Hindutva ideologues “as ballast for their 
anti-Christian arguments.”17 For example the Niyogi Report was an inspirational source material 
for Arun Shourie's book on Christian missionaries called Missionaries in India: Continuities, 
Changes, and Dilemmas. The Niyogi report also gave impetus to frame a bill known as the 
Indian Converts (Regulation and Registration) Bill, applicable to the whole of India, to use the 
state power to prevent conversion. The bill was presented to the Lok Sabha in December 1954, 
who opposed and rejected it. However, at present five states in India have anti-conversion laws 
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in effect and another two are in the process of adopting one.18    
The discriminatory measures put forward by the government to contain conversion to 
Christianity is largely affected by Dalit Christians in India. Sebastian Kim notes: 
[T]he President’s’ Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order issued on 10 August 1950 
stated that no person who professes a religion different from Hindu religion shall be 
deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste’, which meant that converts from these 
castes were outside the scope of state aid applicable to members. The special rights 
and privileges of the Scheduled Castes included political representation, educational 
opportunities and economic aid, and exclusion from them generated considerable 
tension and economic hardship.19  
Christians appealed for not discontinuing governmental privileges for schedule castes 
converts, based on the argument that the Christian convert’s economic and social conditions are 
no better than non-Christian scheduled castes. The Hindus argued that such governmental benefit 
is meant to elevate the problem of caste and “since the converts had opted out of the caste 
system, there was no reason to offer them benefits.”20 But it should be noted that Sikh, Buddhist 
Schedule Caste converts still enjoy constitutional privileges. 
The re-conversion movement or ghar wapsi (Home Coming) movement is another strategy 
employed by Hindutva to check religious conversion. The re-conversion or ghar Wapsi 
movement has its origin in Arya Samaj’s Shuddhi movement in 1890’s. Shuddhi or purification 
ritual was a ceremony used exclusively by upper caste Hindu’s to purify their defilement caused 
through contact with lower castes.21 But drawing inspiration from the practice of baptism by 
Christian missionaries, this ceremony was adapted to form a re-conversion ceremony or home 
coming ritual, “emphasizing that those who had adopted other faiths were to ‘come back’ to their 
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21 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies, 20. 
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‘original’, ‘natural’ faith, Hinduism, and hence their homeland.”22 Since the 1990’s Hindutva 
organizations engage in active re-conversion movements among Christian Dalit and tribal 
populations which has caused a considerable communal tension within these communities. 
Dharm Jagran Samiti (DJS), a Hindutva organization which is a close aide to Rashtriya Swayam 
Sevak (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) in heading recent re-conversion movements, 
has stated, “Our target is to make India a Hindu Rashtra by 2021.”23 To this end, they are 
committed to actively pursue ‘ghar wapsi’ or ‘home coming’ program so that “Christians and 
Muslims would either be converted to Hinduism or forced to run away from here.”24 
The Scandal of Theological Exclusivism  
The Hindutva literature takes issue with Christianity for its theological exclusivism. This is 
done through comparing Christianity with the notion of a pluralistic and all-inclusive Hinduism. 
Ashok Chowgule, a prominent Hindutva leader notes, “Christianity believes in exclusivism. It 
says that Christ is the only Son of God, and was sent to this world to lead the people to Him…. 
Christianity divides the world into believers and non-believers, with the former going to heaven, 
and the latter to that place where one is eternally barbecued!”25 Golwalkar had already stated 
“All the good and great among the holy Christians, otherwise admirable are, when it comes to 
the question of Church, all closed minds.”26 
In contrast to Christianity, Ashok Chowgule notes:  
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Hinduism believes in pluralism - that is there are multiple paths to salvation and one 
chooses the path that one thinks is valid for oneself. This is the hallmark of its 
tolerance. Its ethos is expressed in the shloka Ekam Sat, Viprah Bahudda Vadanti, 
which is best translated as follows: “There is an eternal Truth, but there are many 
ways to achieve it.” While a Hindu may vigorously argue about the merit of his/her 
way to achieve the Truth, he/she will accept that another person may have a different 
way which is better suited to that individual. Hindus consider that the belief that one 
is in sole possession of the Truth is an impediment to enlightenment. It is even 
regarded as being arrogant.27 
It should be noted that liberal Christianity in India has made a large paradigm shift in their 
Christological articulation to be more inclusive. Even evangelical Christianity has become more 
self-reflective and self-critical in their articulation of Gospel to accommodate Hindu sentiments. 
However as Sahayadhas puts it: 
Thus, it has to be kept in mind that the Church or the Christians in India can hardly 
hope for any goodwill from the Hindu nationalists, which is made clear from the fact 
that they are not ready to take the recent paradigm changes in Christian theology and 
more specifically in Christological constructions seriously because, in their view, the 
official theology of the Church remains essentially unchanged.28 
So to the Hindutva proponents Christianity, with its exclusive claims, falls short of a superior 
and more tolerant “pluralistic Hinduism.” Thus it is a threat to communal harmony and peaceful 
coexistence.29  
A Challenge to Multicultural Society 
India is often described as “the epitome’ of the world” due to its diverse socio-cultural and 
religious diversity. India is also known as the cradle of world religions. Although Hinduism 
constitutes the majority religion, India is home to a large number of religious minorities like 
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Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhist, Jain, Jewish, Parsee, animist communities and the like. 
Even people marked under Hinduism are so diverse that not everyone follows a single creed or 
culture. This diversity qualifies Hinduism to be called an ‘umbrella religion”. India also carries 
much diversity in terms of racial groups. India’s 1.2 billon population is basically composed of 
three basic racial groups namely Indo-Aryans, Dravidians and Mongolians with numerous 
subdivisions. The linguistic diversity of India is also notable. Although there are 22 official 
languages in India, according to the 2001 Census, there are, in total 122 languages in India out of 
which 22 languages are spoken by over one million people, while a remaining 100 languages are 
spoken by more than 10,000 people.30  
According to Gurpreet Mahajan “Unity in Diversity” is what India stands for. And “Unity 
in Diversity” articulates the sentiment that India can be a strong and unified country while 
simultaneously affirming its cultural diversity. “Cultural homogeneity is not, in other words, 
seen as a necessary condition for forging a political identity as a nation state.”31 She further notes 
that “when India gained independence in 1947, the political leadership and the framers of the 
constitution took note of this diversity, and they deliberated on a framework that would provide 
for a unified but culturally diverse nation state.”32  With the rise of militant Hindutva 
nationalism, the cultural and religious diversity of the nation is at stake, because Hindutva 
ideology is nothing but an attempt to create a corporate identity either by assimilating or 
excluding the minorities in order to form a monolithic, homogenous Hindu culture under a 
common Brahmanical construction of Indian nation. 
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Indian Christian Theological Responses to Political Hinduism  
The influence of Political Hinduism, its concerns and challenges, either directly or 
indirectly, on Indian theological articulation cannot be ignored. Sebastian C. H. Kim, in his work 
on religious conversion in India, and his wife Kirsteen Kim, in her article on theological 
responses to political Hinduism in India, have noted different approaches taken by Indian 
Christian theologians in responding to Hindu fundamentalism. In this section, adapting and 
further developing from their respective works, I have classified Indian Christian Responses 
towards Hindutva into five major categories, namely, inculturationalist approach, secular 
approach, interreligious dialogue approach, liberation approach and evangelical approach. In 
addition to this, I will also discuss briefly the work of R. Sahayadas, who approached Hindutva 
from Luther’s Ecclesiology. 
Inculturation Approach 
The concerns of inculturation theologies have always been to relate and express the 
Gospelin relation to religiocultural setting of Hinduism.33 Some of the pressing questions 
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addressed were: (1) Can a person remain culturally a Hindu and while embracing Christianity as 
a religion? and (2) Should a person leave the Hindu community to become a Christian? At the 
heart of these questions also lies the Hindutva opposition to religious conversions and 
accusations against Christians abandoning/losing Indian culture for a foreign one. The attempts 
made by Inculturation theologians were to find continuity with Hindu religion and culture yet to 
remain faithful to the Christian faith as Indian citizens.34  
Most of the Inculturation theologians rejected Henry Kraemer’s exclusivist position, The 
Christian Message in a Non-Christian World,35 which argued for the discontinuity of Christianity 
with other faiths but appropriated in different ways the fulfillment theory articulated by J. 
Farquhar, The Crown of Hinduism.36 Thus, they saw Hinduism as preparing men’s hearts for 
Christ, and what is foreshadowed in Hinduism is perfected in Christianity.37 Some of the 
important figures who tried to bring synthesis between Christianity and Hinduism include 
Brahmabandhav Upadhyaya (1861-1906), Sadhu Sundar Singh (1889-1929) and A.J Appasamy 
(1891 – 1975), Manilal C. Parekh (1885–1967),38 Vengal Chakkarai (1880–1958) Pandippedi 
Chenchiah (1886–1959), and Raymond Panikkar (1918–2010).39  
Brahmabandhav Upadhyaya was a Brahmin convert to Christianity, who became Roman 
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Catholic. He taught that it is possible to remain culturally a Hindu while embracing Christianity 
as a religion. He believed that Christianity came to India with its purity hidden under unfamiliar 
western terms and categories. He argued that the imported European garb of Christian truths 
made the Gospel unintelligible to the Hindus. He thought the Vedantic tradition would serve as a 
vehicle to present Christian truth. Upadhyaya’s contribution was to develop the expression of 
Christian doctrine making use of advaita or non-dualistic Hindu philosophy, as taught by 
Sanakara in the eight century.40  
Sadhu Sunder Singh was a convert from Sikh religion through a mystic experience with 
Christ. ‘The water of life in an Indian cup’ was the phrase often used to describe him. Sunder 
Singh was a lay theologian who viewed Christianity as the fulfillment of Hinduism. His 
inclination to Bhakti tradition had profound influence on A.J Appasamy who tried to relate the 
Gospel to the bhakti tradition of Hinduism. So as Upadhaya related to philosophical tradition of 
Hinduism, Appasamy made use of bhakti tradition, especially of Ramanuja.41  
Manilal Parekh, a convert from Jainism, found Christianity and Hinduism as integrated in 
Jesus Christ. Hence, he advocated for a “Hindu Church of Christ,” a fellowship of followers of 
Christ who remained within Hindu community and culture.42 Chenchiah and Chakkarai, both 
converts from Hinduism, saw Hindu scriptures as God’s chosen praeparatio evangelii for the 
people of India and subsequently tried to express Christian understanding using Hindu religious 
concepts.43 Whatever the positive elements of the Church might be, both were skeptical of 
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institutionalized Church, because they saw it as a human institution tainted with an alien western 
pattern and colonial legacy. Chenchiah in particular was attracted to the ancient Hindu idea of 
the ashram, where a small community of people lived with greatest simplicity as disciples of a 
guru. He also thought that the ashram system would effectively cater to the spiritual needs of the 
Christian community instead of an institutionalized Church.44 It has to be noted here that later 
ashram gained momentum both in the Protestant and Catholic mission approach. Chenchiah 
believed that “a Christian movement within Hinduism without its umbilical cord being cut is a 
decided advantage to the Hindu and the Christian.”45 In the backdrop of the Second Vatican 
Council and Karl Rahner’s theology of “anonymous Christianity,” Raymond Panikkar’s The 
Unknown Christ of Hinduism,46 tried to answer the relationship between Christianity and 
Hinduism. Panikkar argued that Christ is already there in Hinduism insofar as Hinduism is a true 
religion and that the Christian mission was to unveil the ‘unknown Christ’ in Hinduism.47  
The inculturationalist approach met with serious objections from both the Christian 
community and Hindutva proponents. Sebastian Kim points out that the proponents of the 
Inculturation theologies were largely drawn from high caste background who wanted to retain 
their Hindu tradition.48 Thus, their efforts to relate the Gospelto Brahmanical traditions of 
Hinduism and the desire to remain culturally as Hindus met with criticism from Dalit and tribal 
Christian theologies as “simply a Christian form of high caste hegemony.”49 Moreover, 
                                                 
44 Boyd, Indian Christian Theology, 159–60. 
45 Boyd, Indian Christian Theology, 164. 
46 Raymond Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany (Maryknoll: 
Orbis, 1981). 
47 Kim, In Search of Identity, 113.  
48 Sebastian C.H Kim, “Indian Christian Mission Ecclesiology: Models for Engagement with Hinduism–with 
Special Reference to Conversion,” in The Indian Church in Context: Her Emergence, Growth and Mission, ed. Mark 
T. B. Laing (Delhi: CMS/ISPCK, 2005), 177 
49 Kim, “Indian Christian Mission Ecclesiology,” 177. 
 46 
inculturationalist theologies did not appeal much to Christians from Dalit and other outcast 
groups who saw conversion as a means of revolt and liberation from oppressive Brahmanical 
structure.50 From the Hindutva side, many thinkers like Swami Devananda, Ram Swarup, and 
Sita Ram Goel vehemently rejected the inculturationalist separation of religion and culture, 
arguing that Hindu culture grew out of Hindu religion. In addition, they thought that such 
attempts were a “deliberate and calculated design” to implant the Christian meaning of Christ 
into Hindu culture to seek converts.51 Moreover, they rejected “fulfillment theory” and the 
Christian ashram movement as an assault on Hinduism. They also questioned how Hindu 
practices and theological concepts could be adopted by Christianity without hypocrisy.52  
The accusation of colonial legacy led Christians in India seriously think about developing 
an indigenous church, free from western legacy. This was a goal, in part, as several 
denominations came together to form the Church of South India in 1947 and later the Church of 
North India in 1970.53 One of statements of the governing principles of the CSI made it clear that 
the Church desires “conserving all that is of spiritual value in its India heritage, to express under 
Indian conditions and in Indian forms the spirit, the thought and the life of the Church 
Universal”54    
Secular Approach  
If efforts for religious and cultural synthesis marked the Inculturationalist theologian’s 
approach, theologians of the secular Gospel thought secularization and secular fellowships would 
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bridge the gap between Hindu and Christian Community. As the West was preoccupied with 
debates on “secular Christianity” with Paul van Buren’s The Secular Meaning of the Gospel,55 
John Robinson’s Honest to God,56 and Harvey Cox’s The Secular City,57 the principles and 
theology of secular theology were developed for the Indian context by M. M. Thomas (1916–
1996) and others.58 In fact, Cox remarked that in the context of Hindu sacralization of India, 
Christians in India should not only accept but struggle for a secular state.59  
M. M. Thomas, who shared the Nehruvian secular vision of India as a secular society, 
believed that secularism could override religious difference. In a context where the institutional 
Church was understood to be associated with colonial legacy and conversion to Christianity 
alleged to foster communalism, he rejected the Church as a legitimate “point of contact” and 
likewise rejected the need for people to convert to Christianity.60 However, he perceived the need 
for the conversion of both the Christian and Hindu faiths into the common ground that he saw as 
“human koinonia,” or, as he later called it, “the Christ-centered secular fellowship.”61  
Thomas rejected any dichotomy between salvation and humanization.62 He believed that 
though salvation and humanization are not identical both are integrally related.63 He thought that 
the purpose of Christian mission was to engage in the common struggle for fuller humanity along 
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with “men of many faiths and no faith.”64 He called on the Church to break the communal 
structures and build up a new partnership of Christians and non-Christians, the “human 
koinonia,” and argued that since Christ was in all, he was to be found there too.65 Thomas was 
highly critical of ‘minority consciousness’s of Christians and encouraged Christians to overcome 
their isolation from national mainstream.66 He thought that such an isolation is a result of 
adherence of Indian Christians to ‘pietistic individualism’ which emphasize an inner experience 
of conversion and dogmatic belief.67 Thomas advocated that ‘Christian participation in the life of 
the State is a moral duty, national obligation, and the demand of the enlightened self-interest”68 
However he was a very influential figure to encourage Christian community not to organize itself 
as a Christian political party to fight exclusively for its own communal interests.69 In line with M. 
M. Thomas’s theology of humanization, several other ecumenical theologians also developed 
theologies of economic development and social justice, especially through the Christian Institute 
for the Study of Religion and Society (CISRS), Bangalore to demonstrate Christian commitment 
towards nation building.70 
Abraham Vazhayil Thomas, another important proponent of secular approach, in book 
Christians in Secular India (1974),71 gives a brief summary of CISRS theologians thinking in 
relation to secularization.72 To CISRS thinkers “In Indian context, secularism is not an anti-
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religious dogma but a means of building a common political community where people belonging 
to different religions can cooperate and work together for common goals. This is called open 
secularism, because it not only guarantees religious freedom but also welcomes useful insights 
from religions.”73 Some of the Christian reasons for justifying secularization are: 
1) God has given a measure of autonomy to society and secular institutions. This should 
be recognized by religion. The sovereignty of God should not be thought of as the 
sovereignty of religion and its domination of society. 
2) The Church has the responsibility of reminding civil society of its true nature and 
destiny, and of the sovereignty of God over society. The Church will be able to do this 
only if it stands apart from society and when both are not completely integrated into 
each other. 
3) Religious institutions (including Christian churches) often succumb to the temptation 
“to discover the unity of all things, and manifest it in a religious synthesis of society.” 
Religious institutions (or any pseudo-religious system or dogma) in themselves cannot 
represent the true nature of God’s order in its complexity, order, freedom, truth and so 
on.74  
      
The ‘CISRS’ thinkers were also conscious about the dangers inherent in an extreme form 
of secularism. They noted, “In endorsing the process of secularization we should be aware of the 
danger that secularism itself may become as closed and idolatrous as any religious system. So the 
kind of secularism which is desired is where ‘the role of religions should be to inspire the secular 
culture from within, so that it may not become self-sufficient but remain open to religious 
insights.”75    
The theologians of secular approach should be commended for their effort to relate the 
Gospel with contemporary issues. Through their efforts they explored the possibility of working 
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closely with people of other religious, non-religious, and secular persuasions for justice and 
common good for all. In a context of Hindutva nationalism, they affirmed and encouraged 
Christians to work with others, for a national community comprising of all, irrespective of caste, 
creed, religion, language, where everyone is entitled to fundamental rights, religious freedom, 
justice, and equality. The secular approach, however, is not without its short coming. Firstly, the 
optimism of proponents of secular approach that secularization would eventually dissolve the 
religious difference and communal interest in India did not bear much fruit. As Sebastian Kim 
notes that M.M Thomas and others’: 
[O]ptimistic predictions of the disappearance of difference between religious 
communities, the demise of religious fanaticism, and the placing of greater value on 
humanization over religious matters did not materialize. Instead, in spite of 
modernization, religious values, religious communities, the fundamentalist groups 
were to play an ever more important role in the daily socio-political lives of the 
Hindus.76 
Secondly, as the secular approach tried to find genuine solutions for problems in the 
society, it failed to be sensitive towards the socio-cultural and theological problems faced by the 
Christians, especially the new converts. The secular proponents’ advocacy for ‘secular 
fellowships’ and failure to affirm Christianity community, due to a fear that such attempts may 
be viewed as communal, created more problems for the converts than it solved.  Kim points out 
that in the context of  Hindutva, Thomas’s and others’ approach “ lead to an identity crisis for 
caste Hindu converts and also for converts from a Dalit and outcaste background putting 
themselves in a situation where they neither fully belong to Hindu community nor the Christian 
one.”77 In addition, in a context where baptism and conversion brings in sociopolitical and 
cultural isolation, “Christian converts would find themselves rootless individuals fearing that any 
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support of the Christian community would be understood as communal and therefore 
unethical.”78  Finally as Leslie Newbigin, in his conversion with Thomas pointed out, conversion 
and the Church are essential to the Christian faith. Therefore, “secular fellowship” could not be a 
“substitute for the fellowship rooted in Christ’s work as Savior.”79 To the Hindutva proponents, 
secularization in general and the secular approach of Christian theologians are not acceptable 
because the common identity as Indians must be based on the Hindu heritage alone. Hindu 
nationalist movement cannot accept anything that is not compatible with their case for a 
monolithic Hindu nationhood.80  
Inter-Religious Dialogue  
Stanley Samartha, who was the first director of the WCC’s subunit for interfaith dialogue 
was the pioneering figure who shaped the texture of inter-religious dialogue in India.81 Samartha 
was not supportive of any “fulfillment model” or syncretic approaches because he thought they 
were open to serious misunderstanding since Hinduism is not ‘Christianity in disguise’.82 He was 
impatient with secular approaches since they tend to play down the importance of religion in 
people’s lives. He was also intolerant towards evangelical approaches and accused them of 
perpetuating colonial missiology, separatist attitudes, and religious supremacy. He also criticized 
liberation theologians who claimed to take sides with the poor and provoke political ferment.83 
He thought in the context of religious fundamentalism the path of interreligious dialogue would 
pave a way forward to maintain peace and harmony between different religious communities in 
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India.84  
Samartha was greatly influenced by Paul Devanandan (Founder-Director of CISRS, 
Bangalore) and M.M Thomas, who explored how Christians could work together with people of 
different faiths and secular ideologies for social liberation. Nimrot Rajagukguk notes that 
Samartha's approach of Inter-faith dialogue was built upon and was strengthened, “firstly, by 
Devanandan’s idea that God’s grace operates everywhere and that other religions may be 
possible ways of salvation, and secondly, by M.M Thomas's emphasis that common concern for 
the social change in the societies is more important and more relevant instead of individual 
salvation.”85 Samartha understands Christian mission as, “In a religiously plural world, 
Christians, together with their neighbors of other faiths, are called upon to participate in God’s 
continuing mission in the world. Mission is God’s continuing activity through the Spirit to mend 
the brokenness of creation, to overcome the fragmentation of humanity, and to heal the rift 
between humanity, nature, and God.”86 He believed that inter-faith dialogue is an effective tool 
towards this end. To Samartha, since salvation can also be found within other religions, the 
purpose of Christian mission should not be individual salvation but the mutual meeting between 
Christians and other faiths through dialogue made possible on the basis of a common humanity 
to work towards social liberation.87 
Samartha’s underlying assumption behind his inter-faith dialogue could be categorized in 
the terms of John Hick, as a ‘truth- seeking dialogue’ in which the Transcendent Being is 
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mutually acknowledged by both partners to be infinitely greater than their own limited vision of 
it, and through dialogue they seek to share their visions in the hope that each may be helped 
towards a fuller awareness of the Divine Reality before which they stand.88  
According to Samartha ‘the increasing politicization of religions is a disturbing feature of 
contemporary India.’89 He notes that “Politicization is the use of religion by political or religious 
leaders for the benefit of one community at the expense of other.”90 To him politicization of 
religion is not acceptable because 1) it is a hindrance to the task of nation building, 2) it is a 
threat to the secular, democratic, and socialistic character of the Indian state, and 3) it has global 
consequences, raising the possibility of the religious factor intensifying conflicts between 
nations.91 Samartha identified Hindutva as an illegitimate politicization of religion.92 He also saw 
Hindutva as the hardening of the core of Hinduism as it reacts to the question of conversion in 
Islam and Hinduism.93 With regard to the challenges raised by Hindutva he noted that “The most 
serious threat to the secular character of the democratic state in India today comes from the 
Bharathiya Janata Party (BJP), which has put forward Hindutva (“Hindu-ness”) as the political 
ideology for the state over against what is described as the “pseudo secularism” of the present 
state”.94 In suggesting an appropriate Christian response to political Hinduism, Samartha wrote: 
For the moment, the Christian responses to Hindu fundamentalism often seem to be 
knee-jerk political reactions reflecting the anxiety of a minority community. Far more 
systematic study of the historical, religious and cultural roots of Hindu claims is 
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necessary before advancing any serious theological criticism of the Hindutva 
ideology. Without recognizing the totality of Hindu fundamentalism as an 
autonomous reality and its certain irreducible basis in religion and religious identity, 
and without exploring the entire ensemble of its social interconnectedness in India’s 
economy, history, politics, ideology and culture, and without consciously relating the 
Christian struggle against it to the larger struggle of people of all religions in India for 
a better life, a genuinely secular and democratic state that can guarantee a life of 
freedom, self-respect and dignity to all its citizens will be beyond the reach of Indian 
people for many generations.95  
Samartha’s solution in the context of increasing politicization of religion is to work 
towards pluralism. According to him pluralism describes a situation “in which various religions, 
philosophies and ideological conceptions live side by side and which none of them holds a 
privileged status.”96 He envisioned inter-faith dialogue to be of great use in this regard. He noted 
that alarming politicization of religion should not be seen as a set back towards inter-faith 
dialogue initiatives, but rather ‘should be regarded as an opportunity to enter more deeply into 
dialogue with our neighbors and to concentrate on vital issues in the life of the nation.”97   
The main contribution of Inter-faith dialogue initiates was to undertake a genuine attempt 
to make Christian faith relevant to a multi-religious context of India, strained by communal 
tensions. By promoting dialogues between different religious communities, they hoped for 
mutual understanding, harmony and cooperation towards the wellbeing of all. However inter-
faith dialogue assumes a willingness and commitment by both parties to engage in conversation. 
To Hindutva exponents any talk of plurality outside the fold of Hinduism is not acceptable.  
Therefore unless so called ‘religions of foreign origin’ confirm to Hindutva pattern, inter-faith 
dialogue is not possible. To the proponents of Inter-faith dialogue the exclusive nature of 
Christian salvation and faith is problematic to an inclusive acceptance of others. Samartha notes: 
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What is foolishness, and what is a stumbling block to neighbors of other faiths, is the 
Christian claim that only in Jesus Christ has God been revealed once-for-all to 
redeem all humanity.  This claim has isolated Christians from their neighbors of other 
faiths in India, led to their theological alienation and spiritual improvishment, and in 
a religiously plural society has made it difficult, if not impossible, for Christians to 
cooperate with their neighbors for common social purposes.98  
Samartha revised Nicene Christology using historical critical methodology to cater to his 
pluralistic project. To Samartha, Jesus of Nazareth should be understood as divine but not God. 
And incarnation is ‘best understood not solely in terms of “deity”, but in terms of “divinity”.99  
Liberation Approach  
The liberation theologies in India emerged in conversation with Latin American liberation 
theologies of 1970s. Indian liberation theologians were aware of the limitations of Marxist 
analysis in dealing with the complex religiocultural context of Indian society. Therefore, 
eventually they developed their own strand of liberation theologies, drawing upon the indigenous 
cultural tradition and experience for the sociopolitical liberation in Indian context.100 The 
liberation theologians usually see sociopolitical and economic uplifting as the visible 
manifestation of redemption in the historical context. They understand and welcome religious 
conversion as a search for social justice and social protest by the oppressed castes in the face of 
sociocultural and political discrimination.101 The liberation theologians are critical of any form of 
inculturation and dialogue that tends to relate with Brahmanical Hinduism. However, they try to 
appropriate indigenous spiritual resources outside the “elitist” traditions for sociopolitical 
liberation.102  Dalit theology, tribal theology, feminist theology, and various forms of eco-
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theologies are some of the strands of liberation theologies in India.  
Among liberation theologies, Dalit theology is the one which came in direct confrontation 
with Hindutva. Dalit theology arouse from a dissatisfaction with prevalent Indian Christian 
theologies which failed to focus on the struggles of Dalit Christians who constitute the majority 
of Indian Christian population.103 Dalit theologians consistently point out that traditional Indian 
Christian theologians, in their efforts for inculturation, inter-faith dialogue, or nation building 
have often related the Gospel to Brahmanical philosophical concepts. Peniel Rajkumar notes that 
it is no surprise that with the upper caste upbringing of these theologians what emerged was ‘the 
cross-fertilization of caste Hindu and caste Christian theological efforts which produced a 
Brahminic-based Hindu-Christian Theology.”104 To Dalit theologians such a dialogue with 
Brahmanical tradition is problematic mainly for two reasons. Firstly because of the oppressive 
and discriminatory caste structure these traditions promote and secondly such traditions do not 
represent majority of Christians who are from Dalit background.105 So as Kirsteen Kim puts it, 
Dalit theology “is vehemently anti-brahmin and therefore seek to move Christian theology out of 
its ‘Sanskristic captivity’ and recover the alternative pre-Aryan oral traditions of the dalits as a 
resource for theologizing.”106  
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Samuel Rayan and Sathianathan Clarke are among the few theologians who engaged in 
conversation with Hindutva. Samuel Rayan, a Jesuit priest, was one of the first people to interact 
with liberation theology from Latin America. Taking side with the cause of Dalits and other 
marginalized people in India, he rejected political Hinduism. To him Brahmanical Hinduism is 
irredeemably oppressive. He preferred to use resources from grassroots religious traditions of 
India in his struggle for justice and liberation.107   Sathianathan Clarke notes that Hindutva, which 
drives on Brahmanical Hinduism, is a threat to the life and existence of religious and ethno-
cultural minorities in India.108 This is so because Hindutva operates with a comprehensive project 
to liquidate the distinct cultural and religious variance of the Ethnocultural minorities and absorb 
them into their imagined homogenous identity. 109 He also maintains that Hindutva persecution 
towards Christians exists because of the latter’s social development work among the Dalits and 
Adivasis, which is perceived as an effort to thwart the homogenizing aim of Hindutva.110 
Situating his thrust of theology along liberation lines, Clarke argues that, in order for 
Christian theology to be relevant in India, it should relate itself to the experience and struggles of 
Dalits and Tribals which represents the majority of Christian population. In the context of 
Hindutva, he finds the task of Christian theology to not only repudiate Hindutva as a paradigm 
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but also affirm “alternate models that legitimate and empower multiple religious, cultural, 
political, and social self-expressions of the various communities that make up the Indian 
nation.”111 In this regard, he finds the worldviews embedded in the culture and oral traditions of 
tribals and Dalits to be much resourceful. Because he argues that their worldviews are more 
amiable to plurality and thus less hostile to difference.112 The plurality it promotes “is not an 
absorbing of the Other, so that the Other is assimilated into the Self. Rather, there is willingness 
in this form of pluralism to allow difference to remain even while participating in each other's 
activities.”113 So according to Clarke, in the context of assimilative Brahmanical Hindutva, 
Christian theology should tap into the liberative motifs embedded in the dynamic worldviews of 
ethno-cultural minorities (Dalits and Tribals) in formulating and promoting paradigms that are 
relevant for collective life at a national level.114   
One of the significant contributions of Dalit theologians and Liberation theologians in 
general was to identify traditions outside Brahmanical fold to dialogue with the Gospel. They 
were also able to relate the significance of the Gospel to the experience and struggles of Dalit 
and Tribal Christians who form the majority of Christian population in India. Unlike the majority 
of other approaches which downplayed religious conversion, liberation theologians were quick to 
affirm it as a means of social protest and liberation in face of oppressive religious structures. 
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Moreover in anti-conversion calls they identified a Brahminic, elite or the upper caste hegemony 
in operation rather than the perspective of the subjects of conversion. However one major 
criticism leveled again the liberation account of religious conversion is that it tends to reduce it 
to a socio-political phenomenon.  Sebastian Kim, points out that a sociological interpretation of 
conversion is insufficient because by reducing conversion to a “structural question,” it fails to 
reflect the complex process involved in a religious conversion. Moreover, it gives only “limited 
recognition to the religious awareness of the converts and the religious appeal of the missionary 
message.”115 In the context of Hindutva, this becomes problematic for two reasons. Firstly, “it 
provides validity to Hindu accusations that conversion of Dalits is political rather than religious. 
Hindus can argue that conversion, especially mass conversion, lacks spiritual motives; it is 
merely a means to escape injustice or a social protest.”116 Secondly, such interpretation seems to 
suggest that Dalits are motivated only by the desire for their own material betterment. “The 
obvious inference is that Dalits lack spirituality. Hence conversion itself is seen negatively as 
opportunism and not as the outcome of an active and considered search by a community for an 
answer to a spiritual quest.”117  
Evangelical Approach 
Kirsteen Kim presents C. V. Mathew and his work The Saffron Mission: A Historical 
Analysis of Modern Hindu Missionary Ideologies and Practices118 as a representative of an 
evangelical approach towards political Hinduism. Mathew’s tradition calls for the centrality of 
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the proclamation of the Gospel and call to conversion in Christian mission. He rejects the 
Hindutva allegation that conversion to Christianity would weaken one’s commitment to the 
nation and argues that his experience of conversion only strengthened his desire to seek his 
nation’s welfare. He argues that Hinduism is as much a missionary religion as Christianity, 
Buddhism, or Islam. He argues that a desire to share one’s faith experience is a natural sign of a 
healthy religion and welcomes all traditions to do the same.119  
Mathew regards Hindutva as the “minority complex of the majority” and finds difficulties 
in accepting its missionary agenda to create a unitive and homogenous Hindu nation in India 
using aggressive methods.120 In the face of Hindutva, he exhorts that “persecution is not an 
exception but a norm for Christians (John 15:20). Christians should accept God’s purpose in 
allowing suffering since ‘it will result in joy, prayer and unity’ (John 17), and ‘it would scatter 
the believers from the mission compounds to give more opportunities for preaching (Acts 
8:4).’”121 He also wants the Church to engage in self-criticism and repentance in the midst of 
opposition from Hindutva.122  
Some of the evangelical Christians took the apologetic task seriously in the face of threats 
from Hindutva. Vishal Mangalwadi’s work India: The Grand Experiment123 is one such example. 
In response to a Hindutva intellectual Arun Shourie’s pro-Hindutva book, Missionaries in India: 
Continuities, Changes and Dilemmas124 which accuses missionaries and Christian’s in India of 
being unpatriotic and enemies of the country, Mangalwadi argues that “India’s independence 
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resulted from the struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi, but India’s freedom is the product of the 
Gospelof Jesus Christ. Our individual, intellectual, religious, economic, legal, municipal, press 
and political freedoms are the result of a grand experiment undertaken by the followers of Jesus 
Christ.”125 
A Lutheran Critique from an Ecclesiological Perspective   
Apart from the above-mentioned five approaches, it is important now to look briefly at R. 
Sahayadhas’s work entitled, Hindu Nationalism and the Indian Church: Towards an 
Ecclesiology in Conversation with Martin Luther.126 In this work, Sahayadhas, a Lutheran clergy 
and professor at United Theological College, Bangalore, reflects on the nature and mission of the 
Church in the context of Hindu nationalism from Martin Luther’s ecclesiological point of view. 
After providing a comprehensive overview about Hindu nationalism, he rightly identifies it as a 
“hate filled ideology of nationalism”127 rooted in Brahminic Hinduism with an exclusive aim “to 
create a Hindu nation through assimilation or exclusion of minorities.”128 He also rightly points 
out that Christians are viewed with suspicion, persecuted, and denied their rightful place in the 
nationhood.129 Unlike several secular or inculturation approaches, he finds the Church and its 
mission integral to Christian faith and theology. He dismisses accusations about religious 
conversion as “a bogey used by Hindutva forces to intimidate Christians and polarize 
communities for political gains”130 
 In the context of Hindutva, he proposes that the Church should not be understood 
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primarily as an Institution but as a communion of saints brought by Word and Sacraments.131 To 
him, this communion should be understood in terms of a perichoretic communion of the people 
of God.132 Sahayadhas places the basis of this perichoretic communion of the Church on to the 
perichoretic communion of the Trinity.  He explains that “Perichoretic intimacy is rooted in the 
communion of the persons of the Trinity with their fundamental characteristics of 
consubstantiality, co-equality, and coeternity, and harmony of will and purpose.133  He further 
notes that:  
Thus the fundamental doctrine is that the persons in the Godhead stand in a unique 
relationship to each other by virtue of the mode of origin of each person in the same 
substance of the Godhead, and it is this relation that constitutes them distinct persons. 
This relation between the persons in the Trinity is called perichoresis, which is an apt 
model for us to emulate in our ecclesial communion. The Trinity never engages in 
ostracism and corresponding insight is that ecclesia is an occasion to embrace and 
celebrate differences; perpetuate intimacy; and live in harmony.134… Thus, if the 
Trinitarian understanding of God represents the inner relationships of the persons of 
the Trinity; if the Logos, one of the persons of the Trinity, became enfleshed; and if 
the Church is the body of the enfleshed Word, then Church as the communion of the 
faithful has to represent the Trinitarian-perichoretic-communion-in-relationship to 
the world.135   
In the context of Hindutva, Sahayadhas argues that the understanding of Perichoretic 
communion equips the Church with a unique vision for its mission. It provides a vision to 
transcend narrow particularisms and embrace multiplicity, differences and plurality both within 
the church, and to extend the scope of its vision “beyond the boundaries of the Church even to 
reach out to those who hatch hatred against the Church.”136 The Church “as a veritable sign and 
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instrument of transformation in this world”137, should continue the ministry of reconciliation and 
“foster the perichoretic relationship among people transcending all that perpetuates division in 
the society.”138 In carrying out this mission, according to Sahayadhas, the Church should not 
engage in retaliatory ethics in face of Hindutva violence nor aspire for temporal power. 
However, as informed by Luther’s two kingdom theory, the Church while maintaining the proper 
distinction between the state and spiritual authority, should not be silent but offer a critical voice 
in the midst of injustice, brokenness and oppression.139   
Sahayadhas’s proposal to translate the vision of ‘perichoretic reality’ of the ‘communion of 
believers’, the Church, to our collective life in the society is both intriguing and relevant in the 
context of Hindutva. But an important question which needs to be asked here is how can this 
“perichoretic communion” operative in the Church, contingent upon faith, be operate in the 
society?  Or can such “perichoretic communion” be possible in a society without faith in Christ 
and ministry of the Word and Sacraments? Or is there a fundamental difference envisaged in the 
actualization of this vision in the Church and society? One cannot find satisfactory answers to 
these questions in Sahayadhas’s work. I think, while remaining faithful to theological rationale 
of Sahayadhas, there could be two theological situations in which his vision for “perichoretic 
communion” in the society could become a viable option. First is the conversion of entire society 
to faith in Christ’s redemptive work on the cross, whereby “perichoretic communion” becomes a 
reality. But, this possibility runs counter even to the Reformers’ understanding of the society, 
because to Luther the world will always have unbelievers who reject Christ. Sahayadhas too does 
not envisage such a rationale. The second option is to explore a different theological foundation 
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to base our common humanity with others in the society under God.   
Summary and Conclusion  
In this chapter, we saw that although Indian Christian theologians of various approaches 
identified and dismissed Hindutva as an illegitimate politicization of Hindu religion, nevertheless 
they took seriously the concerns raised by them. The struggle of Indian Christian theologians has 
always been to be sensitive towards Hindu culture, to find the rightful place of Christians in the 
nationhood, and to prove their patriotism in the face of Hindutva allegations. Most of the 
approaches (except liberational and to some extent the evangelical approach) approached 
Hindutva non- confrontationally and even self-critically. The theologians of inculturation tried to 
relate the Gospel to Hindu traditions and explored how Christians could find continuity with 
Hindu culture yet remain faithful to the Christian faith. Post-independence theologians belonging 
to secular and inter-religious dialogue saw the need of Indian Christian theology relating to the 
task of nation building and addressing the challenges raised by religious pluralism. From the 
1980’s, Dalit theologians belonging to liberationist strand challenged the Brahminic hegemony 
of Hindutva and also of Indian Christian theologians while working towards the liberation of 
Dalits. Though the Indian theological academia was dominated single handedly by ecumenical 
and liberation theologians, the voice of evangelical theologians also began to emerge during the 
past few decades.  
One of the serious drawbacks latent in many of these approaches is the pursuit of a solution 
at the expense of basic Christian faith and identity. Some of the cardinal elements of the 
Christian faith, which include the Christian Church, the proclamation of the Gospel, and 
religious conversion, were either dismissed or given a new interpretation. For example, the need 
for religious conversion and proclamation of the Gospel are downplayed in interreligious 
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dialogue and the secular approach. The liberation approach, on the other hand, does not 
downplay either religious conversion or the proclamation of the Gospelbut reinterprets them 
socio-politically. In addition, the doctrine of Church is found to be communal and scandalous by 
the inculturationalist, interreligious, and secular approaches respectively. As Sebastian Kim has 
rightly suggested, such a dismissal of the fundamentals of Christian faith contribute only towards 
a crisis of identity among Christians in India140 and thereby seriously affects the theological 
strength in responding to various issues. Thus, in order for our conversation to move forward, an 
approach is needed that has the strength to take seriously our Christian faith (exclusive in nature) 
and at the same time embrace all humanity, both Christian and other, (inclusive in nature) as we 
live and work together for the common good.  
The evangelical approach and Sahayadhas work from Luther’s ecclesiological perspective 
are such perspectives that take seriously the Christian faith and identity in finding points of 
contact with others. However one big criticism levelled against the evangelical approach is the 
“instrumental mentality” implicit in its approach. Charitable work and any kind of social 
interaction are seen solely as instruments for evangelizing or Christianizing the other. Apart from 
this, the evangelical approach has no interest in establishing common ground with those of other 
faiths. Sahayadhas proposal for the church’s engagement in the society to work towards a 
‘perichoretic communion’ which would embrace plurality and support a vision for a 
multicultural texture for Indian society is a welcome attempt. However, his approach falls into 
methodical difficulties as he makes a superficial jump from a theological reality existent in the 
Church to be translated unqualified in the society. So what is called forth is to base our vision for 
a society, where Christians could work together with others for common good, in a theological 
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foundation, where we could share a common humanity with others. For this, I believe, there does 
exist in Luther’s thought, theological resources helpful for us. I propose that a robust 
understanding of Luther’s Two Realms doctrine would provide a rich resource in this regard, to 
further strengthen and refine Indian Christian theological voices in responding to the challenges 
raised by the Hindutva. Luther’s understanding of God’s left-hand realm and God’s activity in 
this realm as our Creator God under whom entire human beings, with all their plurality and 
heterogeneity, share a common humanity is a good starting point. So in the next chapters we 
shall explore in great detail, Luther’s understanding of God’s Two Realms and its relevance, in 
our attempt to find an inclusive theological rationale for Christians to cooperate and work with 
others for common good, as responsible citizens of the country. This will also highlight the 
purpose of the State/government as an instrument of God the creator to ensure the common good, 
justice, prevention of evil, and external peace for all irrespective of one’s religious, caste, class, 
cultural, or linguistic identity. 
 67 
CHAPTER FOUR  
AN INTRODUCTION TO LUTHER’S UNDERSTANDING OF GOD’S TWO REALMS 
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce and to provide a brief background on 
Luther’s understanding of God’s Two Realms. I will place Luther’s understanding of God’s Two 
Realms in its Sitz im Leben by identifying some of the influential sources for Luther and how his 
two-fold concept stands in relation to different conflicting views regarding temporal and spiritual 
authority which existed during his time. Building upon this foundation, I will then provide a brief 
introduction of Luther’s understanding of God’s Two Realms. However any mention about 
Luther’s understanding of Two Realms is not borne without difficulties. This is mainly because 
of the misinterpretation, misunderstanding and consequent application which came to be 
associated with this teaching in the past centuries.  I shall begin our discussion with a brief 
overview about some of those distortions with an explicit intention to dissociate my work along 
those lines and provide further clarity to our foregoing discussion.  
Historical Distortions and Challenges in Relation to the Two Realm Teaching   
There has been much written in the recent past about the history of abuse, misinterpretation 
and conflicting views about Luther’s understanding of the Two Kingdom doctrine in the last two 
centuries.1 It is not desirable for the purpose of this study to enter into a detailed discussion of 
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each view, but four such instances are of relevance to our present study.  
Eigengesetzlichkeit, the Concept of the Autonomous Laws of Each Sphere 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the association of Eigengesetzlichkeit, or 
concept of autonomous laws of each sphere of worldly life to the concept of Two Kingdom 
teaching.  Wright captures this distortion thus, “the essence of this perverted doctrine was the 
idea that the world, human institution, politicians, and everyday people were free from the power 
and the laws of God, because the world had its own rules and ethical norms, which were 
produced by processes internal to the world.”2   
Wright, along with others,3 identifies theologian Ernst Troeltsch and sociologist Max 
Weber as two major figures responsible for advancing the concept of autonomy. Wright notes 
that “Troeltsch talked about the autonomy of the various zones of value,”4 and that in Luther’s 
view, “the Decalogue and the natural law were opposed to one another.”5 In his writings, 
Troeltsch argued that “Luther promoted a dual morality for Christians; that is, one Christian 
moral law over against a worldly moral code under autonomous reason.”6  Wright, while 
explaining Max Weber’s contribution, points out that “Weber adapted Luther’s two-kingdom 
concept and his distinctions between the inner and the outer man to the distinctly modern idea of 
public political life versus private religious life.”7 Wright adds that Weber then further extends 
this spurious distinction to economic, aesthetic, erotic and intellectual spheres of life, claiming 
                                                 
2 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 21. 
3 Some of the writers who advanced this concept includes Rudolf Sohm, Friedrich Naumann, Wilhelm 
Hermann. Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 25. And Karl H. Hertz ed., Two Kingdoms and One World: A 
Source Book in Christian Social Ethics (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), 86–91. 
4 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 26. 
5 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 26 
6 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 26. . 
7 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 29. 
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that each of these spheres have the “inner Eigengestzlichkeiten” of their own.8   
Wright, while dismissing Luther’s misrepresentation by Troeltsch and Weber, notes that 
such an autonomy concept is alien to Luther’s original thought in the sixteenth century but has its 
roots elsewhere. In responding to Troeltsch, he argues that such a concept could be found in the 
writings of Niccolo Machiavelli and the idea of reason of state in the sixteenth century, as well as 
in some modern day philosophers. Wright thus argues: 
We must not let it escape our attention that Troeltsch identified Luther’s teaching 
with Machiavellianism. At the same time, he connected Lutheranism with the 
conservatives of his era. But Troeltsch erred in this claim. Luther was neither a 
proponent of reason of state nor or Machiavellianism for he did not assert that the 
state must preserve itself and promote its welfare above all other things. Luther’s 
understanding of the two kingdoms represented a way to avoid the extremes of 
monastic withdrawal from the world as well as Machiavellian worldly autonomy 
from God’s rule and law (Eigengesetzlichkeit). In addition, it has been noted that 
Eigengesetzlichkeit, or the moral autonomy of institutional life, may also be found in 
the works of Jean Bodin, Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, 
the Social Darwinists and most classical liberals. The idea of determining laws in 
nature, which are independent of Divine control, was an essential ingredient of 
Darwinism and the physical sciences generally.9    
Responding to misreading of Luther by Max Weber, Wright similarly states, “As Pawlus 
recently noted, there is something ‘almost laughable’ in Weber’s attempt to claim Lutheran 
origin for the modern Adam Smithian ethics based on self- interest. The latter was ‘an almost 
grotesque antithesis’ to Luther’s ethic based on serving God and neighbor.”10 But whatever the 
origin, the negative consequence of this spurious teaching became evident with the Nazi use of 
this concept during the time of Hitler.11 This led Karl Barth to allege the intellectual ancestry of 
                                                 
8 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 30.  
9 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 26–7. 
10 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 31. 
11 Wright argues that even though Luther’s two kingdom doctrine assumed a perverted form, still it did not 
automatically lead to Nazism. Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 33. In the same way, Hanz Schwarz also 
argues that “it must first of all noted that Adolf Hitler’s first denominational support came from Catholicism. Further 
one must point out that the Lutheran nations of Scandinavia, albeit with little success, sought to offer resistance to 
the Nazi occupation. Indeed, so many factors came into play with the rise of the Third Reich that one cannot simply 
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Adolph Hitler to Luther, via Bismarck and Frederic the Great.12  In the same way, this also led 
Reinhold Niebuhr to portray Luther “as an archconservative with an overwhelming fear of 
anarchy and a pessimistic view of life who prepared the way for German tyranny.”13  In the 
present times, the argument for strict separation of religion from the state and the dismissal of 
religion as a private affair, as having no positive and constructive role in the public sphere, could 
be traced to this concept of autonomy of each spheres.    
Two Kingdom Teaching 14 as Church and State Reductionism  
Another common confusion is to treat and equate the Two Kingdom teaching to a Church 
and State relationship teaching. Such a perspective is a reductionist reading of Luther’s 
understanding of Two Realm Teaching.  As Gerhard Ebeling notes, “But anything like 
separation of Church and State, which is what people usually have in mind, is a totally 
inadequate picture of the scope of Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms.”15 It is true that distinct 
concerns relating to Church and temporal authority comes under the purview of Two Realm 
teaching, but the scope of Two Realm teaching moves beyond that. As Robert Kolb points out, 
Luther’s Two Realm teaching is “a part of the Lutheran conceptual framework, for it is more 
than an individual doctrine. It is a presupposition which permeates the whole of our thinking 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
lay the blame directly on the Lutherans.” Hanz Schwarz, True Faith in The True God: An Introduction to Luther’s 
Life and Thought (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1996), 87–88. For a detailed discussion on the same see Lowell 
C. Green, Lutherans Against Hitler: The Untold Story (St.Louis: Concordia, 2007).  
12 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 35. 
13 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 29.  
14 Two Realm teaching is also alternatively known as the doctrine of the Two Kingdom or the Twofold Rule 
of God. At various places in this chapter I use the term “Two Kingdom” because various authors I interact with 
mostly use Two Kingdom instead of Two Realm. The reason for my usage of Two Realm instead of Two Kingdom 
is stated in the foot note 10 of Chapter 1.     
15 Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, trans. R.A Wilson (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), 
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about how God works in His world and the entire life to which He has called us.”16 But it should 
be noted that Luther did not advocate a separation of Church and state but only wanted its 
respective roles and functions to be distinguished for each other.17     
Two Kingdom Teaching as a Guardian of Status Quo and Quietism  
The two kingdom teaching has been invariably criticized for promoting quietism and 
supporting the status quo. Duncan Forester, in his work on Caste and Christianity narrates how 
early Danish Lutheran missions in India, headed by Ziegenbalg shaped largely by pietism and 
Luther’s doctrine of two kingdoms, operated differently from other missions during that time.  
He points out that under the influence of Luther’s two kingdom teaching, Lutheran missionary 
approaches were limited in their ability to understand and interact with the local realities by 
treating “‘politics, culture, even forms of Church government’ as irrelevant to Christian faith.”18 
Forester identifies in early Lutheran missionaries two kinds of attitudes towards caste. The first 
one is to ignore it as irrelevant since it has nothing to do with one’s religious profession. The 
second one is to accommodate it as a national or civil institution, which need not to be 
disturbed.19  Other protestant missionaries took a different approach, in which they identified 
caste not merely as a civil distinction but as an evil which stands in direct conflict with the 
Gospel, which should not be tolerated among Christians.20 
Missouri Evangelical India Mission (MELIM)’s approach was not radically different from 
                                                 
16 Robert Kolb, “Christian Civic Responsibility in an Age of Judgment,” Concordia Journal 19 (January 
1993): 18–19 
17 Steven E. Ozement, The Age of Reform 1250–1550 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 268. 
18 Duncan B. Forrester, Caste and Christianity: Attitudes and Polices on Caste of Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
Missions in India (Dublin: Curzon, 1980), 17. 
19 Forrester, Caste and Christianity, 18. 
20 Forrester, Caste and Christianity, 18.  
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other early Lutheran missions, however, MELIM missionaries saw caste as evil but not 
necessary sinful. Elmer Griesse a former LCMS missionary notes “Lutheran churches no doubt 
recognized the breaking down of caste distinctions as an ideal, but did not necessarily favor an 
abrupt setting aside of these social distinctions. In any case they did not favour a forcible 
disruption of the method of living that had through the centuries become crystalized in the caste 
system.”21 In this regard, Luther Meinzen, a LCMS missionary to India, quotes Prof. Rajarigam 
that Lutheran missions hoped that “by bearing with it for a while it would gradually be dispelled 
by the strong light of the Gospel shining upon their hearts”.22 Lutheran missionaries’ approval of 
the status quo might be a result of their effort to distinguish between the civil and religious 
elements in the caste system. However as Forrester points out  
[S]uch efforts did not find much support from Hindus, who agreed with the majority 
missionary opinion that caste and the Hindu religion were so intimately wrought 
together that the one could barely be distinguished from the other. Hinduism provided 
the religious sanctions and the religious legitimation for caste, while caste was the 
classic example of a social order providing the iron frame for a religion. Two stood, 
or fell, together.23 
The Lutheran approach thus was thought to be naïve, quietist, and was largely criticized by 
later native Lutheran leaders and other mission societies.24 In this regard B.H Jackayya, the first 
native general secretary of the India Evangelical Lutheran Church (IELC), believes that early 
                                                 
21 Elmer Griesse, “Lutheran India Missions” (Master’s Thesis, St.Louis, 1945), 37. 
22 Luther W. Meinzen, A Church in Mission: Identity and Purpose in India (Vaniyambadi: Concordia, 1981), 
48. 
23 Forrester, Caste and Christianity, 198.   
24 However it would be inaccurate to asses that MELIM missionaries were indifferent and detached to caste 
struggles its members went through.  From the beginning MELIM missionaries saw education to be a great means to 
bring social awareness and upliftment among the downtrodden. By 1952, MELIM already had 99 schools with 273 
Indian teachers out of which 232 were members of the Lutheran Church. Apart from this missionaries also acted as 
social protectors and financial supporters of the Lutheran Christians who came from depressed castes. So although 
MELIM missionaries did not employ a head on confrontational approach to social issues, still they hoped to bring 
change through a gradualist policy, mainly with the help of education and pure teaching of the Gospel. See Sam 
Thompson, Evolving an Ethical Critique in Relation to the Leadership Crisis of the India Evangelical Lutheran 
Church (IELC) with Particular Reference to the Trivandrum Synod  (Masters in Theology Thesis, Bangalore, 2008), 
14–15. And D. Christudas, Tranquebar to Travancore (Delhi: ISPCK, 2008), 73–77.    
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Lutheran missionaries’ approval of the status quo, had a negative effect on the Sambavar pastors, 
belonging to so called lower castes according to Hinduism.25 Similarly, D. Christudas quotes, the 
Christian Patriot, a journal of Christian and social progress, which sums up well other mission 
societies’ criticism that “Lutheran mission is worshipping caste instead of treading it.”26  
To some extent, it could be argued that the mission practice of Lutheran mission in India is 
also reflective its parent church, Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod (LCMS).  Robert Benne 
notes that “the Missouri Synod’s history in America is marked by fewer ventures in direct public 
theology than that of other major Lutheran bodies.”27 And that the “Missouri Synod also stands 
alone in its commitment to indirect methods of affecting the public order.”28 Similarly Charles 
Arand and Joel Biermann, admitting certain quietism in LCMS’s public theology, note that “And 
so during the past one hundred and fifty years, many Lutherans in America have quietly and 
contentedly raised families and contributed to the economy through their labor. But when it came 
to the matter of larger social and political matters (especially those requiring service within the 
government), American Lutherans of German descent have often been invisible and their voice 
unheard by the larger community.”29 Taking this criticism seriously, in the past two decades, 
several scholars including Robert Kolb, Charles Arand, Joel Biermann, and William Schumacher 
at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis have addressed the relationship between faith and the public 
sphere. Arand and Biermann note “A renewed appropriation of the two kinds of righteousness 
can revitalize our thinking on God's twofold rule so as to encourage Lutherans to be more active 
                                                 
25 Meinzen, A Church in Mission, 47.  
26 D. Christudas, Tranquebar to Travancore, 83.  
27 Robert Benne, The Paradoxical Vision: A Public Theology for the Twenty-First Century (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1995), 131.  
28 Benne, The Paradoxical Vision, 131.  
29 Charles P. Arand and Joel Biermann, “Why the Two Kinds of Righteousness?,” Concordia Journal 33 
(April 2007): 133.  
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participants in the civil realm.” Far from quietism or indifference, the Two Realm teaching, 
properly understood, does not discourage Christians from an active involvement in the world, but 
rather clarifies their distinctive role and frees them to be innovative and proactive to work in the 
civil realm (the left-hand realm).30  The present dissertation is also undertaken to contribute 
towards this end within an Indian context. 
The Nature of Luther’s Political Thought  
 Any discussion pertaining to the nature of Luther’s political thought contains within it 
conflicting perspectives. While some scholars tend to see Luther as a consistent political 
theorist,31 others try to limit his area of concern to the ecclesial sphere.32 It is true that Luther was 
primarily a theologian, reformer, and a pastor and not a statesman or political philosopher. As 
Jarrett A. Carty rightly notes “Luther was not a political philosopher such as Thomas Hobbes or 
John Locke; he never considered himself called to such a task, for his life was preoccupied with 
theology and Church reform in all its complexity.”33 Substantiating this fact further, Heinrich 
Bornkamm notes: 
For this reason it is not easy to fit him into political history and to label him and his 
views. An investigation will, moreover, show a wide deviation of his principles from 
those of political philosophers. Luther’s pronouncements on questions of political and 
national life are all spiritual counsel, the application of the Word of God to the 
activities of men sharing in the order of civic life; they do not lend themselves to 
being pieced together into systematic whole.34  
                                                 
30 Arand and Biermann, “Two Kinds of Righteousness?,” 134.   
31 See L. H Waring, The Political Theories of Martin Luther (New York: Kennikat, 1910), W.D James Cargill 
Thompson, The Political Thought of Marin Luther (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1984) and also Joshua Mitchell, 
Not by Reason Alone: Religion, History, and Identity in Early Modern Political Thought (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), 1–3. 
32 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 38. 
33 Jarrett A. Carty, The Political Writings of Martin Luther: Divine Kingdom, Holy Order (Saint Louis: 
Concordia, 2012), 4. 
34 Heinrich Bornkam, Luther’s World of Thought, translated by Marting H. Bertram (Saint Louis: Concordia, 
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It is misleading, however, if we remove any political significance embedded in the 
numerous writings of Luther and picture him as apolitical.  Luther himself wrote about his 
unique theological insight in relation to politics. In his pamphlet Whether Soldiers Too Can Be 
Saved Luther writes, “I must boast here, that since the time of the Apostles the temporal sword 
and government have never been so clearly described or so highly valued as by me, as even my 
enemies must admit,” 35 and elsewhere in On War against the Turks he noted “No other teacher 
has written so nobly or so usefully about temporal government since the time of the Apostles, 
unless it be St. Augustine.”36 Bornkamm notes about Luther and Politics thus: 
However within the confines of his dominant line of thinking and writing Luther was 
such an ardent political being, i.e., a man who was deeply moved by the fate of his 
people; and the influence of the reformation was in so large a measure not only 
religious but also historical-political, that the question regarding Luther’s political 
views-correctly understood-suggests itself very spontaneously. It goes without saying 
that the counsel he gave his contemporaries as spiritual adviser must also contain 
some views on a proper political life.37 
Although Luther’s theological ideas carry profound political implications, it is important to 
note his point of departure from secular political philosophers. Bornkamm and Cargill Thompson 
note that Luther’s concerns, questions, and interests in politics were much different from those of 
conventional political philosophers.  Luther, unlike political theorists, was not interested in the 
mechanics or inner working of politics. He was not concerned with questions pertaining the best 
or the ideal form of government. Nor did he attempt to analyze different constitutions to suggest 
one method of governance over another. 38 Bornkamm notes, ‘he did not draft and device an 
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outline of an ideal state; he did not regard it as his duty to make revolutionary proposals, but in 
the main he worked toward an amelioration of the system which he found.’39 
Luther’s interest in politics was theological and ethical. He was concerned with the moral 
nature of the state and the demands of moral behaviors upon rulers and subjects seen in relation 
to God’s overall purpose for His creation. In this regard, Luther’s moral demands came directly 
from his theological commitments. Thus David Whitford notes:   
Luther’s political judgments and opinions cannot be separated from his theological 
positions and presuppositions and are in fact only truly understood when placed 
within his theological framework…..for Luther the Bible remained normative. Within 
this framework, we can discern three theological motifs that had lasting implications 
for Luther’s political thought; the distinction between the law and the Gospel, the two 
kingdoms doctrine, and his understanding of authority. All derive from his 
commitment to preach the Gospelin the midst of an ongoing struggle between God 
and the devil (between order and chaos).40  
Sitz im Leben of Luther’s Two Realm Thought  
Luther’s Two Realm thought cannot be understood in a vacuum. Luther’s thought was no 
doubt influenced by some of the early two fold conception. The purpose of this section is to 
identify some of the influential sources for Luther and how his Two Realm thought stands in 
relation to some of the conflicting views regarding the nature and relationship between the 
temporal and spiritual realms of his times.  
Augustine’s well known work, City of God (426)41 is often credited as an influential source 
                                                 
39 Bornkam, Luther’s World of Thought, 256.  
40 David M. Whitford, “Luther’s Political Encounters,” in Donald K. Mackim, eds., The Cambridge 
Companion to Martin Luther (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 180.    
41 The immediate context for the writing The City of God (354-430) was the sack of Rome by Goths under the 
king Alaric in 410.  The fall of Rome, once thought to be invincible and intact from any foreign invasion, was 
received with utter astonishment and dismay. In such a situation a recognizable size of educated pagans blamed 
Christianity, the favored religion by then, for this unthinkably shocking event. Two allegation made by them is as 
follows “first, the moral teaching of Christianity, especially on meekness and forgiveness of enemies, had 
undermined the strength of the people; and second, the pagan gods were punishing Rome for the gradual decline in 
sacrifices and for ending the official worship of these gods in the empire.” See, Saint Augustine, Saint Augustine 
City of God Vol I, (London: Dent, 1957), viii.  In 412 the pagan writer Volusianus addressed these arguments against 
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to Luther for his two kingdom thought. To Augustine, the two cities namely, the civitas terrena 
(earthly city) and the civitas Dei (city of God)42 “are not two sociological associations (state and 
church), but intangible communities of persons.”43 According to Augustine the two cities can be 
best understood by their common love or loyalty. The earthly city consists of those who live 
according to man (secundum hominem) and self-love, but the heavenly city consists of those who 
live according to God (secundum Deum) and the love of God.44  
Some of the concerns embedded in Augustine’s two cities which one finds reflected in 
Luther are as follows. Augustine finds state as the guardian of peace and order although it is 
limited and not perfect.  The final peace is a post historical reality which is to be realized by the 
members of city of God. While on earth they are to cooperate with others in human concerns and 
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43 Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther’s Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms in the Context of His Theology (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1966), 22.  
44 Bornkamm, Two Kingdoms, 20. 
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for the sake of earthly peace to fulfil their citizenship obligation.45  Moreover to Augustine a 
person’s membership in the ‘City of God’ destroys neither his patriotism, nor his civic or social 
involvement or responsibilities. Instead these are reinforced it by elevating them to the rank of 
religious obligation. According to Augustine all history can be understood as the interplay and 
comingling of both cities. Augustine believed that throughout all history these two cities live 
together side by side and intermixed, until the last winnowing and the final separation in the day 
of Judgement where doom is in store for those do not belong to the City of God.  
 The difference between Luther and Augustine is also obvious. Luther do not speak in 
terms of “two civitates” but rather Two Realms, which carries distinct meaning for him. Oswald 
Bayer notes, “Luther does not speak in the main about two separated regions, but rather about 
two realms. Whereas Augustine uses a theology of history to describe two ‘cities,’ each of which 
has different individuals and groups of individuals, Luther maintains that every Christian takes 
part in both governing units; the differentiation between the two realms goes at the same time 
right through each person.”46 Another difference, Bornkamm notes is, Augustine views the state 
ontologically, on the basis of its nature, whereas Luther includes it in God’s salvatory will. Thus 
“That which Luther describes as God’s activity in the secular government has almost no counter-
part in Augustine.”47 Next, Bornkamm notes that Augustine was more ascetic in orientation and 
thus reflected more of a flight from the world. Luther reflected more on the Christian’s activity 
and distinguished between one’s action as a private and public person, a distinction which is 
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lacking in Augustine.48 Finally one could also find in Augustine “an embryonic form of the idea 
of a Christian state,”49 which to Luther is problematic.50   
Another important person, worthy of mention is William of Ockham (1280–1349) who 
presented a powerful counter position to the Papal claim to temporal authority. In his defence of 
Franciscan vows of poverty against papal assault, he questioned the temporal superiority of the 
papacy over the emperor and other temporal authorities.51  Limiting the Pope’s power to ecclesial 
realm, he rejected as heretical the view that “the pope has fullness of power from Christ in such a 
way that in both temporal and spiritual he can do by right all things not against natural or divine 
law.”52 He also rejected the view that temporal authority is entrusted to the Pope for qualified 
delegation to the civil magistrate.  Ockham affirmed that “the power of the emperor comes from 
God, not through the pope but through the people.”53  It should be noted, however, that Ockham 
was not against the papacy as such but only a distorted conception of papal power. He affirmed 
that the “papacy exists not by the choice of Christians, still less by the choice of the secular ruler, 
but by divine institution.”54  Ockham’s view of the power of the emperor parallels his account of 
the power of the Pope. Because “both are limited by the rights of free subjects and by the 
requirement that whatever is imposed be for the common good.”55 To Ockham, “the emperor is 
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bound not only by natural and divine law but by the law of nations.”56     
Another important earlier source is the “original ‘two swords’ doctrine,” set forth by Pope 
Gelasius I (died 496) in 494.57 In his writings, Gelasius 58 made a clear institutional distinction 
between the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. His primary concern in his letter addressed to 
Emperor Anastasius was “to protect the Church jurisdiction from that of state usurpation.”59 
According to him, the world is ruled by two, the sacred authority of the priesthood and the royal 
power.60 To Gelasius, Christ distinguished between the powers of both offices. Thus the Church 
is concerned with matters of divine affairs and salvation, and the emperor is to be concerned with 
public order and temporal affairs.61 And in “divine affairs, emperors were to ‘submit’ to bishops, 
while in ‘the sphere of public order’ bishops were to ‘obey’ the emperor’s law.”62 Gelasius notes 
“Thus the humility of each order would be preserved, neither being exalted by the subservience 
of the other, and each profession would be especially fitted for its appropriate functions.”63 
The two sword doctrine as propounded by Gelasius underwent radical change during the 
medieval period leading to Luther’s time. Boniface VIII (1235–1303) rearticulated and 
reformulated the two swords doctrine in the course of his conflicts with French King Philip IV.64  
Boniface VIII’s famous papal bull, Unam Sanctam, of 1302, noted that both swords belong to 
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church. VanDrunen summaries Boniface VIII’s articulation thus:  
The church, however has delegated the material sword to the state, though not at all 
absolutely or irrevocably: “The one is exercised for the church, the other by the 
church, the one by the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of kings and soldiers, 
though at the will and sufferance of the priest. One sword ought to be under the other 
and the temporal authority subject to the spiritual power”.65   
 During Luther’s time, this papal bull (Unam Sanctam) of Boniface VIII, which asserted 
the supremacy of the power of the Pope over the spiritual and temporal world, was renewed by 
Pope Leo X in 1516 before a session of the Lantern Council.66 During Luther’s time, the 
medieval two-sword theory represented a political and sociological interpretation of Corpus 
Christianum, or Christendom, wherein Christian society was understood in terms of an 
institutional entity, rather than a theological one. In this hierarchically arranged political 
structure, the pope and emperor were God’s lieutenants on earth and the pope as the vicar of 
Christ, stood above the emperor with the jus novum, the new law; the canon law.67  Wright sums 
up the political workflow of such an arrangement based on two-sword theory thus: 
The clergy ruled this Christian body, through the canon law that applies to all 
Christians. It was administered by bishops and the papacy, as well as the 
ecclesiastical courts, even though temporal rulers and lords (nobles) were technically 
in charge of administrating physical, temporal matters. In spite of this separation of 
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powers, temporal rulers and lords were all subject to the canon law and censure by 
the ecclesiastical courts, bishops, and the papacy (the most famous censures being the 
excommunication and interdict).68      
In his articulation of his Two Realm teaching, Luther clearly rejected the medieval 
conception of two-sword theology. Luther showed that the medieval conception had clearly 
confused the function and objectives of the temporal and spiritual spheres.69 Contrary to two-
sword theology, Luther emphasized that Church is not a law-making authority and that the 
formal temporal authority lay with the state and not with the cleric.70 To him, the Christians in 
the world are to be understood as the Corpus Christi (the body of Christ) and not Corpus 
Christianum (the body of Christians).71 Luther also rejected the medieval hierarchal theory of 
human society based on moral qualification. He affirmed that in the temporal realm God 
ordained three basic forms of authority (family, Church and the state), none of which are 
hierarchically arranged but are instituted to resist the power of sin and the devil in the earthly 
kingdom.72   
Luther’s Two Realm theology departed also from many of the other protestant reformers 
conception of the relation between temporal and spiritual power. In this regard, Luther rejected 
any inclination towards establishing a biblicistic theocracy. He contended against legalist 
Andreas Karlstadt who was determined to build an ideal Christian city based on the Law of 
Moses73 and the political activist Thomas Müntzer who was determined to take over the 
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machinery of state towards Christianization of social and political life.74 Luther’s two realm 
theology departed also from Calvin of Geneva’s and Zwingli in Zurich’s distinction between two 
realms. In the course of his reformation in Zurich, Zwingli did distinguish between temporal and 
spiritual government, but he proposed that they should not be seen as separate entities. Unlike 
Luther, he found the purpose of both in working together for the Christianization of the society 
and establishing a theocracy. To Zwingli, both preacher and prince are servants of the kingly rule 
of God, and the community consisted of both Church and political community under the same 
rule of God.  Within the city, the minister and the magistrate have different tasks and functions, 
one preaching and the other ruling, but both related to and submitted to the kingship of Christ, 
help reinstate Christ on the throne.75 Bruce Gordon sums up Zwingli’s approach thus: 
Zwingli understood ‘reformation’ to mean the reform of the community or 
congregation. The agents of reform were magistrates. Since human communities 
reformed by the Word of God were to reflect the divine law by which they were 
governed, there could be no distinction between the religious and political life of the 
community; to belong to the state was to belong to the church. Thus magistrates were 
charged with administering justice in accordance with Scriptural authority, and 
further, they were responsible for the spiritual welfare for their people.76 
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Calvin more or less followed the pattern of Zwingli in his treatment of two kingdoms 
theology. Identifying Calvin’s approach, Ralph Hancock notes that “In every fundamental 
question that he addresses, Calvin rigorously distinguishes between and the union of the secular 
and the spiritual in order to join them fast together.”77 Thus in Calvin we find “the task of joining 
the spiritual and the political is made especially precarious by the danger of joining them too 
closely, of destroying the distinction between them.”78 Unlike Luther, Calvin envisaged a 
religious republic, which is both theocratic and theonomic.79 To this end, Calvin finds the Church 
and state working together, “but separated by a porous membrane- a membrane dividing their 
respective functions into spheres, one sphere focusing on the spiritual, the other on temporal.”80 
To him, the state and Church are mutually religious, and both, according to their respective mode 
of operation, are committed to oppose the evil whether it is spiritual, social, doctrinal, moral, or 
temporal. To Calvin, “the state's vision and raison d'etre derives from the church.”81  And the 
civil magistrate should be competent to enforce both tables of the Ten Commandments, that is, 
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“to the enforcement of pietas as well as aquitas and external righteousness.”82 They also have the 
responsibility to “defend the sound doctrine of godliness (pietas) and the order and standing 
(status) of the church.” 83 In this regard, unlike Luther “Calvin was known to mean that persistent 
heretics and blasphemers should be punished by death”84 by the state. 
Luther’s Two Realm theology in its understanding of the purpose of the state stands in 
sharp contrast to Calvin’s understanding. As we shall see later, although Luther wants the state to 
protect religion for sake of public order and common good, nevertheless he does not see the 
state’s role to judge and protect true doctrine against heresy, or the state to partner with the 
Church in Christianization of the society. Moreover to Luther, unlike Calvin, the secular 
government can function quite independently of the Christian faith and the emperor need not be 
a saint or even a Christian.85 However, unlike the Anabaptists who wanted Christians to sever 
their relationship with the secular world,86 Luther, along with other reformers, affirmed the 
temporal realm and authority as the arena in which Christians are called for active service and 
participation.    
Luther was not only influenced by the strands of traditions we have discussed so far, but he 
was also shaped by his faithful effort to interpret and relate the Scriptures to Christian life. In 
fact, Luther’s two realm distinction came to the forefront as he tried to reconcile various 
scripture passages which seem to promote conflicting demands in the life a Christian in society. 
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For example, at one hand, some prominent scriptural passages seems to teach Christians not to 
resist evil and that secular rights and laws have no validity at all to the believers. Thus Jesus on 
the Sermon on the Mount taught to love your enemies, turn the other cheek and not to resist an 
evil doer (Mathew 5:25, 39). Elsewhere Jesus taught that his kingdom is not from this world 
(John 18:36). On the other hand, the apostles Paul and Peter upheld the divine sanction of secular 
authority and urged everyone to be subject to governing authorities (Romans 13:1, 4; 1 Peter 
2:13).87 Luther sought to relate these different instructions to one another and to that extent as 
Hans-Martin Barth argues, “one can rightly say that he as elsewhere, as an exegete made a 
distinction between the two kingdoms”88. And as Jarret A. Carty notes: 
Luther’s conception of the two government came directly from the fact that neither 
the advice of Paul to submit to authority nor the commands of Christ to turn the other 
cheek could be disregarded. The two governments were the manifestation of two 
divine gifts, though seemingly contradicting one another, but In fact complementing 
each other as two distinct ways in which God directed human beings on earth. In the 
spiritual government, the Gospel of Christ ruled; in the temporal regiment, God ruled 
through law and worldly authority and demanded obedience.89    
To conclude our discussion thus far, Luther’s doctrine of Two Realms or kingdoms 
emerged in opposition to the medieval concept of supremacy of the Church and pope over 
temporal things, it critiqued Anabaptist tendency to withdraw from the society and refusal to 
assume positions of secular authority, and stood in sharp contrast against the vision of theocratic 
and theonomic vision of society of other reformers like Zwingli and Calvin.  Luther’s conception 
of Two Realm theology also is based upon, but moves beyond, some of the early two fold 
conceptions of reality, like that of Augustine’s two cities, Gelasius I’s original two sword theory, 
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and Ockham’s critique of papal authority. Equally essential for Luther was his effort to be 
faithful towards the biblical witness which teaches a distinction between two realms of God’s 
activity.  
The Contours of Luther’s Understanding of God’s Two Realms   
Luther’s understanding of God’s two realms is often understood as his basic framework for 
understanding the Christian reality.90 William J. Wright refers to Luther’s Two-realm framework 
as his reformation worldview or Weltanschauung, which is essential for clarifying all of his 
views.91 Similarly, Robert Kolb calls it “a part of the Lutheran conceptual framework, for it is 
more than an individual doctrine. It is a presupposition which permeates the whole of our 
thinking about how God works in His world and the entire life to which He has called us.”92 In 
this regard, John R. Stephenson points out that Luther’s two-realms understanding “could be 
used as a kind of conceptual clotheshorse on which to spread out the whole of his theology.”93  
To Luther, the realm of the right hand refers to the spiritual or heavenly realm where God’s 
concern is the redemptive/restorative work through the Gospel.94 In this realm, God reigns as the 
Redeemer and Sanctifier. Charles Arand thus elaborates: “The right hand kingdom refers to 
God’s work in bringing about a new creation, a new community of people . . . and . . . in doing 
so, the Spirit gathers the Church.” 95 Here the Church refers not to the Church as an organization 
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or institution but as the assembly of all true believers “who are scattered throughout the world 
but share the same Jesus Christ and Holy Spirit. As such, it is visible only to God; it remains 
hidden from the physical view of human beings.”96 
The left-hand realm refers to the earthly realm or the realm of God’s creation. As Arand 
notes, “we are dealing with the realm of creation, namely, the first article of the creed.”97 God 
reigns here as the Creator and Preserver, and thus His concern here is to preserve and protect His 
fallen creation from falling apart. The focus then is to foster the well-being of the whole creation, 
especially human communities in the midst of the destructive presence of sin.98  
At the heart of Luther’s two-realms understanding lies the distinction between God’s mode 
of  rule or government in human life. In the words of Martin Luther,  
For this reason, God has ordained two governments: the spiritual, by which the Holy 
Spirit produces Christians and righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, which 
restrains the un-Christian and wicked so that—no thanks to them—they are obliged to 
keep still and to maintain an outward peace.99 
Thus, to Luther, the spiritual government (“das giestliche Regiment”) is operated through God’s 
word and exists in the right hand. The temporal government (“das weltliche Regiment”) of the 
sword, rules the left-hand realm. Luther drew a sharp line of distinction between God’s modes of 
rule in the two realms. John Meyers elaborates the difference and unity in the mode of operation 
thus:  
The spiritual realm is without external power. Its power is exercised by God Himself 
through the Word and the preaching office. The secular realm is subject to human 
reason, and its authority is exercised by men who have the power to enforce laws, etc. 
It is God Himself who is active in both realms, and thus they are united. In the 
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spiritual sphere God works through the Gospelto save men, and in the secular He 
works through the Law and impels men to live in a certain way, to do good and avoid 
evil.100 
To Luther, human life operates within these two fundamental realms or arenas. We live 
before God (coram Deo) in the right-hand realm and before the world (coram Mundo) in the left-
hand realm. However, we inhabit both realms simultaneously. Thus, “we live in God's presence 
and at the same time in community with one another where we have responsibility for fellow 
creatures.”101 As Luther put it, “We inhabit two worlds as it were, one of them heavenly and the 
other earthly.”102  
It is important to note here that to Luther God maintains and uses both realms against the 
kingdom and work of the devil. As Gustav Aulen has demonstrated, according to Luther, the 
fundamental scriptural conception of history is a cosmic fight between good and evil, and 
between God and devil.103 Luther elaborates thus: 
For Christians know there are two kingdoms in the world, which are bitterly opposed 
to each other. In one of them Satan reigns, who is therefore called by Christ “the ruler 
of this world” [John 12:31] and by Paul “the god of this world” [II Cor. 4:4]. He 
holds captive to his will all who are not snatched away from him by the Spirit of 
Christ, as the same Paul testifies, nor does he allow them to be snatched away by any 
powers other than the Spirit of God, as Christ testifies in the parable of the strong 
man guarding his palace in peace [Luke 11:21]. In the other Kingdom, Christ reigns, 
and his Kingdom ceaselessly resists and makes war on the kingdom of Satan. Into 
this Kingdom we are transferred, not by our own power but by the grace of God, by 
which we are set free from the present evil age and delivered from the dominion of 
darkness.104 
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At the heart of Luther’s realms theology lies the reality of this cosmic fight against the kingdom 
of the devil. God employs his worldly and the spiritual government, adversus Diabolum, carnem 
et mundum. As Gustaf Wingren points out, should the both realms “be left to themselves for a 
moment, they would be overthrown by the power of evil and destruction.”105    
In order to better understand the Christian reality Luther envisages in relation to two 
realms, it is now important to discuss briefly two important theological distinctions Luther 
makes, which find their fullest expression under the rubric of his Two-Realm perspective. For 
our purpose, we shall briefly look at the distinction of Law and Gospel and the Saint-Sinner 
(simul justus et peccator) dialectic. In addition, the distinction of the two kinds of righteousness 
is key to understand the identity and performance of the Christian living in two realms, which 
will be the concern of chapter 6.  
Law and Gospel in Relation to Two Realms  
The distinction Luther made between Law and Gospel is key to understanding God’s rule 
in both realms. Robert Kolb explains this relation thus: 
Within the two realms exist distinct forms of governance, exercised through God’s 
two words: the Gospel governs the relationship between God and his children, the 
law governs relationships among his creatures, as his plan for life which prescribes 
proper human behavior. The Gospel does, however, motivate Christian service in the 
horizontal, the law prescribes human trust with mind and heart in the vertical 
relationship. Behind his words of both Gospel and law stands God, revealed in the 
vertical relationship in Jesus Christ, sometimes revealed, at others hidden, in the 
course of horizontal relationships. 106 
Law is often understood as the “embodiment of eternal will of God.”107  As Kolb and Arand 
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put it “The law is God’s prescription for human life.”108 In this sense, it could also be understood 
as “universal common sense of the human race.” Moreover “it is a sign of God’s love for his 
creatures that for them he designed a life with a framework and boundaries.”109 In this sense, law 
is also commonly termed as the divine law, natural law, or the law of creation, and, according to 
Luther, finds its clearest expression in the Ten Commandments.110 Moreover “Luther used the 
Ten Commandments, as found in Exodus and Deuteronomy, because when taken as a whole they 
are an ‘unsurpassed summary of the natural law’.”111  
Luther understands Law as the “eternal will of God” and finds its theological use in the 
right-hand realm. Here it reveals the root of all sin and all its fruits; it accuses, frightens, and 
judges the conscience. However, this primary use of the law, which then is God’s alien work 
(opus alien), prepares people for the hearing of the Gospel. However, the law cannot make a 
sinner alive, and it cannot establish his relationship with God.112 But this is precisely what the 
Gospel accomplishes in the right hand realm. Here God’s Spirit works through the Gospel, God’s 
“word of promise,” to create faith in a person, to passively receive God’s forgiveness and 
salvation. This work of the Gospel is often referred to as God’s “proper” work (opus 
proprium).113 In the right-hand realm, the law precedes the Gospel, however it is the Gospel 
alone which establishes one’s identity before God, and thereby carries out God’s proper work 
(opus proprium). Thus the right hand realm properly is the realm where God works through His 
Gospel. In this realm, God works through the ministry of Word and Sacraments to open up the 
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fountains from which people can truly receive forgiveness of sins, identity, purpose and 
motivation to live before God (coram Deo) and in his left hand realm (coram mundo).114    
 The left-hand is the realm wherein God rules through His law. In the left-hand realm, the 
law finds its “civil use” and acts a curb to restrain evil to maintain peace and justice.115  To 
Luther, this ‘civil use’ of the law proceeds directly from the fact that God is Creator.116  As 
Wingren notes, God “has created the whole world, and cannot remain a passive onlooker while 
evil and earth become firmly entrenched in the world. He sets up a barrier against the onward 
course of evil, and restricts its effects.”117 To Luther, since natural law is woven into the very 
fabric of creation, it is universally accessible and applicable to everyone through human reason 
and hence remains no secret.118 Luther maintains that although fallen human reason cannot lead 
one to the saving knowledge of Christ, it still has a God-ordained role in the left-hand realm 
because it helps humanity understand the requirements of the natural law for civil life.119 Thus to 
Luther, although human reason and natural law are both written in man’s heart, yet tainted with 
sin, they play an important role in the left-hand realm to keep society from destruction.120 To 
Luther, the left-hand realm is primarily the realm of the Law. However, the Gospel is indirectly 
related to the left-hand realm inasmuch as it shapes the identity, ability, and motivation of 
Christians to perform the tasks entrusted to them for the preservation of His creation.121  
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Saint-Sinner Dialectic (simul justus et peccator) in Relation to Two Realms   
To Luther, Justification is not a process but an act, a declaration, whereby through faith, 
sinners are declared to be forgiven and to be perfectly right with God. This declaration which is 
whole and complete makes one a perfect saint in God's sight.  This does not, however, mean that 
a baptized person, when judged by God’s law, does not continue to be sinners.122  As Cargill 
Thompson further clarifies: 
For Luther it is of the essence of the Christian’s position on earth that he is a divided 
person. He has two natures: he is flesh and spirit, old man and new man; and these 
two natures are constantly rising against one another within him. Hence it is 
fundamental in Luther’s view of the Christian on earth, that he remains a sinner. 
Justification does not remove original sin. At best it simply gives the Christian power 
to resist sin, but his saved in spirt of his sins, not because of his ability to avoid them. 
In practice original sin remains as strong in the Christian as in other men; he is 
constantly tempted to commit sins and, even with the gift of faith, he cannot totally 
resist sin.123 
Kolb and Arand explain the implication of this dialectic relationship thus, “Luther’s simul justus 
et peccator means that in this life a person is a sinner in the eyes of the law, the world, and 
oneself, while at the same time completely a saint in the eyes of God on account of Christ.”124 As 
Luther puts it “Though I am a sinner in myself, I am not a sinner in Christ.” Luther’s simul, 
should not be understood that a person is partially a sinner and partially righteous. But “The 
Christian is completely and totally righteous in the eyes of God, even as the believer is 
completely and totally sinful when considered in and of oneself.”125  
Luther’s assertion that a Christian is simultaneously a saint and sinner carries much 
relevance towards our understanding about God’s activity in the two realms. Since we are both 
saint and sinner throughout every moment of our life, we always stand in need of God’s work 
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123 Thompson, The Political Thought of Marin Luther, 21. 
124 Kolb and Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology, 49. 
125 Kolb and Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology, 49. 
 94 
through His right and the left-hand government. Thus through God’s activity towards us in the 
right hand realm, through His word of law and Gospel, we are reminded each day about our 
sinfulness and the need to live a life of repentance. Each day the Gospel restores our trust in 
Christ and renews our new identity as His child whom God created in justification.126 Moreover, 
through His activity in the right hand realm, God’s spirit instructs us through His Law127 and 
Gospel provides us with the identity, motivation and strength to perform in the left-hand realm 
for our neighbors’ good.128  Still because of their sinful nature, God continues to use His left hand 
regiment to restrain, guide and check the evil inclination of His baptized children and saints in 
Christ. Thus Luther’s affirmation of the reality of saint-sinner dialectic (simul justus et peccator) 
points towards the reality that a Christian is simultaneously a spiritual person and a temporal 
person. And as a temporal person due to sin, he needs the disciple of the government.129 Thus 
God’s rule in the left-hand realm is a loving service to all people, including Christians for the 
preservation of His creation and common good for all.130       
Conclusion   
The attempt made in this chapter was to briefly introduce Luther’s understanding about 
God’s two realms in its theological and historical context. This effort was made with an intention 
to further build upon and elaborate on the concept of state and Christian involvement in society 
                                                 
126 Robert Kolb, Confessor of the Faith, 130. 
127 Apart from its theological and civil use, a third use of the law is often identified as the educational, 
didactic or pedagogical use of the law. Here Law serves to teach those who have already been justified by faith, to 
perform good works that please God and benefit one’s neighbor. Although Luther did not explicitly expound this 
use as the third use of the law as Melanchthon did, still he recognized and found it valuable that “those who are 
justified by faith remain sinful and in need of God’s constant instruction through the law.” For more discussion see 
Witte, Law and Protestantism, 103–104. 
128 Kolb and Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology, 157–58. 
129 Thompson, The Political Thought of Marin Luther, 24. 
130 Hoefer, Church-State-Society, 22–3. 
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in the context of Luther’s understanding of God’s two realms in the later chapters. Towards that 
end, this chapter attempted to locate Two Realm theology in relation to some of the earlier two-
fold conception of reality and how it differs from some of the other competing theological 
perspectives. In the course of our discussion we have noted that the whole of humanity, 
irrespective of whether they are Christians or non-Christians, stands in need of God’s two-fold 
rule in this world. Moreover, God’s rule through His law in the left-hand realm, is a sign of His 
love towards His creation. The purpose of His left-hand realm is to keep order in the world, 
provide justice, and to restrain evil so that people may obtain a stable, orderly, and peaceful 
life.131 For that reason God has ordained certain structures or institutions in the left-hand realm. 
The temporal authority, particularly the state, is one such institution in the left-hand realm. Our 
concern in the next chapter is to undertake a detailed study of the God ordained institutions in the 
left-hand realm, and particularly the concept of state in the backdrop of Luther’s two realm 
theology. 
 
                                                 
131 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 131.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
LUTHER’S CONCEPT OF STATE: ITS PURPOSE, FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS 
The purpose of this chapter is to undertake a study on God ordained structures or 
institutions in the left hand realm for the preservation of His creation. Our special focus will be 
on the functions and limitation of the institution of the State against the backdrop of Luther’s 
Two Realm perspective. 
God Ordained Structures or Institutions in the Left-hand Realm  
Luther’s teaching on divinely ordained intuitions in the left hand realm and people acting 
through these structures to carry out God’s will for His creation is fundamental to his  teaching 
on God’s two realm theology.1  Luther affirmed that God has created and placed human beings in 
community for each other. In this community God has ordained “comprehensive spheres or 
structures of life (genera vitae), which might be called created orders or walks of life.”2   
Luther’s understanding of the structures of life in the left hand realm was drawn from and 
was adapted from the prevalent medieval social theory of his times. Robert Kolb elaborates it 
thus:  
All Western European societies in the Middle Ages presumed a division of labor 
among the Church (ecclesia), which consisted of priests, monks, and nuns; the 
leadership of society (politia)\and the household, in which family and economic life 
took place (oeconomia). The great mass of the population fell into this third category. 
These “estates”—the usual translation of the German Stand and the Latin status—
                                                 
1 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 130.  
2 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 59. Different authors uses a variety of terms while discussing 
this concept. For example, Robert Kolb uses “Situations” See Robert Kolb, “God’s calling”, 5. And Robert Benne 
“Places of Responsibility” See Robert Benne, Ordinary Saints: An Introduction to the Christian Life (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1988). 
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embraced all people in their individual metaphorical locales in which life unfolds 
each day. This social theory also posited that in each of these situations or walks of 
life (as we might better translate the term) individuals have “offices ״— Amt in 
German, officium in Latin—that define the roles and the functions which are imposed 
upon each person in their respective Stände or walks of life. A better translation for 
Amt might be, if you will pardon the misspelling, “response-ability,” for these 
“offices” give human beings the ability and obligation to respond to the needs of 
others for the smooth functioning of the community and its individual members.3  
Luther’s account of the God ordained structures finds a systematic treatment in his Genesis 
Commentary.4  Luther notes, “These, then, are the three hierarchies we often inculcate, namely, 
the household, the government, and the priesthood, or the home, the state, and the church”. 5 
Luther further explains, “The first is that of the parents, who should maintain strict discipline in 
their house when ruling the domestics and the children. The second is the government, for the 
officers of the state bear the sword for the purpose of coercing the obstinate and remiss by means 
of their power of discipline. The third is that of the church, which governs by the Word.”6 Luther 
notes that “with this threefold authority” God protects “the human race against the devil, the 
flesh, and the world, to the end that offenses may not increase but may be cut off.” 7 
Luther’s rejection of the traditional view, which made a hierarchical distinction between 
                                                 
3 Robert Kolb, “Called to Milk Cows and Govern Kingdoms Martin Luther's Teaching on the Christian's 
Vocations,” Concordia Journal (Spring 2013): 133–34. 
4 Luther articulated his understanding about the institutions in the left-hand realm at several other places also. 
Another good place where he offers a comprehensive treatment about the same is in his explanation on the forth 
commandment in the Large Catechism. Here he organized the created structures using the category of “four fathers.”  
The first group includes biological parents, where the order of marriage and family life comes (domus). The second 
group includes fathers and mothers of the household as employers (patres et matres familias), which comes under 
the order of economic life (oeconomia). The third group are fathers of the nation (patres patriae) which includes 
magistrates, princes or people who are in temporal authority. This arena of temporal authority of the state 
(civutas/politia). Finally comes the spiritual fathers such as pastors and bishops. This area of religious life) has to do 
with the Church ((ecclesia).  See “Martin Luther, Ten Sermons on the Catechism, 1520,” in Vol. 51 of Luther’s 
Works, Sermons I, ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1999), 143–49. 
5 Martin Luther, “Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 26-30,” in Vol. 5 of Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav Jan 
Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehmann (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1999), 139. 
6 Martin Luther, “Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 15-20,” in Vol. 3 of Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav Jan 
Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehmann (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1999), 279.  
7 LW 3:279.  
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the sacred and profane spheres of human activities in the world, resulted in his application of 
these three structures in the left-hand realm, in a way that radically differed from the medieval 
spiritualizing world view of the medieval Christianity. Luther overturned the view that sacred 
activities, whether it includes formal liturgies, monastic life or daily spiritual practices, were 
more God-pleasing and holy than the so called profane activities which includes the ordinary and 
common tasks of daily life.8 Luther’s rejection of this distinction was based on his contention 
that “God’s bestowal of passive righteousness, which comes through the Holy Spirit’s 
pronouncement of forgiveness and the resulting faith in Christ, determines the core identity of 
those whom the Spirit turns to Jesus through the re-creative word of life and salvation on the 
basis of Christ’s death and resurrection.”9 To Luther  “all activities performed by the faithful 
people of God as a result of their trust in him are equally holy, and equally without influence in 
determining that his people are his people.”10  Thus as Edward Cranz rightly observes, “Luther 
maintains that there are three “holy rules.” The house father and the prince exercise an office 
which is equally God ordained and holy with that of the clergy, and accordingly the office and 
estate of the clergy is as such no higher than that of the two other hierarchies.”11 
Luther’s articulation of God-ordained threefold structures, could be translated into a 
modern context, firstly, as the order of daily life, which includes marriage, family life and 
livelihood. (domus, oeconomia or parentum); secondly, the temporal government  or state 
(civitas/politia) and third; the Church and religious life (ecclesia). 12  
                                                 
8 Kolb, “Christian’s Vocations,” 134.    
9 Kolb, “Christian’s Vocations,” 134. 
10 Kolb, “Christian’s Vocations,” 134. 
11 Edward Cranz, Essay on the Development of Luther’s Thought on Justice, Law and Society (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), 174.   
12 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 58–9. And Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 130. 
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Oswald Bayer finds three different aspects of our modern life coming under the first order 
of daily life. They are, the family and marriage, business, and education and academic study.13 
Luther finds the order of the family as “the foundational and the first order of the human life.”14 
All other orders, namely that of government and the church, stand in service of the family.15 To 
Luther, “all authorities derive their authority from the office of the parent-and not the other way 
around.”16  
Kolb and Arand note that in the modern context the economic dimension of the created 
order of life could include the production and consumption of goods and services, our work place 
environments, our roles as owners, workers, employers and employees.17 And “by means of the 
workplace and marketplace, God provides us with the goods and services necessary to sustain 
our physical life and community.”18 The economic life during Luther’s time was different from 
ours, as the economy of medieval Europe was largely shaped by an agrarian culture.19 
Nevertheless as Bernhard Lohse points out, the latter part of the fifteenth and the sixteenth 
centuries was also a time of radical change where economic practices of early capitalism 
developed.20  Although the complex globalized economic structure of the modern times was 
unknown to Luther, his basic ethical perspective towards the economic life of a society, holds 
relevance to our modern economic context largely shaped by self-interest, an attitude of profit at 
                                                 
13 Bayer, Martin Luther's Theology, 142. Bayer bases this interconnection noting the fact to Luther rooted in 
Aristotelian tradition, finds economy (oeconomia) as coming from the house (oikos), from the way a household 
operates. Bayer, Martin Luther's Theology, 142. 
14 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 60.  
15 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 60. 
16 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 60. 
17 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 61. 
18 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 61.  
19 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 61. 
20 Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther: An Introduction to His Life and Work (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 7. 
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any cost, and moral emptiness.21 Kolb notes that Luther had definite convictions about economic 
life and throughout his life he encouraged believers to demonstrate and execute God’s providing 
care through their economic sphere of life.22 Luther, critiquing various unjust economic practices 
during his time, “recognized no mammonistic autonomy in business, whether by grand capitalists 
or pretty tradesmen, just as he recognized no ‘Machiavellian autonomy of politics’. All who 
served the public did so at God’s call and behest and were obliged to do according to his rules.”23   
Luther placed great value on education.24 He found, the school to be an extension of the 
home, since to Luther, ‘the basis of both the State and the Church is found in the family, in 
which the young are trained for civil life and the Kingdom of God.”25  The two reasons which 
stands out in Luther’s writings for the establishment of schools “were the welfare of the Church 
and the needs of the State.”26 In Luther’s thinking, schools help the Church by training children 
                                                 
21 Mark Lutz a well accomplished economist defines the character of modern economics thus, “Modern 
economics is the science of self-interest, of how to best accommodate individual behavior by means of markets and 
the commodification of human relations . . . In this economic world view, the traditional human faculty of reason 
gets short-changed and degraded to act as the servant of sensory desires. There is no room for logic of human values 
and rationally founded ethics. Human aspirations are watered down to skillful shopping behavior and channeled into 
a stale consumerism. One would think that there must be an alternative way to conceptualize the economy. As 
quoted by Kamran Mofid “The Roots of Economics and Why it has Gone So Wrong”, http://www.religion-
online.org/showarticle.asp?title=3143 ( accessed on 20th July 2015). Similarly Amartya Sen, the 1998 Nobel Prize 
winning economist in his writing warns about the growing distance between economics and ethics which has already 
brought some major deficiencies in the contemporary economic theory and practice. Sen believes that modern 
economics could become more productive by paying greater and more explicit attention to the ethical considerations 
and welfare for all. Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1987), 78–89.  
22 Robert Kolb, Martin Luther: Confessor of the Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 184–85. 
For more discussion on Luther’s thought on trade and economics see Luther’s Appeal to the German Nobility (1520) 
and Trade and Usury (1524). And also Luther Hess Waring, The Political Theories of Martin Luther (New York: 
Kinickbocker, 1910), 205–20. 
23 Kolb, Martin Luther: Confessor of the Faith, 185. See also Robert Benne “The Calling of the Church in 
Economic life,” in Carl E. Braaten and Robert W.Jenson edited, The Two Cities of God: The Church’s 
Responsibility for the Earthly City (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 95–116.  
24 Luther enunciated most progressive ideas about education of all German protestant reformers. Some of his 
important work in this regard includes  Letter to the Mayors and Aldermen in Behalf of Christian Schools (1524) and 
Sermon on the duty of  Sending Children to School (1530) 
25 Franklin Verzelius Newton Painter, Luther on Education: Including a Historical Introduction and A 
Translation of the Reformer’s Two Most Important Educational Treatises (Saint Louis, Concordia, 1889), 114.  
26 Painter, Luther on Education, 131. 
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to become useful teachers and heads of families, and raise godly ministers to preach and defend 
the Gospel.27 Painter rightly points out that it is a mistake to assume that Luther was interested in 
education solely for the sake of the Church.28 Painter quotes Luther from the Letter to Mayors 
and Aldermen in Behalf of Christian Schools (1530):  
Even if there were no soul, and men did not need schools and the languages for the 
sake of Christianity and the Scriptures, still for the establishment of the best schools 
everywhere, both for boys and girls, this consideration is of itself sufficient, namely, 
that society, for the maintenance of civil order and the proper regulation of the 
household, needs accomplished and well-trained men and women. Now such men are 
to come from boys, and such women from girls; hence it is necessary that boys and 
girls be properly taught and brought up.29 
Luther placed great value on civil government and found it to be a divinely ordained 
structure for social order and human welfare.  He believed that the welfare of the State depends 
on the intelligence and virtue of its rulers and citizens. Schools and educational structures serve 
an explicit purpose in the human welfare by providing well educated and socially responsible 
people for the State.30  
Before we discuss in detail the order of the temporal authority, it would be profitable for us 
to discuss here briefly about the institution of the Church in the left-hand realm. In Luther’s 
thought Church is the only institution which finds its existence both in the right and the left hand 
realm. In this sense the Church is different from other orders in the left-hand realm.  Arand put 
this two dimensional nature of the Church thus: 
In one sphere the Church lives in relation to God under the Word, and in the other 
sphere the Church lives in relation to other human creatures as the Word flows into 
human affairs. The Church coram Deo lives from the Word of God, and it lives 
coram mundo to deliver the Word of God to others. It lives in the presence of God as 
a creature and recipient of His Word and in the midst of human society as an agent 
                                                 
27 Painter, Luther on Education, 132.  
28 Painter, Luther on Education, 134–35. 
29 Painter, Luther on Education, 135. 
30 For more discussion see Painter, Luther on Education, 135–146. 
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that delivers life and salvation through preaching and absolution, through the 
Sacraments, and through the mutual conversation and consolation of Christians with 
one another. At its core, the Church is a spiritual reality, but a reality that has a 
sociological/empirical expression in the world.31 
In Luther’s thought, the Church is understood as a human institution because “God had 
entrusted the spiritual work of the Church to people.”32 While the church’s spiritual work is 
governed directly by Christ, the Church as a human institution has physical and temporal 
responsibilities. This not only includes worldly responsibilities such as paying pastor’s salary, 
maintaining accounts or repairing the sanctuary, but also effectively ordering those activities 
which are directly related to the Church coram deo, through which God builds His church, 
namely the ministry of the Word and Sacraments.33   
  Thus while the Church is una sancta, the assembly of believers belongs in the right-hand 
realm, and the Church as an institution belong in the left-hand realm.34 This two-dimensional 
understanding means that while the Church as the spiritual government35 of the right-hand realm 
operates to bring God’s forgiveness and salvation to man, the Church as an institution that 
operates in the left-hand realm is also concerned with the extension of law and justice within that 
                                                 
31 Charles P. Arand, “A Two-Dimensional Understanding of the Church for the Twenty-First Century,” 
Concordia Journal (April 2007): 147. 
32 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 139. 
33 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 139.  In the horizontal dimension of the Church as it exist in the 
left-hand realm, Luther recognized two important but unequal kinds of activities which are important to the life of 
the church. They are those activities which are commanded by God (de iure divinó), which are directly related to the 
Church coram Deo.  And secondly those activities which are carried out using human reason and imagination (de 
iure humanó) for the purpose of carrying out the ministry of Word and Sacraments. These includes human 
traditions, human orders, and adiaphora.  Although these activities are not directly related to the definition of the 
Church coram Deo,  “but they do contribute to the way in which the Word is delivered by human beings and the 
effectiveness in which God's people carry out God's will within the world. We can distinguish between these two 
activities in that the former deals with the "what" we are given to do by God; whereas, the latter deals with "how" 
we carry them out.” For more discussion see Arand, “Two-Dimensional Understanding”, 149. And Charles P. 
Arand, “What are Ecclesiologically Challenged Lutherans to Do: Starting Points for a Lutheran Ecclesiology,” 
Concordia Journal (January-April 2008).   
34 Arand and Biermann, “Two Kinds of Righteousness?,” 30. 
35 See Wingren, Luther on Vocation, 25 and Kolb, Confessor of the Faith, 177. 
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realm.36 Thus within the left-hand realm the Church has a moral responsibility to preach the 
wrath and law of God “in such a way, by audible and visible words, as to combat the world’s 
decline towards nothingness.”37  
Luther finds the establishment of the church, before the household and the state.38  God’s 
Word to Adam to eat of all trees in Paradise except the tree of the knowledge of good and evil 
(Genesis 2:16-17) established the church.39 Luther notes “God gave Adam Word, worship, and 
religion in its barest, purest, and simplest form, in which there was nothing laborious, nothing 
elaborate…. Only this He wants: that he praise God that he thank Him that he rejoice in the 
Lord.”40  
Hans –Martin Barth notes that the “sense for ‘worship of God’ as built into the “order of 
creation,” “cannot mean ‘church’ in the proper sense, but only a social form of religion 
belonging to it as a reality in the society.”41 Oswald Bayer further elaborates this form of general 
religion, which is not uniquely a Christian one as follows: 
The first Word of God to the human being, according to the non-Priestly creation 
story, is  the promise of life (Gen 2:16): “You may freely eat…!” This promise of life 
is protected by a threat (Gen 2:17): “But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil 
you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die.” About this promise 
and threat Luther observes concisely in his 1535 Genesis lecture: “This is the 
establishment of the church, before the household and the state existed”; no special 
church, but general one: “without walls,” it exists in Word and in faith—in that God 
calls the human beings to life, “preaches” to him in this way, “sets his Word before 
him,” and thus “desires only that he praises God, offers him thanks, so that he will 
                                                 
36 Arand and Biermann, “Two Kinds of Righteousness?,” 131–32. 
37 Braaten and Jenson edited, The Two Cities, 6. 
38 See Martin Luther, “Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 1-5,” in Vol. I of Luther’s Work.  ed. Jaroslav Jan 
Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehmann (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1999), 103. 
39 LW 1:103. 
40 LW 1:106.  
41 Hans, The Theology of Martin Luther, 328. 
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rejoice in the Lord. It seems astonishing at creation” and is not a uniquely Christian 
institution.42 
This observation opens doors to discuss the implications of the nature and role of other 
religions in the left hand realm. The first argument is that there does exist the impulse to reach 
out to the true God in other world religions, though it might be darkened and distorted through 
sin. Kolb and Arand note “Although Adam and Eve fell into sin by being pulled away from 
God’s word, the human religious impulse was not destroyed. Instead, it became distorted so that 
humans invented religions to replace the true knowledge of God that they had lost.”43 Oswald 
Bayer further elaborates the nature and limitations of human religious impulse as present in other 
religions:  
From the primeval promise of life that is valid for every person (Gen.2:16), together 
with the self-revelation of God: “I am the Lord, your God!” (Exod. 20:3), which uses 
the threat of death to protect the promise of life (Gen. 2:17), an appropriate “natural 
theology” comes forth, and concurrently, a religious phenomenology. In the sense 
that it is used in Romans 1:18-3:20, it assumes that there is a relationship with God 
that is lived out by every human being, but which is actually and in practice always a 
failure; it is a broken relationship. Reason-not primarily the theoretical, but rather the 
practical variety that is guided by the power of the imagination-is grasping for God 
already, but always misses the mark, so that Luther (concerning Jon.1:5: “Then the 
mariners were afraid, and each cried to his god”) can formulate the concise statement 
“that these people in the ship all knew about God” “but had no certainty of God.” To 
make God the true and certain God is the office of Jesus Christ.44 
Secondly, from this perspective we could also affirm that other religions do record certain 
truths about God’s nature and law which are useful for a peaceful and orderly life in the left-hand 
                                                 
42 Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology, 126–27. In this way, a need and sense for worship is already build into 
creation (First Article). However fall radically corrupted this sense of worship built into creation and human beings 
lost the true knowledge and relationship with God, and invented their own religion and gods to their imaginations to 
continue with. However the church, as an unique reality although having its continuation in the realm of creation 
before fall as an order of creation, should be properly understood in the realm of redemption (Second and Third 
Article), where true knowledge of God is restored once again, through Jesus Christ and God’s Word, and fallen 
human being are redeemed and resorted their relationship with God, through faith, by the Holy Spirit in Jesus Christ. 
In this sense Church stands apart from the general sense worship build into creation which was distorted with fall.        
43 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 63. 
44 Bayer, Martin Luther's Theology, 127. 
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realm.45 In this sense Luther could affirm with Paul that God’s “deity and power” are evident to 
anyone in the natural order of things (Rom 1:20). Similarly the evidence of God’s goodness in 
the bounty with which He replenishes the earth (Acts 14:16-17) is evident to everyone. Moreover 
it can be alluded that the voice of God’s law is also present in different religions since the 
requirements of God’s law is written on everyone’s heart (Rom 2:5).46 In the right-hand realm, 
the affirmation of God’s truth in other religions may be theologically deficient, because it does 
not confess saving faith in the true, triune God revealed in Jesus Christ.47 World religions, 
however, with regard to their ceremonial righteousness, have relevance in the left-hand realm 
contributing towards building order, external peace and justice.48 Thus non-Christian religions do 
have a positive voice and role to play for the sake of common good in the left-hand realm. 
Luther’s Perspective on State and Temporal Authority  
The purpose of this section is to undertake a detailed study on the nature and function of 
the State or Civil government in Luther’s thought. We shall also discuss the role of reason and 
natural law in relation to the State and further explore the dynamic relationship between Church 
and State as a two God ordained institution in the left-hand realm, fulling His purpose for His 
creation. Luther was a not a political philosopher but a biblical theologian and a religious 
reformer. Hence, his perspective on temporal authority was profoundly theological in nature.49 
                                                 
45 Hoefer, Church-State-Society, 75. 
46 See Martin Luther, “Lectures on Jonah,” in Vol. 19 of Luther's Works, Minor Prophets II: Jonah and 
Habakkuk,  ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehmann (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1999), 53–
54,  Martin Luther, “Lectures on Romans,” Vol. 25 of Luther's Works, ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald 
and Helmut T. Lehmann (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1999), 180–81., Oswald Bayer, Martin Luther's Theology,126– 
39. And Hoefer, Church-State-Society, 75. 
47 William W. Schumacher, “Civic Participation by Churches and Pastors: An Essay on Two Kinds of 
Righteousness,” Concordia Journal 30 (July 2004): 175. 
48 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 63. 
49 Ernest K. Pasiciel, “Martin Luther’s Theology of the Civil Authority,” Didaskalia 11 (Spring 2000): 38–39. 
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Lewis W. Spitz notes “Luther did not understand the concept of the "state" as a legal, political 
and social entity in the modern sense.50Thus Cargill Thompson further elaborates that Luther did 
not have a “highly developed sense of the state in the modern sense of the term.”51 To Luther, 
political authority was not an abstract institution but “something which is vested in individuals, 
in rulers or collectively in magistrates.”52 So his political theory was always conducted in 
personal terms, for example, “obedience is something which is not given to an abstraction, but to 
a person-like king or prince, or to the collective magistrates of a city.”53    
Luther’s vocabulary to denote political communities includes “respublica”, “politia”, 
“civitas” and “Reich.”54  His key-word to denote political authority was “Oberkeit” or 
“Obrigkeit”,  with its Latin synonymous “magistratus”,  which then was an umbrella term “to 
denote political authority in general and which can be applied equally in the political context of 
Germany to the Emperor, the princes or the town governments.”55 Some of the important works 
of Luther on temporal authority includes: Temporal Authority: To What Extent it should be 
Obeyed (1523), On Whether Soldiers Too Can Be Saved (1526),   
Origin and Purpose of State/ Civil Authority   
In Luther’s estimate, civil authority is a divine institution and its authority in the left-hand 
realm primarily rests not on “an autonomous will to power,” or “man's natural social drive and 
impulse,” nor in “the consent of the governed,” but in the divine will of God for the preservation 
                                                 
50 Lewis W. Spitz, “Luther’s Ecclesiology and His Concept of the Prince as Notbisch,” Church History, 22, 
no.2 (June 1953): 115. Spitz further notes that the State in the modern sense of the terms seems first to have come 
into common usage in the last half of the sixteenth century from Italian sources via French jurists. See Spitz, 
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of the fallen world.56  Luther writes: 
First, we must provide a sound basis for the civil law and sword so no one will doubt 
that it is in the world by God’s will and ordinance. The passages which do this are the 
following: Romans 13, “Let every soul [Seele] be subject to the governing authority, 
for there is no authority except from God; the authority which everywhere 
[allenthalben] exists has been ordained by God. He then who resists the governing 
authority resists the ordinance of God, and he who resists God’s ordinance will incur 
judgment.” Again, in I Peter 2[:13–14], “Be subject to every kind of human 
ordinance, whether it be to the king as supreme, or to governors, as those who have 
been sent by him to punish the wicked and to praise the righteous.”57 
Luther viewed temporal rulers not just as delegates to whom God has entrusted the exercise 
of temporal government: but also in a more positive sense, as the actual instruments or “masks” 
through which God exercise his temporal governance in the left-hand realm.58 In this sense 
Luther could affirm that “The hand that wields the sword is not the hand of man, but the hand of 
God.”59 Although Luther affirms the divine character of the office of temporal authority, he was 
well aware of the possible abuse by the rulers who actually occupy the office. In Luther’s 
thought one could trace at least two reasons responsible for this fate; temptation, which comes 
along with the office and Satan’s ploy to overthrow God’s rule in the two realms. Cargill 
Thompson rightly sums up Luther’s perspective in this regard: 
Indeed, Luther sees rulers as being particularly exposed, by the nature of their office, 
to temptation. For the possession of authority encourages them to abuse their office 
and to use their power to advance their own selfish interests instead of those of their 
subjects. Standing as they do above their subjects, they are inclined to treat their 
subjects as their serfs or as their private property and to believe that they are entitled 
to do whatever they wish. Moreover- and here one returns to the doctrine of the 
conflict between “Reich Gottes” and “Teufels Reich”- they are particularly exposed to 
the attacks of Satan. For one of the Devil’s constant aims is to overthrow the Two 
Regiments or to gain control of them for himself, and one of the easiest ways he has 
                                                 
56 Pasiciel, “Martin Luther’s Theology,” 39. 
57 LW 45:85–86. 
58 Thompson, Political Thought, 63–64.  
59 Thompson, Political Thought, 63–64. 
 108 
of doing this is to tempt the offices of the temporal regiment to abuse their authority 
and to use it for their own selfish needs to neglect and oppression of their subjects.60   
Although the possibility of abuse of temporal office is real, still Luther does not believe 
this abuse destroys its divine character, but “it merely means that Satan is being (temporarily) 
successful in his efforts to undermine God’s government. For God turns evil to good and He uses 
evil rulers for His own ends.”61 
In Luther’s writings one could find at least two perspectives regarding the origin of the 
state. In the first perspective, sees the state not as an order of creation but rather as an order of 
necessity. In his Genesis Commentary Luther notes “…Moreover, there was no government of 
the state before sin, for there was no need of it. Civil government is a remedy required by our 
corrupted nature.”62 In this sense, to Luther the state is a postlapsarian necessity.63 And it is 
primarily a “forma et remedium peccati”64 or “a necessary antidote against the ruined natural 
world.”65  The power of the state is, then, a coercive authority. The purpose of the state is to 
punish sins and to save people from the effects of the sin. This coercive power of the government 
is essential to the left-hand realm because as Luther notes “no one is by nature Christian or 
righteous, but altogether sinful and wicked”66 and without the sword of the government wicked 
men would destroy each other. In this sense Luther’s perspective on government is Hobbesian, 
since according to Hobbes the life of man on earth would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
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short”67 in the absence of the government. Oswald Bayer sums up Luther’s thought, “…the 
power of coercion is primary in the state. It alone hinders random actions; it alone restrains 
animal instincts, in situations where it is one against the other for survival; it alone can deal with 
Cain, the murderer of his brother; it alone subdues the battle of everyone against everyone else in 
a life-and-death struggle for mutual recognition.” 68 Although to Luther temporal government is a 
postlapsarian necessity, an eye of faith can alone still see it as a divine gift of God which 
evidences God’s continuing mercy to his creation.69  
Although Luther at times treats temporal government as being a product of fall, still there 
are other times wherein Luther treats it as an original act of creation along with other institutions. 
For example, Luther finds the political estate coming “from Adam’s paternal authority and from 
God’s gift to Adam of rule over all the beasts of the field.”70 To Luther the political estate is 
rooted within the economic or household estate. Oswald Bayer clarifies, “Thus, the explanation 
of fourth commandment in the large catechism reads; ‘All other authority flows and spreads out 
from the authority of the parents.’ And at another point: ‘The household is the source of all 
public affairs.’ To this extent, Luther relativizes his strict theological assessment that the political 
estate had to be established because of sin.”71  Kolb and Arand clarify that in the later years 
Luther “recognized the human need for organization in society. And so, against some 
Anabaptists of the sixteenth century, the Lutheran reformers stressed that “legitimate civil 
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ordinance are good creations of God and divine ordinance.”72 To Luther state has its origin along 
with other institutions in the left-hand realm as a natural and necessary part of divine economy, 
to foster and enhance the collective life of God’s creation in the left-hand realm.    
Oswald Bayer notes that each perspective concerning the origins of the state brings along 
with it particular political options. If we fail to balance our views or lean towards one at the 
expense of other, a distorted view on the temporal authority would result. The first perspective 
on state as postlapsarian necessity lend to the view that the state needs to be a coercive authority. 
If taken to the extreme, this perspective could envisage a police state. In such a scenario, 
“opportunities to settle public matters by vote, to contribute to understanding the common will, 
are going to be distrusted in principle; one fear mob rule in such system.”73 However, if we 
proceed from the assumption that state is an order of creation, then we could affirm an optimistic 
view about the natural law and human capabilities in the left-hand realm. From this view one 
could positively affirm that “human beings can strive for a consensus that will eventually be 
cosmopolitan, a consensus of all peoples to be achieved by their powers of reason…”74 This 
resonates with Luther’s affirmation that “God created human beings so that they could get along 
together in a friendly and peaceful way.”75 However taken to extreme, one weakness inherent in 
this approach is the failure to take seriously sin and its effect in human beings. So if the first 
perspective of state as a coercive authority is deficient in its theology of creation, then the second 
perspective of state is deficient concerning a theology of sin.76 The task ahead is not to treat these 
two perspectives as competing or conflicting with each other, but rather as revealing two facets 
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of the same human reality—human sin which needs to be checked, as well as the need to affirm 
the goodness still left in God’s creation though distorted, and God’s design for humanity to live 
in fellowship marked with justice, peace and good order.   
From the above discussion, it is essential to grasp at least two affirmation Luther makes 
regarding the secular government. Firstly, the state carries a divine mandate, with its coercive 
authority to contain lawlessness and violence which marks sinful human nature and disturbs 
peace and order in the temporal realm. Secondly, the state as an order created in the left-hand 
realm, has a positive role to play to promote and foster those conditions conducive for a peaceful, 
just and harmonious human existence in this world.  
The Modus Operandi of the State   
To Luther, the three most important elements which constitute the effective functioning of 
the State are its coercive authority (sword), natural law and human reason. Together these three, 
help the state to carry out its task of promoting life and curbing sin and its effects in the left-hand 
realm.  
For Luther, the power of the government is the power of the sword. The power of the 
sword could be interpreted as the “law grounded on the power of punishment” 77 or “the just, 
orderly use of power.”78 The sword never is without a master and its master is the legitimate 
temporal authority. Thus in Luther’s thought there is no place for street justice or private 
individuals taking law into their hands.79 The state is divinely called to preserve the civil order 
and peace by both issuing laws and legislations which promote life and thus diminish the 
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possibility of lawlessness and the powerful exploiting the weak. However taking human sinful 
nature seriously, laws are useless unless there is an authority that can compel its citizen’s to 
follow it. Thus the state is vested with its coercive authority. The state functions to carry out 
retribution and make use of appropriate force to enforce its laws and thereby to contain 
lawlessness and violence that disturbs civil order and peace.80 Luther thought that in absence of 
such a coercive temporal sword, the wickedness of the world would lead to mob rule and 
eventually to the destruction of humanity. Luther succinctly sums up his rationale:   
There are few true believers, and still fewer who live a Christian life, who do not 
resist evil and indeed themselves do no evil. For this reason God has provided for 
them a different government beyond the Christian estate and kingdom of God. He has 
subjected them to the sword so that, even though they would like to, they are unable 
to practice their wickedness, and if they do practice it they cannot do so without fear 
or with success and impunity, In the same way a savage wild beast is bound with 
chains and ropes so that it cannot bite and tear as it would normally do, even though it 
would like to; whereas a tame and gentle animal needs no restraint, but is harmless 
despite the lack of chains and ropes. If this were not so, men would devour one 
another, seeing that the whole world is evil and that among thousands there is 
scarcely a single true Christian. No one could support wife and child, feed himself, 
and serve God. The world would be reduced to chaos. For this reason God has 
ordained two governments: the spiritual, by which the Holy Spirit produces 
Christians and righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, which restrains the 
un-Christian and wicked so that—no thanks to them—they are obliged to keep still 
and to maintain an outward peace. Thus does St. Paul interpret the temporal sword in 
Romans 13[:3], when he says it is not a terror to good conduct but to bad. And Peter 
says it is for the punishment of the wicked [I Pet. 2:14].81 
In Luther’s thought the coercive authority of the state is to be guided by the natural law. 
The sword stands ready for the enforcement of the civil law which comes from the natural law. 
The sword and the natural law works together for the proper functioning of the State.  
It is important to note here that the natural law tradition is not unique to Luther’s thinking. 
It was a common conviction of theologians and philosophers from “Plato and Aristotle to 
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Aquinas and Bonaventura, as well as from Luther and Calvin to Kant and Hegel.”82 Carl Braaten 
notes that “the bare bones of this common tradition entail the belief that the natural law is 
grounded in the eternal mind of God and knowable by human beings through reason and 
conscience. The unwritten natural law is universal, the same for everyone and everywhere. The 
universal natural law is the norm and standard of all laws enacted in society.”83  
Luther’s concept of natural law is traditional in many ways. He could concur with the 
medieval articulation of the natural law that “there is a universal moral law, which is binding on 
all men-irrespective of whether they are Christians or not-since it is laid down by God and the 
knowledge is planted by God in men’s hearts.”84 In Luther’s thought natural law is integrally 
connected to divine law or it is a poorly understood form of it. In his Romans lectures (1515) he 
makes it explicit that the content of the natural law consist of the Ten Commandments and the 
love of God and of neighbor enjoined. 85 Further he conceived the natural law as epitomized in 
the golden rule set forth in Mathew 7:12: “Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so 
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to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets.”86  
Luther is also explicit in his Roman lectures and elsewhere that God’s law is given to all 
people, though differently to Jews and Gentiles. Luther finds support from the scriptures that the 
divine law was given directly to Jews in the form of the Ten Commandments whereas to gentiles 
“the law was written namely, with the finger of God, on their hearts.”87    
Luther’s conception of natural law stands distinct from classical88 and medieval Christian 
articulation89 of natural law in many sense.  To classical natural law theorists “nature” refers to a 
self-contained and self-sustaining order within creation and all persons embody this natural order 
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within themselves and strive to fulfill their created purpose. To Luther human beings are fallen 
creatures and only in and through Christ we can overcome our sinfulness and fulfill our created 
purpose.90  
Luther’s articulation also departed from the medieval understanding of natural law where 
Christ distributes grace through His sacraments to perfect one’s sinful nature to conform one 
God’s requirements as revealed in the natural law for the one’s salvation. Luther makes a clear 
distinction about the purpose and function of law in both realms. In this regard as Thomas D. 
Pearson observes, “Natural law functions for Luther as an ingredient in maintaining the integrity 
of the left-hand kingdom of civil order, but not as a fit subject on which to ground theological 
discourse within the kingdom of the right.” 91 Luther with his two realm distinction could clearly 
affirm that the natural law has its significance only in the temporal realm and “it is the law of the 
“weltliches Reich”-one cannot be saved by observing it.”92 To Luther the purpose of the law in 
the right hand or spiritual realm is only to show men their sinfulness and to prepare them to 
accept the promise of the Gospel. Thompson rightly sums up Luther’s thought in this regard as 
thus: 
To fulfill the law for the purposes of the spiritual “Reich” it is not enough that men 
observe the law externally, that they refrain from theft, murder, adultery- it is 
necessary that they keep the law in their hearts, and this they are incapable of doing, 
Natural law, on the other hand, represents the law in its temporal role. For in the 
temporal “Reich” all that is required is that man should observe the precepts of the 
moral law externally. In order to maintain peace on earth, it is enough if men refrain 
from killing, theft and so on. Thus whereas the law is related to the spiritual 
righteousness of the spiritual “Reich”, natural law is related to the temporal or 
external righteousness of the “weltliches Reich”.93     
In Luther’s thought along with Natural law, human reason plays a pivotal role in left-hand 
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realm and especially for the smooth functioning of the state. Luther’s perspective on human 
reason can appear to be contradicting at first. At times Luther completely rejects reason and calls 
it “the Devil’s appointed whore”94 and in other places he affirms it as a divine gift and says, “that 
reason is the most important and the highest in rank among all things and, in comparison with 
other things of this life, the best and something divine.95 One important question that arise at this 
point is, Can Luther’s divergent views on reason can be reconciled? A careful study on this topic 
would reveal that, in order to truly understand Luther’s estimate about human reason, it is 
important to place it within the frame work of his understanding of God’s two realm. Luther 
holds specific conviction regarding the scope and limitation regarding the human reason within 
the framework of his Two Realm theology.  
To Luther reason has only a minimal role in the spiritual kingdom. This is because it fails 
to comprehend spiritual things and cannot help someone to become righteous before God. In this 
sense reason is totally ignorant about the Gospel which is a "right-handed knowledge" of God. 
Because “reason cannot know the depths of sin or the riches of the Gospel, but it can know and 
speak of Christ in an historical sense. This, however, is not saving faith.” 96 Knut Alfsvág further 
notes two defects of reason when employed in the spiritual realm:  
According to Luther, “Reason believes in God’s might and is aware of it, but it is 
uncertain whether God is willing to employ this in our behalf, because in adversity it 
so often experience the opposite to be true” (WA 19: 206.15-18; AE 19: 54). In other 
words, reason can never on its own solve the problem of Anfechtung, or anxiety, 
which leads Luther in De servo arbitrio to conclude that the approach of natural 
reason, when honest to itself, has to end in despair before the Deus absconditus (W A 
18: 719.4—35, AE 33: 190). The other defect is that reason can never “identify God 
properly; it cannot ascribe the Godhead for the One who is entitled to it exclusively” 
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(WA 19: 206.31-32; AE 19: 54), namely, Jesus Christ. Natural reason can never 
fathom the mystery of the incarnation.97  
Thus as Wright points out, to Luther, “reason then is not the part of the spiritual kingdom, but 
rather the kingdom of the world,”98 Reason in the right hand realm is an "enemy of God" and a 
"source of mischief." It is "carnal" and "stupid."99 Commenting on Psalm 2, Luther states, “There 
is the place where our reason works, provides, and runs as if on its own race track, as much as it 
can. But in the presence of God all these things are nothing, nor do they count for anything, for 
here a better righteousness and a greater power than ours is required.”100   
Despite all his negative comments concerning reason in the right hand realm, Luther was 
confident about the ability of the human reason in the left-hand realm. Luther referred to the 
earthly kingdom as the “Kingdom of Human Reason.”101  As Steven Hein points out to Luther, 
“Reason, free will, and power are present even after the fall for man to conduct his household 
affairs, to handle the proper administration of government, and to perform other earthly tasks 
over which God has given him dominion.”102 Further explaining Luther’s estimate about human 
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reason in relation to two realms, B.A Gerrish notes: 
Luther is even ready to grant that man's natural powers remain largely uncorrupted by 
the fall. Again it is simply a matter of making careful distinctions: "I make a 
difference between naturalia and spiritualia." The spiritualia (or spiritual 
endowments) are certainly corrupt, so that no man loves God or keeps His Law; but 
the naturalia (natural endowments) are sound.103 
Gerrish further summarizes the function of reason in relation to temporal authority:  
Reason is able to found kingdoms and common wealth’s, to fence them in and make 
them firm with useful laws, to direct them and govern them with good counsel and 
sound precepts, to prescribe many things indispensable for the preservation of the 
commonwealths and of the human society (soceitatis humanae- virtually 
‘civilization). Reason, in fact, is the ‘soul of law and mistress of all laws.’ The 
philosophy of government rests upon the principle of that reason (in a sufficiently 
liberal amount) is the possession of the few, whilst law prescribed by reason must 
serve for many.104     
According to Luther, reason is to be employed to bring order and positive development in 
the temporal life.  It was Luther’s conviction that force alone is not sufficient to run the temporal 
authority. Luther notes “Everything runs smoother with wisdom than with force. It is necessary 
for men to rule with reason and not with power alone, as is already now the case, for sheer power 
without reason cannot last long and keeps the subjects in a state of everlasting hatred against 
authority, as all history loudly testifies.”105 Thus ‘in "earthly government," the affairs of state, 
reason is to be exercised in its best possible fashion for providing a stable government and 
promoting civil righteousness”.106  
 Luther finds natural law and natural reason key to the founding of civil law through which 
the state/civil government operates. Luther did not claim that Christians have, based on the 
                                                 
103 Gerrish, Grace and Reason, 73.  
104 Gerrish, Grace and Reason, 13. 
105 As quoted in Scott Travis Kline, “A Genealogy of a German-Lutheran Two-Kingdom Concept: From a 
German Treology of the Status Quo to An East German Theology of Critical Solidarity” (PhD Diss., McGill 
University, 2001), 57. 
106 Hein, “Reason and Two Kingdoms,” 140. 
 119 
Gospel, a special knowledge or special insight into problems which confront society. Luther 
valued the reasoning abilities of non-Christians and non-Christian rulers alike.107 Kolb and Arand 
note that Luther advised that: 
whoever wants to rule his land well and be learned in secular government should read 
Homer, Virgil, Demosthenes, Aristotle, Cicero, Livy, and others who Luther called 
God’s pagan “prophets” and “apostles” in secular affairs, even as Moses, Elijah, 
Isaiah, and others were his prophets in spiritual affairs. Rulers should also learn from 
the example of exemplary rulers (endowed with wisdom and courage) of worldly 
governments, such as Alexander the Great, Philip his father, Augustus, Trajan, and 
others, who were the Davids and Solomons of the pagans. One difference between 
pagan and Christian rulers consisted in the fact that the former attributed their success 
to the goddess Fortuna whereas Christian rulers recognized their success as a gift of 
God. Such divine direction is especially necessary in secular governments, for rulers 
like David and other God-fearing Christian princes serve God and govern the 
people.108    
To Luther the secular government can function quite independently of the Christian faith 
and the “emperor need not be a saint or even a Christian.”109 However, this does not mean that 
the state/civil government is autonomous with respect to the rules of God as people like Ernst 
Troeltsch and Max Weber thought. 110 Hans Schwarz rightly points out that Luther’s conception 
of natural law and natural reason does not correspond to an Enlightenment notion that human 
reason is an autonomous possession of humans. “For Luther, even natural reason is a gift of 
God.”111  
Luther’s affirmation of the universality of natural law and reason carries much significance 
to our discussion. Firstly as Christians, who seek to work with others in the left hand realm for 
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the common good, we are not required to introduce the world to God and His law.112 There is no 
such realm of life from which God is absent, because “God is always present in the world 
beforehand through the law engraved in the nature of the things He creates. God is universally 
present as the authority that drives people to do what they must do to sustain life, to administer 
justice, to play by the rules, and to care for their families and communities.”113 Thus “the 
universality of law provides a common ground for us to cooperate with all those who share 
respect of law, regardless of their theological conviction.”114 Secondly a positive affirmation of 
the natural law and of human reason in Luther’s thought also presents with us possibilities to 
work towards strengthening, sustaining, and deepening human fellowship and finding solutions 
in dealing with various social problems which disrupts peace and justice. As Knut Alfsvág points 
out “Fellowship based on reason as an important (but not the ultimate) goal of human activity is 
the proper role for the political estate according to Lutheran understanding.115  Thirdly a positive 
affirmation of natural law and human reason also help us avoid being tossed away by the wind of 
moral and cultural relativism in our ethical decision making. Carl Braaten affirming the 
importance of natural law notes:  
They all oppose cultural relativism, the notion that laws are mere moral conventions 
that vary among societies, with no transcendent ontological claim to being universally 
valid all binding. To the contrary, those who hold to the natural law believe that for a 
law to be just, it must conform to the structure of reality itself and it should not 
depend on the shifting opinions and preferences of human beings. The law must be 
the same for all human beings and at all times, so ‘that if murder is morally wrong in 
America, it is equally so in Asia and Africa, if torture is to be condemned as evil in 
Jerusalem, it must be equally so in London and Tehren.116 
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This does not mean that human beings will not experience a certain amount of ambiguity 
with regard to how best to carry out the demands of natural law and civil law. God has created us 
with a “rich complexity that enables us to accomplish goals in more than one way in many 
aspects of life.”117  Difficulty in making concrete ethical decisions is further “exacerbated by the 
sin and evil that infects all systems and roles”.118 In this regard Kolb and Arand notes that in 
those situations involving ambiguity, Luther calls for the use of sapientia,  which could be 
translated as “wisdom,” “equity,” “fairness,” or “reasonableness,” because a good judgement 
often does not come straight from law books but “rather from common sense (aussz freyem 
synn).”119 And “guided by love, such ‘wisdom’ has to make an ‘educated guess’ about the best 
course of action in many instance. This means that we will make mistakes: we just dare not 
worship them but must confess them and turn away from them.”120 
Finally, it should be noted that a Lutheran affirmation of natural law is different from a 
purely secular philosophical assessment of the same which fails to take into account the effect of 
sin on creation and human reason. From a Lutheran theological perspective, political proposals 
which reason tries to make are only proximate achievements at best. “That is to say, on this side 
of eternity, reason will never find the ‘perfect solution’ or utopia.”121 
The Proper Limits of the State 
In Luther’s thought one could easily discern that in its existence and function, the State 
does have proper limits. Although the state has an integrity, authority and rationale of its own, 
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nevertheless it is not absolute and it always stand under God's sovereignty and judgment as 
God’s creation. Moreover, “the business of government at all levels is to patch up and preserve a 
non-ideal reality,” and it carries only a penultimate purpose. That means, “God preserves the 
human community from utter destruction that he may accomplish his right-hand work of 
ushering in his new creation and a new community, namely, the body of Christ.”122 To Luther the 
proper sphere of the state is only the temporal realm because the worldly government is able only 
to compel an outward righteousness on earth. The state is unable to remove evil from the heart, 
since only the Gospel can provide the cure for evil. 123  
The basic affirmations made above carry significant implications for the state as it comes in 
contact with various spheres of life in the society. The first area of significance concerns one’s 
obedience to the secular authority. Luther noted that no secular authority is entitled to 
unquestioning obedience. In his Treatise on Good Works (1520) Luther taught that the duty to 
obey earthly rulers (whether it is secular or ecclesiastical authority) rests on the supreme 
authority of the Decalogue and it is qualified by the teaching of Peter that “We must obey God 
rather than men” [Acts 5:29]. Luther notes: 
But if, as often happens, the temporal power and authorities, or whatever they call 
themselves, would compel a subject to do something contrary to the command of 
God, or hinder him from doing what God commands, obedience ends and the 
obligation ceases. In such a case a man has to say what St. Peter said to the rulers of 
the Jews, “We must obey God rather than men” [Acts 5:29].124  
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The second area of significance concerns beliefs and religious tolerance.   In the second 
part of On Temporal Authority (1523) Luther dealt with the proper limits of secular government 
in terms of religious beliefs.  The immediate context for the reformer to reflect on these issues 
was “the outbreak of a bloody persecution of ‘evangelicals’ which marked the beginning of the 
Counter-Reformation.”125 John Stephenson elaborates:  
1st July 1523 saw the Augustinian friars Henricus Vos and Jan van den Eschen 
burned at the stake in Brussels marketplace; and meanwhile, nearer home, Luther’s 
bête noire Duke George had forbidden the sale of his translation of the New 
Testament in local Saxony and demanded the surrender of those copies already 
distributed. Against this background Luther inquires ‘how long the arm [of secular 
government] may extend and how far its hand may reach, lest it should overreach 
itself by assaulting God in his reych und regiment.’126 
Expounding the proper limit of the State in this context, Luther wrote, “The temporal 
government has laws which extend no further than to life and property and external affairs on 
earth, for God cannot and will not permit anyone but himself to rule over the soul. Therefore, 
where the temporal authority presumes to prescribe laws for the soul, it encroaches upon God’s 
government and only misleads souls and destroys them.”127 Thus Luther made it clear that since 
the worldly government is able only to compel an outward righteousness on earth but it is unable 
to remove evil from the heart, 128 the proper sphere of competence of secular authority is limited 
to the temporal realm. This is so because only the Gospel can provide the cure for evil. So the 
task of the government is limited to keep order, protect property, enforce the laws of the land, 
care for the poor, punish the wicked and generally maintain those conditions conducive to the 
happiness and well-being of all people in the temporal realm. If the government exerts the 
authority to judge, regulate or enforce religious beliefs, it is overstepping its God ordained realm 
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of activity.   
Luther stated clearly that faith is a free act and cannot be forced. The legal coercive power 
of the temporal authority should not be used for imposing matters concerning faith or religion.129 
Luther notes,  
How he believes or disbelieves is a matter for the conscience of each individual, and 
since this takes nothing away from the temporal authority the latter should be content 
to attend to its own affairs and let men believe this or that as they are able and 
willing, and constrain no one by force. For faith is a free act to which no one can be 
forced. Indeed, it is a work of God in the spirit, not something which outward 
authority should compel or create.130 
To Luther, though a verbal affirmation can be coerced, the certainty of the Gospel's truth 
cannot be, since coercion can “never generate the inner, free certainty that constitutes faith.”131 
The government cannot regulate the realm of faith and should not try to do so.132 When the 
government tries to force its subjects to a particular faith, Christians are free to disobey the will 
of the government. Notger Slenczka elaborates Luther’s view:   
Christian should not comply with the will of the government when it tries to force its 
subjects to faith. Luther had the opinion, for example, that Bible translations should 
not be handed over by Christians if the government commanded them to do so—that 
was of significant concern during that time. Without resisting, the Christian should 
instead endure possible violent treatment by the government and consider it God 
himself to be causing the suffering.133 
Luther recognized that there will always be different sects and people with different 
religious ideas living together in a society. However, he consistently maintained that the 
distinction of true from false doctrine is per se no concern of the secular authorities.”134 Since 
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heresy is a spiritual matter, not the temporal rulers but the ministers of the Word should be 
responsible in restraining it. Luther strongly believed that force and legislation is futile in 
restraining heresy but exhorted that one should let word of God engage in battle. In this regard 
Luther maintained that “‘burning heretics is not to my liking.”135 Luther notes:    
Heresy can never be restrained by force. One will have to tackle the problem in some 
other way, for heresy must be opposed and dealt with otherwise than with the sword. 
Here God’s word must do the fighting. If it does not succeed, certainly the temporal 
power will not succeed either, even if it were to drench the world in blood. Heresy is 
a spiritual matter which you cannot hack to pieces with iron, consume with fire, or 
drown in water. God’s word alone avails here, as Paul says in II Corinthians 10[:4–5], 
“Our weapons are not carnal, but mighty in God to destroy every argument and proud 
obstacle that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, and to take every thought 
captive in the service of Christ.136 
Luther also recognized that, we may not always be successful in our effort to contain 
heresy. Those instance do not provide an excuse for temporal rulers to intervene and use legal 
coercion.  Luther would admit secular rules to intervene only in those instance where disputes 
cause public unrest and disturbance of peace.  Stephenson reiterates this point further when he 
reference to Luther’s approach to Thomas Müntzer’s preaching, which according to Luther, 
‘leads souls to destruction’. Although Luther had the favor of the Saxon princes, he remained 
true to his principle of toleration.137 Stephenson explains Luther’s position: 
In his open letter of 1524 Against the seditious spirit, Luther refrains from invoking 
the assistance of the secular arm against the enthusiastic preaching of Thomas 
Müntzer. Even though the latter’s teaching leads souls to destruction, it can only be 
countered by spiritual weapons; and the Saxon princes should intervene in Allstedt 
only in the event of a breach of the peace: ‘Simply let them preach with vigour and 
confidence… against whom they will. For as I have said, there must needs he sects 
(cf. 1 Cor. 11:19) and the Word of God must take to the field and engage in battle. . . . 
If their spirit is genuine, it will have no fear of us and will endure; and if ours is 
genuine, neither will it fear them or anyone. Let the Spirits go at it hammer and tongs. 
Should some souls be led astray in the process, so be it, this is the way of war. Some 
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are bound to fall and suffer injury where battle is waged, but anyone who fights with 
integrity will receive a crown. Should they wish to do more than fight with the Word, 
however, that is, should they wish to smash and smite with their fists, then Your 
Graces ought to intervene.’ As Heinrich Bornkamm comments, ‘These words are of 
epochal significance in the history of toleration.’ 138 
Some have suggested that Luther moved from his initial practice of tolerance to an 
increasing intolerance later in life. Cargill Thompson argues that although in 1523, Luther stood 
against the use of force for the suppression of private masses, later in Of the Abomination of the 
Private Mass (1524) he called upon the Elector to take steps to suppress private masses both in 
Wittenberg and throughout the Saxony. Luther’s reasoning was that the private mass represented 
a public blasphemy against Christ because it denies the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice on the 
Cross.139 In his exposition of Psalms 101 Luther did appeal to the magistrate to suppress the 
public teaching of the Anabaptists since it contradicts the basic doctrines of Christian faith as 
contained in the Creed and hence is a blasphemy.140 
 However it should be noted that Luther never thought his appeal to the secular authorities 
in either case ran counter to his principles of toleration and distinction between two realms. He 
consistently held to his conviction that faith cannot be forced, and magistrates should not 
interfere in matters of personal beliefs. However, as exemplified in the above cited cases, Luther 
made an important distinction between blasphemy and false belief. Luther held blasphemy to be 
a public offense against God because it runs counter to the natural law and causes civil discord. 
Since natural law is identical to the Ten Commandments and since blasphemy is against the First 
table of law, magistrates carry the responsibility to punish the same without confusing between 
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God’s two regiments.141  
Given the fact that Luther was criticized for being inconsistent at times in applying his own 
theology of religious toleration to concrete situations, it is questioned whether Luther’s 
principles still hold relevance in a religiously pluralistic modern society, especially one such as 
in India. Mary Jane Haemig exemplifies one beneficial approach to this problem, “The fact that 
the possibilities for tolerance in the Lutheran heritage were generally not realized in the sixteenth 
century should not discourage us from thinking about them today.”142 Although the sixteenth 
century was not generally thought of as a religiously tolerant century, it cannot be discarded that 
Luther’s distinction of two realm theology does provide us with “a frame for tolerance that went 
far beyond the actual practice of sixteenth-century Lutheran lands.”143  As Haemig rightly puts it:  
…the recognition that the Church and state have different jobs allows the state to be 
“non-Christian” and still do its job. Similarly, the high but limited valuation of human 
reason and civil righteousness means a non-Christian neighbor may be valued for 
these qualities. We can even see God at work in these qualities of our non-Christian 
neighbors. Furthermore, the doctrine of creation enables us to see all humans as 
God’s creations. Because God creates and sustains all humans, every human has 
worth. God protects all people with his commandments. The structures (orders) of 
creation provide a place for each human. Thus every human has a God-given place, 
and the daily life and the work of Christian are not inherently more valuable than 
those of the non-Christian. The Lutheran perspective provides a framework for 
tolerance and appreciation of the non-Christian neighbor.144       
To conclude, in Luther we do not find support for a theocratic state, a godless temporal 
authority, or an autonomous entity detached from God’s law but the state/civil government as an 
institution ordained for the preservation and wellbeing of all in the temporal realm, irrespective 
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of one’s religious or cultural persuasion. 
Church and State Interaction in the Temporal Realm  
Luther brought with the reformation a significant changes in the prevalent Church and state 
relationship practice shaped by medieval two sword theology. As already noted, Luther’s Two 
Realm theology clearly rejected the hierarchically arranged political structure in which the 
Church and clergy controlled the state. Erwin R. Gane summaries Luther’s contribution towards 
this as follows: 
 Luther's concept of the ministry, the bishopric, the sacraments, and the priesthood 
of believers implies that the Church is in no sense superior to the state in temporal 
matters, nor are the clergy a special class who may justly be exempt from those 
secular controls to which all other Christians are subject. Luther vehemently opposed 
the canon law stipulation that a bad pope could not be punished or deposed by secular 
authority. In his address To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation he urges that 
temporal matters should be left to temporal authority and not referred to Rome. 
Bishops' courts, he argued, should deal only with "matters of faith and morals, and 
leave matters of money and property, life and honor, to the temporal judges.” Luther 
deplored sentences of excommunication passed by bishops' courts in cases in which 
questions of faith and morality were not involved. Luther denied that the pope had 
any authority above the emperor except in spiritual matters, and then only by virtue 
of office, not by virtue of superior sanctity or sacerdotal privilege.145  
In Luther’s view the Church should not rule the State, nor should it be ruled by the State. 
This does not mean that Luther envisaged a strict separation where these two distinct paths never 
crossed in fulfilling God’s purpose for His creation. As Gane notes “in Luther's theory there is 
much greater interaction between the two swords without one ruling the other.”146 This 
interaction is unavoidable because of the underlying unity between these two intuitions for at 
least two reasons.  Firstly although Law and Gospel establishes and affirms the distinction 
between Church and state, God’s sovereign rule over His both realms establishes an underlying 
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unity and, “this unity is and always will be visible only to the eyes of faith.”147 Secondly as 
already noted a two-dimensional understanding of the Church which situates the Church as an 
institution operating in the left-hand realm also makes it genuinely concerned with the extension 
of law and justice in that realm.148  Thus as John Stephenson notes, “Martin Luther’s doctrine of 
the two kingdoms manages to combine the insight that the Church’s prime duty is to publish 
abroad the message of both the forgiveness of sins for Jesus sake and the future restoration of our 
vitiated human nature in eternity with the acknowledgement of the essential God-pleasingness of 
the performance of provisional secular tasks in faith.”149  In this way the Church shares with the 
state a responsibility to promote civil righteousness in the society. In line with this conviction 
Luther thought that a duly called minister of the Word has not only “the right but also the solemn 
duty to remind the bearer of the sword of his duty before God: ‘If a preacher in his official 
capacity says to kings and princes… “Consider and fear God and keep his commandments,” he is 
not meddling in the affairs of secular authority (weltlich Oberkeyt). On the contrary, he is 
thereby rendering service and obedience to the supreme authority (hohesten Oberkeyt).”150 
To Luther the state carries a distinct purpose and function from the church. Nevertheless, 
the state carries a solemn responsibility towards the welfare of the church. In this regard Luther 
called upon secular rulers to be actively involved in the reform of the Church and to establish 
proper relationship between the Church and State.151 In the preface to the Instructions to the 
Visitors and in his Address to the Christian Nobility (1520) Luther brought in the Christian 
                                                 
147 “Render unto Caesar and unto God: A Lutheran View of Church and State” (A Report of the Commission 
on Theology and Church Relations of The Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod. St. Louis, 1995), 53. 
148 Arand and Biermann, “Two Kinds of Righteousness?,” 131–32. 
149 Stephenson “The Two Governments,” 9.  
150 Stephenson “The Two Governments,” 4 Luther himself wrote to princes regarding the proper conduct as 
they carry out their calling. The third part of On Temporal Authority and the expositions of Psalms. 82 and Psalms. 
101 etc. are few examples for the same.  
151 Wright, Martin Luther’s Understanding, 133. 
 130 
prince as Notbischof- an emergency bishop and urges the German princes  “to break the power of 
a cramping episcopate by calling a general council, by refusing to support so many cardinals, by 
repudiating payment of annates, by passing laws against the papal months and by restoring to the 
German bishops "their right and responsibility to administer the benefices in the German nation 
to the best of their ability." 152 Luther was well aware that such a reform of the Church properly 
belonged to the clergy alone. However “such was the political involvement of the late medieval 
papal Church that only legal, governmental interference was sufficient to relegate to their rightful 
provinces the secular and spiritual kingdoms.”153 In such an emergency situation, a Christian 
prince’s position in the secular society made him well placed to undertake this task. Luther thus 
argues:  
Therefore, when necessity demands it, and the pope is an offense to Christendom, the 
first man who is able should, as a true member of the whole body, do what he can to 
bring about a truly free council. No one can do this so well as the temporal 
authorities, especially since they are also fellow-Christians, fellow-priests, fellow-
members of the spiritual estate, fellow-lords over all things. Whenever it is necessary 
or profitable they ought to exercise the office and work which they have received 
from God over everyone. Would it not be unnatural if a fire broke out in a city and 
everybody were to stand by and let it burn on and on and consume everything that 
could burn because nobody had the authority of the mayor, or because, perhaps, the 
fire broke out in the mayor’s house? In such a situation is it not the duty of every 
citizen to arouse and summon the rest? How much more should this be done in the 
spiritual city of Christ if a fire of offense breaks out, whether in the papal 
government, or anywhere else!154 
Luther did impose clear limits and conditions for such an intervention by secular 
authorities as Notbischof.155  Firstly, Luther did not think that such an arrangement ought to be a 
permanent arrangement. He clearly stated that once the Church revert to normal, “the prince 
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should relinquish his special powers and allow the Church to be governed by its proper 
governors, the ministers who are representatives of God’s regiments.”156 Secondly, Luther 
allowed a secular authority to serve as a  Notbischof- an emergency bishop not because of their 
secular office but only on the ground that they too are baptized Christians. Luther notes in this 
regard “Since those who exercise secular authority have been baptized with the same baptism, 
and have the same faith and the same Gospel as the rest of us, we must admit that they are priests 
and bishops and we must regard their office as one which has a proper and useful place in the 
Christian community.”157 Luther’s thought can be summarized in the words of Erwin Gane:  
If a prince influences doctrine he does so only as a Christian, not by virtue of princely 
authority. If a Christian takes part in secular government and enforcement of law and 
order, he does so as subordinate to secular laws and as an instrument of secular order. 
The prince is not to force uniformity of belief, nor is the individual Christian to take 
part in secular rule for the sake of enforcing the teaching of his church. Faith is a 
spiritual matter to be engendered by spiritual weapons.158  
Luther upheld a clear distinction between the institution of Church and state in the left hand 
realm. This does not mean for Luther a strict ‘separation of Church and state’ in the modern 
sense of the term.159 It is indeed an intriguing question to ask in this context, what then could be a 
meaningful vocabulary to best conceptualize Luther’s conviction regarding Church and state 
relationship? Any attempt to answer this question will soon be wrought with difficulties because 
it is difficult to find a single phrase or word to contain all the nuances, richness and complexities 
involved in Luther’s thought. However, as Eugene Linse suggests, “While no neat model exists 
that permits us to discuss these relationships between two living institutional structures in 
society, one that is commonly used is that of institutional separation and functional 
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interaction.”160 Eugene further elaborates:  
The phrase, "institutional separation and functional interaction," is a catchy way of 
talking about the interrelationships between Church and state from an historic 
perspective. Yet, it yields little by way of norms or standards as a consequence of 
which one is able to detect shifts in direction, encroachment, or incipient elements of 
secularism. Nor is it useful, except in a vague and general way, for attempting to give 
direction to emerging public policy. It both judges everything and serves as a 
criticism of nothing, except perhaps the grossest kinds of abuses either by the state or 
the church; most of these would be apparent anyway, even if the phrase did not exist. 
Yet, every aphorism contains the shadow of a truth, and this phrase can be useful in 
delineating in a broad, general outline the relationship of two viable structures in 
society.161  
Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter has been to explicate a theoretical framework to understand 
God given structures in the left hand realm with a special focus upon state/temporal authority. In 
our discussion we have seen that Luther viewed the state as neither a theocratic institution, nor a 
godless structure. He was convinced that state is an authority instituted by God for the 
preservation of all irrespective of one’s religion or cultural persuasion.  We also noted that the 
state functions through the creative power of human reason and cohesive legal authority, to 
constrain evil, foster civil righteousness and promote human fellowship. In this venture, Luther 
envisaged that the state is be informed and guided by the parameters dictated by the natural law. 
Luther was also consistent in maintaining that one’s legal status in the society should not be 
based on one’s religious faith. He was convinced that matter’s concerning religious faith 
properly belongs to the right-hand realm, where coercive authority of sword should not prevail. 
Thus Luther’s understanding of the State “do not require the promotion of Christianity in order 
to promote the common good.”162 Luther did find the state and other structures in the left-hand 
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realm to be places where Christians could work together with people of different cultural or 
religious persuasions to bring about common good for all. Christians approach their particular 
responsibilities with God’s strength and a unique sense of calling informed by an understanding 
about Christian vocation and two kinds of righteousness. Our concern then in the next chapter is 
to examine Luther’s understanding about two kinds of righteousness and Christian vocation.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
 TWO KINDS OF RIGHTEOUNESS AND CHRISTIAN VOCATION: A CHRISTIAN 
CONCEPTUAL FRAME WORK TOWARDS ENGAGEMENT IN THE WORLD 
An important distinction that emerges from Luther’s understanding of the two realms is the 
distinction between the two kinds of righteousness. As Kolb and Arand note “To use Luther’s 
language, Christians live in two worlds, one heavenly and the other earthly. Into these, we place 
the two kinds of righteousness, which are distinct and separate from each other. Both kinds of 
righteousness are God’s will, and both kinds are necessary for us to live as full human creatures 
restored in Christ.”1 Robert Kolb refers to the two kinds of righteousness of a Christian as the 
“Righteousness of Identity” and the “Righteousness of Performance.”2 A clear understanding of 
the distinction between the two kinds of righteousness is fundamental to our discussion because 
this helps to clarify our identity and the manner in which that identity shapes our actions in 
relation to our fellow human beings in the left-hand realm. The purpose of this chapter is to 
undertake a brief study on Luther’s two kinds of righteousness and how this would shape our 
understanding about Christian performance in the society. We shall also discuss how Luther’s 
understanding of Christian vocation helps the Christian to be actively involved in the world 
informed by a true estimate of the Christian self, shaped by two kinds of righteousness.  
Luther’s Understanding of Two Kinds of Righteousness 
One of the best places to look at Luther’s understanding of two kinds of righteousness is in 
                                                 
1 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 26. 
2 Robert Kolb, "Luther on the Two Kinds of Righteousness: Reflections on His Two-Dimensional Definition 
of Humanity at the Heart of His Theology," Lutheran Quarterly 13 (1999): 453. 
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his famous Galatians Commentary (1535).3  Here he refers to the two kinds of righteousness as 
“our theology” and thus notes, “This is our theology, by which we teach a precise distinction 
between these two kinds of righteousness, the active and the passive, so that morality and faith, 
works and grace, secular society and religion may not be confused. Both are necessary, but both 
must be kept within their limits.”4 As Kolb and Arand note, what is fundamental to Luther’s 
distinction between two kinds of righteousness was that “to be righteous is to be the human 
person God envisioned when he created us. It has to do with meeting God’s “design 
specifications” for being a human creature and fulfilling the purpose for which God created us.”5 
Fundamentally, God created us to be relational beings who live in his presence (coram Deo) and 
at the same time in community with one another (coram Mundo).6 To Luther “in these two 
relationships we encounter a twofold definition of what it means to be the person God made us to 
be-hence two kinds of righteousness.”7 Luther terms our righteousness before God (coram Deo) 
as “passive righteousness” and our righteousness before others in the world (coram Mundo) as 
the “active righteousness.” These two kinds of righteousness “place our relationship to God as 
our redeemer into the larger context of our relationship to God as creator.”8 As Kolb and Arand 
point out, “The crux of the Lutheran reformation rested on maintaining the distinction between 
divine righteousness (which is salvific before God) and human righteousness (which is good for 
                                                 
3 Few among the other places where we could find the treatment about two kinds of righteousness is in 
Heidelberg disputation and in his sermons entitled “Three kinds of Righteousness” (1518), “Two Kinds of 
Righteousness (1519)”, on Monastic Vows” (1522), and his sermons on Genesis (1523/1527). See Kolb and Arand, 
Genius of Luther’s Theology, 25.  
4 Martin Luther, “Lectures on Galatians, 1535, Chapters 1-4,” in  Vol. 26 of Luther's Works,  ed. Jaroslav Jan 
Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehmann (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1999), 7. 
5 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 26. 
6 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 26. 
7 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 26. 
8 Arand and Biermann, “Two Kinds of Righteousness?,” 128. 
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the world).”9 However to Luther the two kinds of righteousness are not separable entities nor are 
they alternative forms of human existence. Because “the passive righteousness of faith provides 
the core identity of a person; the active righteousness of love flows from that core identity out 
into the world.”10 In this regard, as Kolb refers to them, the two kinds of righteousness are the 
“righteousness of identity” and the “righteousness of performance.”11   
The Passive Righteousness: The Righteousness of Identity  
To Luther, passive righteousness establishes our identity.  As God’s creatures and children. 
Here we relate to God firstly as our creator and secondly as our redeemer. We receive this 
identity from God passively because it flows from God’s activity towards us without our 
contribution or participation. We passively received our creaturely life when He first created us 
as God, the Creator. And in addition, when we lay dead in sin, he restored life to us, as God the 
Redeemer, through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.12 “In both instances, human beings 
‘suffered’ the work of God.”13 Luther terms the righteousness we receive as “alien 
righteousness” because it is given to us from outside.14  Luther further elaborates:  
As the earth itself does not produce rain and is unable to acquire it by its own 
strength, worship, and power but receives it only by a heavenly gift from above, so 
this heavenly righteousness is given to us by God without our work or merit. As 
much as the dry earth of itself is able to accomplish in obtaining the right and blessed 
rain, that much can we men accomplish by our own strength and works to obtain that 
divine, heavenly, and eternal righteousness. Thus we can obtain it only through the 
free imputation and indescribable gift of God.15 
                                                 
9 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 30. 
10 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 26.  
11 Kolb, “Luther on the Two Kinds of Righteousness,” 453. 
12 Kolb, “Luther on the Two Kinds of Righteousness,” 28. 
13 Kolb, “Luther on the Two Kinds of Righteousness,” 28. 
14 Martin Luther, “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” in Vol. 31 of Luther's Works, ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, 
Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999), 297. 
15 LW 26: 6. 
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There are at least three things, namely Christ’s work on the cross, God’s Word, and faith 
which form an integral part in Luther’s articulation of passive righteousness. Firstly to Luther, 
we are righteous because of Christ (propter Christum). The human righteousness in God's sight 
is intrinsically related to Christ’s life and work for us. Kolb captures Luther’s thought in this 
regard: 
For sin had indeed destroyed that righteousness which consisted in trust in the 
Creator. Christ took sin into himself and substituted himself for sinners before the 
law's tribunal. Christ took the punishment for sin, its wage of death, into himself and 
satisfied the law's condemnation of human creatures who fail to be and behave like 
the creatures they were designed to be. No cheap atonement was possible from 
Luther's point of view. The Lamb had to die. Luther employed the Pauline baptismal 
model of dying and rising in Romans 6:3-11 and Colossians 2:11-15 to speak not 
only of God's saving action in baptism but also of his action of justifying. The 
sinner's sin kills Christ. Christ buries the sinner's sin. Christ raises the sinner to new 
life—to a new identity and a new way of practicing that identity.16 
Thus to Luther “the work of Christ, properly speaking, is this: to embrace the one whom the Law 
has made a sinner and pronounced guilty, and to absolve him from his sins if he believes the 
Gospel. ‘For Christ is the end of the Law, that everyone who has faith may be justified’ (Rom. 
10:4); He is ‘the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world’ (John 1:29).” 17 
Secondly Luther always maintained that it is through God’s word of Gospel that He 
bestows passive righteousness to a person. Luther notes, “Although the work took place on the 
cross and the forgiveness of sins has been acquired, yet it cannot come to me in any other way 
than through the word.”18 Luther rejected any tendency to deal with God apart from the Word,19 
since “the Word that imparts, gives, proffers, and delivers the forgiveness of sins that has been 
                                                 
16 Kolb, “Luther on the Two Kinds of Righteousness,” 462. 
17 LW 26: 142.  
18 Martin Luther, “The Sacrament of the Altar,” in the Large Catechism, The Book of Concord, eds., Robert 
Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress, 200), 469. 
19 Luther here depart both from medieval theologians and the Anabaptists who seems to relegate God’s word 
to secondary place. For example the medieval theologians claimed a revelation to its hierarchy whereas Anabaptist 
to an inner voice within each Christian. See Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 41. 
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purchased on the cross. Christ bestows his righteousness on God’s human creatures through the 
Spirit, who brings it to us in the Gospel.”20  To Luther “the Word that freely justifies us is the 
same Word that first gave us physical life”21 and just as “the Word of the Lord had defined 
reality in the act of creation,” so “in the act of re-creation the Word of the Lord also defined the 
fundamental reality of the believer’s existence.”22 The concept of “promise” is fundamental to 
Luther’s understanding of God’s word as Gospel. The Gospel remains just a piece of information 
or biography of Jesus if it is devoid of God’s promise attached to it. But it becomes “the 
Gospelwhen it grasps the sinner with the promise that Christ lived, died, and rose ‘for you!’ and 
‘for me!’ and ‘for us!’”23 Kolb and Arand further elaborate the significance of Luther’s 
understanding of promise: 
The term “promise” highlights several things. First, the Bible is filled with promises. 
The promise of God highlight the unity of the Old and New Testaments better than 
the term good news. Second, the promise brings out the personal and relational 
character of God. God himself makes promises to us. Third, in the Gospel God 
promises that he will receive us into the new age as fellow children and coheirs with 
Christ. The promise is a pledge and guarantee of God’s favor in the eschaton. Finally, 
and most important for Luther, the promise is not an announcement that will be 
fulfilled only in the future; it is a creative word that takes immediate and present 
effect. In the here and now it brings about the very thing it announces about the 
future. It creates the reality that we are justified. It announces about the future. It 
creates the reality that we are justified. It announces that we have gone through the 
eschatological judgment ahead of time.24  
Luther understands Baptism as God’s sacramental Word of promise through which a 
person receives passive righteousness. In his Small Catechism Luther teaches that baptism 
“brings about forgiveness of sins, redeems from death and the devil, and gives eternal salvation 
                                                 
20 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 41. 
21 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 43. 
22 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 43. 
23 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 42. 
24 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 42. 
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to all who believe it, as the words and promise of God declare.”25 To Luther, “God’s baptismal 
word of promise, according to the scriptures, kills and makes alive; it raises sinners from the 
dead, and it cleanses them of their sins (Rom.6:3–11; Col. 2:11–15).”26  
The final element significant to our discussion on Luther’s understanding of passive 
righteousness is faith. To Luther “promise without faith accomplishes nothing. Because faith 
without a promise has nothing to which it can cling.”27 A promise then calls forth for a response. 
And ‘faith grasps the promise, and in this way the promise finds it realization and fulfillment.”28 
However Luther did not find faith to be an accomplishment we can boast and take credit for, 
because faith itself is a gift and work of God in us.29  Luther’s understanding of faith can be 
termed as via passiva, a concept which means we passively allow God to work in us and/or 
receive His righteousness. Oswald Bayer summaries this concept in Luther thus: 
The righteousness of faith is passive, in that we allow God alone to work in us and we 
ourselves, with all our powers, do not do anything. Faith is a divine work in us that 
changes us and brings us to a new birth from God (John 1:13) and kills the old Adam; 
he makes of us a completely different human being in the heart, mood, mind, and in 
all powers. (cf.Deu.6:5). Faith is thus the work of God, through and through, with 
nothing accomplished by the human being; rather it can only be received and 
suffered. The righteousness of Christ is set in complete opposition to the 
righteousness of works; it is passive. We can only receive it. We do nothing, but 
instead suffer its coming from another, who work in us: God.30      
                                                 
25 Martin Luther, “The Sacrament of Holy Baptism,” in The Small Catechism, The Book of Concord, eds., 
Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert (Minneapolis, Fortress, 200), 359. 
26 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 193. 
27 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 45. 
28 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 45. 
29 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 45. 
30 Bayer, Martin Luther's Theology, 43. 
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To conclude our discussion, passive righteousness brings forth “God's gift of our identity as his 
children, reveals itself as that upon which human existence depends,”31 and from this identity as 
His creatures and children our active righteousness before the world (coram Mundo) proceeds. 
Active Righteousness: The Righteousness of Performance  
To Luther if our righteousness before God (coram Deo) is passive, our  righteousness 
before the world (coram mundo) is ever active. The sole concern of our righteousness before 
world is to carry out God-given responsibilities within our walks of life towards the well-being 
of our fellow creatures. Although our active righteousness is good for the left-hand realm (coram 
Mundo), it does not constitute or determine our relationship with God in the right-hand realm 
(coram Deo). In other words “our active righteousness dare never become the basis of our 
righteousness coram Deo.”32 Luther made it explicit that good works which constitute our active 
righteousness “should be done as fruits of righteousness, not in order to bring righteousness into 
being. Having been made righteous, we must do them; but it is not the other way around: that 
when we are unrighteous, we become righteous by doing them. The tree produces fruit; the fruit 
does not produce the tree.”33  
Thus Luther believed that there is an intrinsic relationship between two types of 
righteousness. He found that our identity, which is determined by passive righteousness, flows 
into and determines our performance in the left hand realm. In this regard our active 
righteousness is seen as a fruit of our passive righteousness. Luther notes, “When I have this 
righteousness with me, I descend from heaven like the rain that makes the earth fertile. That is I 
                                                 
31 Kolb, “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” 457.  
32 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 30.  
33 LW 26:169. 
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come forth into another kingdom, and I perform good works whenever the opportunity arises.”34  
Thus to Luther, our passive righteousness of faith “does not remain relevant only for realities in 
heaven; it belongs also to earthly realities and contributes to the pursuit of active righteousness 
within the world.”35 Moreover, “our relation to God empowers and provides the basis for our 
relation to creation. And so on earth, as we grow in faith we actively pursue a life of works and 
virtues in accordance with God's will for creation and His reclamation of creation in Christ.”36  
If Luther called our passive righteousness our alien righteousness, then to him active 
righteousness is our “proper righteousness” which is a “product, consequence and the fruit of 
passive righteousness.”37  Luther notes, “The second kind of righteousness is our proper 
righteousness, not because we alone work it, but because we work with that first and alien 
righteousness…”38 and “This righteousness is the product of the righteousness of the first type, 
actually its fruit and consequence.”39 
To Luther the two types of righteousness are not alternative forms of human existence.  He 
rejected any one dimensional approach to Christian righteousness. He could not envision a 
human existence which is complete and genuine with only one kind of righteousness. To be fully 
human, according to God’s design, requires both kinds of righteousness.  The two kinds of 
righteousness find an inseparable nexus in the life of a Christian person because “the passive 
righteousness of faith provides and continually reaffirms the core identity of the believer, while 
the active righteousness of love flows from and through this justified child of God in service to 
                                                 
34 LW 26: 11. 
35 Arand and Biermann, “Two Kinds of Righteousness?,” 122. 
36 Arand and Biermann, “Two Kinds of Righteousness?,” 122.  
37 Masaki Makito, “Luther’s Two Kinds of Righteousness and His Wartburg Postil (1522): How Luther 
Exhorted People to Live Christian lives” (PhD diss, Concordia Seminary, 2008), 56.  
38 LW 31: 299. 
39 LW 31:300. 
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the surrounding creation.”40 However, “maintaining the distinction between the two kinds of 
righteousness allows us to affirm both dimensions of our humanity.  Arand and Biermann best 
summarize this idea: 
Luther did not compartmentalize the human being in such a way that one could be 
human by partly possessing passive righteousness and partly possessing active 
righteousness. To be a human being as God created us to be, a perfect human 
specimen, involves being totally passive—as a newborn child of God—and totally 
active—as a responsible neighbor to other people and to the whole of God's world. 
People need both kinds of righteousness in order to be completely and genuinely 
human. "We must be righteous before God and man. Without one or the other we find 
our humanity diminished."41 
Luther always affirmed that as Christians seek to pursue their active righteous to serve their 
neighbor, their efforts are ever guided by the natural law, human reason, and imagination. God’s 
gifts of human reason and imagination help to tailor and apply God’s law towards specific 
situations so that our practice of active righteous becomes useful and effective towards 
promoting creaturely well-being of both the human and non-human creation.  
To Luther there is nothing Christian to the effectual nature of one’s good deeds performed 
in the left-hand realm. Because the effectiveness of one’s performance in the left hand realm 
depends on various factors other than faith, such as one’s personal ability, skills, knowledge, 
resources, social standing, or opportunities.42 Kolb and Arand further elaborate: 
Within creation some people are better at certain things, whether or not they are 
believers. Some people have more resources or are more talented or better educated 
or more compassionate, and so they might be more effective at looking after the 
needs and providing solutions than other might be. Here a nonbeliever may 
accomplish just as much or more than a believer; and in one sense God does not care 
(if we may speak that way) because God’s concern in terms of the creation is the 
good of the neighbor. Or, a believer may actually be more effective than a 
nonbeliever in doing good, but it may not be because of one’s faith or Christian 
                                                 
40 LW 31:300. 
41 Arand and Biermann, “Why Two Kinds of Righteousness,” 120. 
42 Arand and Biermann, “Why Two Kinds of Righteousness,” 73 
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insight but because of the creaturely gifts and accomplishments with which one has 
been blessed.43  
It should be noted here that in Luther’s thought one cannot find any instrumental mentality 
attached to the practice of active righteousness. The Christian in his practice of active 
righteousness is neither motivated nor is required to objectify his neighbor to use him as means 
to a self-serving end, because a Christian does not need to practice good works towards his 
neighbor to secure salvation or a good standing before God. Being firmly assured of one’s 
standing before God through passive righteousness, a Christian is made free to practice his active 
righteous to meet his neighbor’s need devoid of any ulterior motive.   
In Luther’s articulation of active righteousness, one does not find a retreat from one’s 
responsibility towards fellow creatures. The two kinds of righteousness “open up the world as 
God’s good creation so that Christians can live unreservedly in the world where good works are 
done for neighbor and for the good of creation.”44 In such a positive affirmation of our creaturely 
life, Luther’s understanding of two kinds of righteousness “widens our vision regarding the left-
hand realm and seeks to identify the common ground for moral reflection between Christians and 
non-Christians”45. Arand and Biermann further elaborate the relevance of Lutheran emphasis on 
active righteousness in the left-hand realm:    
Thus the definition of active righteousness provides the necessary theological space 
for reflection on the place of the social sciences, ethics, and moral theology for 
Christian living. It even creates space for Christians to actively consider and address 
such secular and mundane concerns as economics, environment, public policy, 
politics, and justice: thus affirming a common "worldliness" between Christians and 
non-Christians that is grounded in our creaturely existence. At the same time, it 
                                                 
43 Arand and Biermann, “Why Two Kinds of Righteousness,” 76. 
44 Arand and Biermann, “Why Two Kinds of Righteousness,” 111. 
45 Arand and Biermann, “Two Kinds of Righteousness?,” 131. 
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recognizes that the Gospel's work (coram Deo) will inform, empower, and even 
transform our creaturely activities in the world {coram mundo).46   
Another important affirmation found in Luther is the nature of good deeds resulting from 
the active righteousness performed by a believer and the civil righteousness practiced by a non-
believer. To Luther, “There is nothing particularly “Christian” about either our actions or our 
roles; rather they are human and creaturely (and in that sense are profoundly Christian).”47 In this 
sense Kolb and Arand note, “the Christian life looks quite ordinary and mundane with regard to 
the activities that are carried out. Christian life is human life, as God designed it for all his 
human creatures.”48 Thus there is no fundamental difference in nature pertaining to the good 
deeds performed by a believer or a non-believer since both contribute towards God’s purpose for 
the well-being of all in the left-hand realm of His creation. Thus to Luther, the external works of 
the non-believers are truly and useful and “they are useful creatures of God”49 and in this sense 
“the good works done by non-Christians and those by Christians in earthly sense may share the 
same value in the sight of man.”50 To Luther the only difference between the good deeds of a 
believer and a non-believer is in their nature of orientation. The believer might practice deeds of 
active righteousness stemming from their passive righteousness and conscious of their call from 
the Lord. Whereas the non-believer performs their civil righteous out of constraints of the sword, 
as a means towards a peaceful and respected life in the society, or as part of their effort towards 
work righteous with a false hope to earn their salvation from God.51  
                                                 
46 Arand and Biermann, “Two Kinds of Righteousness?,” 128. 
47 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 75. 
48 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 103. 
49 Martin Luther, “Against Latomus: Part Three,” in Vol. 32 of Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, 
Hilton C. Oswald and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1999), 256. 
50 Makito, “Luther’s Two Kinds of Righteousness,” 63. 
51 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 75. 
 145 
Although our discussion above clearly suggests that there exits fundamentally no visible 
difference between the civil righteousness practiced by a non-Christian and the active 
righteousness practiced by Christian in the left-hand,  it remains helpful for us to distinguish 
between each other, because such as distinction helps us to distinguish the difference within the 
horizontal or this-world righteousness between the righteousness practiced by a non-Christian 
and that of a believer 52  To some extent this would also help us to address the intra-Christian 
criticism within our theological circles that the two kinds of righteousness paradigm eliminates 
the unique aspect of the Christian life and equates the morality of a “righteous pagan”  with that 
of a faithful follower of Christ.53  Joel Biermann’s recent work, towards developing a Lutheran 
frame work on virtue ethics, is helpful in this regard. Biermann brings to our attention that 
Luther in his sermon on “Three Kinds of Righteousness” in 1523 has talked about three 
respective kinds of righteousness.54 Building upon the two types of righteousness approach and 
interacting closely with Luther and Melanchthon, Biermann proposes a three-kinds-of 
righteousness frame work for our theological clarity.55 Biermann elaborates this view point: 
In the three-kinds-of-righteousness framework that I am suggesting, the first 
righteousness is the righteousness that applies to all people, regardless of a person’s 
standing before God, whether justified coram Deo or not. A key aspect of the first 
kind of righteousness is its grounding in the recognition that God’s will (that is, the 
law) has been revealed and is still present throughout all of creation. This first kind of 
                                                 
52 Joel Biermann, A Case for Character: Towards a Lutheran Virtue Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014), 
126. 
53 Biermann, A Case for Character, 126.  
54 Biermann notes that the first kind of righteousness is the one expected in the civil realm that can operate 
independent of faith in the triune God. Civil, political righteousness and ceremonial righteousness which a non-
Christian is able to practice are good examples of the same. The second kind of righteous relate to alien righteous or 
the passive righteous through which a person is justified. And the third kind of righteousness relate to the active 
righteousness, which a believer alone is capable of performing because it stems from one’s faith in triune God. 
Biermann, A Case for Character, 124.       
55 Biermann also points to our attention that three-kinds-of righteousness approach closely relate to three uses 
of law (namely law as a curb, mirror, and guide) but later transcends the limitation of the later, “dealing as it does 
only with law- and is burdened with an unfortunate excess of negative baggage See for more discussion. Biermann, 
A Case for Character, 126–27.  
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righteousness is roughly parallel to what Luther called apparent righteousness, and 
what Melanchthon labeled righteousness of reason. The second righteousness is the 
righteousness of salvation that comes from outside, through faith. What is being 
called here the second kind of righteousness, Luther named, among a variety of other 
terms, alien righteousness. Melanchthon termed it the righteousness of the promise 
and considered it third. The third kind of righteousness in this threefold framework is 
the righteousness that is evident in the godly lives and good works of Christians as 
they function within the created world. In Luther’s sermon from 1518, this pious 
Christian activity was labelled as actual righteousness, and Melanchthon designated it 
as the righteousness of the law.56   
Biermann further ascribes participles, governing, justifying, and conforming to the respective 
righteousness and thus writes:  
There is a righteousness based on God’s will, governing righteousness, which rules 
and directs all of life in this world, and those who adhere to it attain a certain degree 
of righteousness according to the world. The second righteousness, justifying 
righteousness, is entirely distinct from governing righteousness, and for the sake of 
Christ delivers salvation to the wholly passive recipient. Justifying righteousness 
flows (through new and heightened “Christian” motivations of love for God and 
concern for neighbor) into the third kind of righteousness, conforming righteousness, 
which in its expression often seems to the outward observer quite similar to the 
governing righteousness.57  
Having discussed and named different kinds of righteousness operative in the life of a 
believer and also in a non-Christian, it is now pertinent that we briefly discuss on how Christians 
work with others towards the well-being of all in the left-hand realm. Important in this regard is 
Luther’s understanding on Christian’s Vocation.  
Luther’s Understanding of Vocation   
A Christian’s vocation in the left-hand realm occupies an important place in Luther’s 
understanding of God’s two realm. Luther articulated his understanding of vocation in contrast to 
the popular medieval understanding. The medieval spirituality which preserved certain pre-
Christian pagan elements in thinking, separated the “sacred” from the “profane.”  The “Sacred” 
                                                 
56 Biermann, A Case for Character, 127. 
57 Biermann, A Case for Character, 129. 
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activities, largely ritualistic in nature, were regarded as more God-pleasing and holy than profane 
activities, which consisted of “regular” every days tasks, oriented toward earthly life.58 The 
medieval Church also restricted the use of the biblical term “calling”—vocatio in Latin, Beruf in 
German only to those people who were entrusted with the so called sacred responsibilities like 
the priests, monks, and nuns. “They were the ‘called’ of the medieval church; these sacred 
responsibilities were defined as ‘voca- tions’ or ‘callings.’”59 Luther overturned this 
spiritualizing view of medieval Christianity by affirming that “all activities performed by the 
faithful people of God as a result of their trust in him are equally holy, and equally without 
influence in determining that his people are his people.”60 Luther also “transformed the use of the 
word “calling” or “vocation” by assigning it to all Christians.”61  
As pointed out in the previous chapter, God has ordained certain structures or institutions 
in the left-hand realm to preserve his creation.62 Within these structures or situations God assigns 
“offices” (ämter) or responsibilities for his people to carry out the corresponding tasks. To 
Luther, “God places all people, not just Christians, in these situations; He assigns all people these 
responsibilities.”63 However, Luther specifically used the word Beruf or vocatio in reference to 
                                                 
58 Robert Kolb notes three reason for Luther’s rejection of the traditional distinction of the sacred and profane 
in medieval Christianity. He notes, “First, the sacred activities of the medieval Church were often (though, not 
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62 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 58–59. 
63 Robert Kolb, “God Calling, ‘Take Care of My People:’ Luther's Concept of Vocation in the Augsburg 
Confession and Its Apology,” Concordia Journal 8 (January 1982): 6. 
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Christian’s work in the world as he perceives and carries out his God-given responsibilities.64  
Luther’s affirmation of God’s ongoing creative work (creatio continua) towards his 
creation forms an integral part in Luther’s understanding of Christian’s vocation. To Luther, God 
is actively at work in His creation for its preservation and well-being. In this regard “sin and 
human evil have not prevented God’s ongoing work within creation.”65 Luther called people in 
the exercise of their response-abilities “masks of God,” through whom God, for example, milks 
cows so that his human creatures may be nourished. However only those who trust God may 
understand that their responsibilities are personal assignments from God.66 In this regard Luther 
notes in his explanation of the first commandment that “Creatures are only the hands, channels, 
and means through which God bestows all blessings. For example- he gives to the mother breasts 
and milk for her infant, and he gives grain and all kinds of fruits from the earth for man’s 
nourishment-things which no creature could produce by himself.”67 Wingren further summaries 
how creatio continua, human vocations and Two Realm theology is inter-related in Luther’s 
thought: 
In his vocation man does work which effect the well-being of others; for so God has 
made all offices. Through this work in man’s offices, God’s creative work goes 
forward, and that creative work is love, a profusion of good gifts. With persons as his 
“hands” or “coworkers,” god give his gifts through the earthly vocations, towards 
man’s life on earth (food through farmers, fishermen and hunters; external peace 
through princes, judges, and orderly powers; knowledge and education through 
teachers and parents, etc, etc). Through preacher’s vocation, God gives the 
forgiveness of sins. Thus love comes from God, flowing down to human beings on 
earth through all vocations, through both spiritual and earthly governments. This can 
also be a connection between two governments from man’s point of view, if he 
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ponders what he receives through the faithfulness of others to their vocations. He 
receives the good gifts of God’s love thought both prince and preacher.68  
Luther recognized that as a member in the community, a Christian could belong to all the 
three estates at the same time and can have responsibilities in each sphere. Thus a person could 
often live in “several walks of life at the same time; for example, a person may simultaneously 
be a father, husband, employee, taxpayer, citizen, and Church member.”69 Sometimes it is 
inferred that the rigid societal structure during Luther’s time prevented people from vocational 
change. Luther, too, held on to a static notion of vocation, that people are called into particular 
stations through birth and are called to be content where they are.70 However Kolb and Arand 
dismiss such a view and note that although Luther lived in a society with fewer opportunities for 
social mobility and vocational change, he recognized that vocations do change with time and 
circumstance. Kolb and Arand argue:  
In addition, Luther came from an early-modern European family that itself had 
experienced and fostered its own upward mobility. His father left the farm to become 
a successful smelter. Luther himself had been sent as the first ever in his family to the 
university in hopes that he would win a place in the governmental structures of some 
princedom or city. His own rebellion against his father’s plan moved him from the 
faculty of law to a life in monastery. Luther knew that God can direct lives in such a 
way that vocational change takes place. So in our day, Luther’s understanding of 
vocation would not view as inappropriate the aspiration to seek a better job or a 
promotion as long as one does not turn that new job or promotion to an idol (as 
evidence when a person feels that life is no longer worth living if one does not attain 
it), but instead view it as an avenue for better serving God and neighbor. For God’s 
callings to his people are not end in themselves.71  
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Luther’s view of vocational mobility offers a critique to the caste system in India, where 
through birth a person’s caste determines one’s social status and prevents social mobility. But to 
Luther vocations do change with time and circumstance. 
The purpose of all our vocations is to serve and meet our neighbor’s need. In this way 
Luther did not see any salvific value to our deeds we perform through our vocations.72  As 
Wingren rightly puts it “God does not need our good works but our neighbor does.”73 Luther thus 
writes: 
Let us truly learn we are saved through faith in Christ and that alone. This fact has 
been made sufficiently manifest. The let no one rely on his own works. Let us in our 
life time engage only in such works as shall profit our neighbors, being indifferent to 
testament and intuition, and direct our efforts to bettering the full course of our 
neighbors life.74  
Our gifts and neighbor’s need determines our vocational considerations and human reason 
and law guides our efforts to live out our active righteousness in the service of the common 
good.  Luther, affirming the importance of our gifts and the need of neighbor in our practice of 
vocations, notes: 
If you are a manual laborer, you find that the Bible has been put into your workshop, 
into your hand, into your heart. It teaches and preaches how you should treat your 
neighbor. Just look at your tools—at your needle or thimble, your beer barrel, your 
goods, your scales or yardsticks or measure—and you will read this statement 
inscribed on them. Everywhere you look, it stared at you. Nothing that you handle 
every day is so tiny that it does not continually tell you this, if you will only listen. 
Indeed, there is no shortage or preaching. You have as many preachers as you have 
transactions, goods, tools, and other equipment in your house and home. All this 
continually crying out to you: Friend, use me in your relations with your neighbor 
just as you would want your neighbor to use his property in his relations with you.75   
A Christian’s vocation is externally identical to the responsibilities carried out by non-
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Christians in the left-hand realm. As Kolb points out, it is the faith that motivates the Christian 
that differentiates the Christian’s vocation from the non-Christian's practice of his 
responsibilities as both carry out God-given responsibilities as the mask of God.76 Therefore, in 
this thought of Luther we find a common ground for Christians and non-Christians working 
together as instruments and masks of the one true God. In addition, the only thing that 
distinguishes a Christian’s work from that of any other is “the vertical relationship with God, the 
trust which recognizes God's love and lordship, impinges on and controls the horizontal 
relationships in which that faith now perceives God's calling and command.”77 
To Luther, vocation relates to the entire life of a Christian in significant way. As Wingren 
encapsulates: 
Vocation belong to man’s situation before the resurrection, where there are two 
kingdoms, earth and haven, two contending powers, God and the devil, and two 
antagonistic components in man, the old man and the new, related to the constant 
battle for man. The old man must bear vocation’s cross as long as life on earth lasts 
and the battle against the devil continues. As long as he continues in his earthly 
vocations, there can be no end to the struggle. After death comes a new kingdom free 
from the cross; heaven has taken the place of earth, God has conquered the devil, and 
man has been raised from the dead. The man’s struggle is at end.78 
Thus to Luther vocation is more than just dedicated service to one’s occupation. Vocation 
encapsulates the “the whole theater of personal, communal, and historical relationships in which 
one lives.”79 Marc Kolden elaborates on the much deeper and broader nature of vocation: 
The call comes from Christ, but it locates one in a calling in the creation doing works 
for one's neighbor. …vocation" refers not only to one's occupation but to all one's 
relationships, situations, contexts, and involvements (including, of course, one's 
occupation, if one is employed). It is true that Luther often speaks about specific 
occupations, but the purpose in doing so is not to restrict vocation to occupation but 
to affirm that even the most mundane stations are places in which Christians ought to 
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live out their faith; such work serves other people, unlike religious vocations which 
serve no one but the person involved (and not ever that person, if it is seen that 
salvation comes not by pious works.80 
Luther’s understanding of vocation provides value to every vocation as a sacred calling. 
Thus ordinary and mundane tasks of everyday life carried out through one’s respective vocations 
find significance because they contribute towards the welfare for earthly life. All vocations are 
places of service to others, in living out our life as human beings according to God’s good 
design. The doctrine of the priesthood of believers forms an important element in this regard. 
Luther notes:  
All Christians are truly of the spiritual estate, and there is no difference among them except 
that of office. Paul says in I Cor. 12[:12–13] that we are all one body, yet every member has its 
own work by which it serves the others. This is because we all have one baptism, one Gospel, 
one faith, and are all Christians alike; for baptism, Gospel, and faith alone make us spiritual and 
a Christian people… As far as that goes, we are all consecrated priests through baptism, as St. 
Peter says in 1 Peter 2[:9], “You are a royal priesthood and a priestly realm.” The Apocalypse 
says, “Thou hast made us to be priests and kings by thy blood” [Rev. 5:9–10]. …Therefore, just 
as those who are now called “spiritual,” that is, priests, bishops, or popes, are neither different 
from other Christians nor superior to them, except that they are charged with the administration 
of the word of God and the sacraments, which is their work and office, so it is with the temporal 
authorities. They bear the sword and rod in their hand to punish the wicked and protect the good. 
A cobbler, a smith, a peasant—each has the work and office of his trade, and yet they are all 
alike consecrated priests and bishops. Further, everyone must benefit and serve every other by 
means of his own work or office so that in this way many kinds of work may be done for the 
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bodily and spiritual welfare of the community, just as all the members of the body serve one 
another [I Cor. 12:14–26].81Two important vocations which are of importance to this present 
study relating to Christian’s responsibility in the context of Hindutva nationalism in the political 
realm, are the call to live as a citizen and the call to be a ruler in leadership within political 
structures. The modern political arena, marked with democratic ideals, has altered drastically the 
conceptual parameters of people as passive subjects during Luther’s time to proactive citizens 
having an active responsibility in the political process. Similarly the political ethos with regard to 
the role and function of political authority operative under a democratic system is different from 
Luther’s time. But such a change in circumstance and ideals does not mean that Luther’s 
principles with regard to our civic responsibilities in political area is obsolete. In the next 
chapter, I will return to this topic as we discuss in detail the vocation of citizens and political 
leaders in our engagement with the Hindutva nationalism in India. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce a theological rationale towards 
Christian’s involvement in the left-hand realm. In this regard we discussed two important 
teachings of Luther in relation to Luther’s understanding of two realms, namely two kinds of 
righteousness and Christian’s vocation in the world. The two kinds of righteousness of a 
Christian grounds him with an identity as a child of God and provides impetus to work towards 
the welfare of all in the left-hand realm. Further, the two kinds of righteousness rejects any one-
dimensional understanding of Christian anthropology, and it affirms the indispensable nature of 
the simultaneity of two kinds of righteousness operating in a Christian, who lives out his calling 
in this world. So we cannot conceive of a compartmentalization and/or separation of the 
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Christian’s identity from the Christian’s action in the world. Thus any talk about a Christian’s 
performance in this world is talk about his faith and identity. We also saw that through one’s 
vocation Christians serve the world as God’s mask towards the common good of all. God uses all 
people, not just Christians, as His mask towards the preservation of His creation. The Christian’s 
performance of active righteousness through his vocation can find common ground with others 
to work towards the well-being of all in the left hand realm. Our effort in the next chapter, then, 
is to find the relevance of Luther’s Two Realm theology in response to Hindutva nationalism, 
informed by a theological rationale which takes seriously a two dimensional Christian 
anthropology and a distinction between God’s two mode of governance. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A RESPONSE TO HINDUTVA FROM A TWO REALM PERSPECTIVE: TOWARDS A 
THEOLOGY OF ENGAGEMENT   
Thus far this dissertation has identified the specific challenges to the common good 
brought about by Hindutva ideology, specifically its conception of a Hindu State in India. . 
Following that I also surveyed some major responses given to Hindutva from different Christian 
perspectives. In order to further contribute towards theological thinking in India I have 
introduced Luther’s Two Realm theology to provide a conceptual and theological framework to 
Christians in India as they engage in the public sphere. This framework assists Christians in their 
effort to take seriously their Christian faith (exclusive in nature) but at the same time embrace an 
inclusive attitude (inclusive in nature) as they address various challenges that come from 
Hindutva nationalism. This chapter will first, summarize and spell out a Lutheran theological 
frame work useful for Christian engagement in the public sphere, Second, offer a critique to 
Hindutva understanding of the State from Two Realm frame work, and third, discuss how 
Christians and Church in India could carry out their respective calling in the context of Hindutva 
informed by Luther’s Two Realm theology.  
Towards a Theology of Engagement in Public Square: Luther’s Two Realm Theology  
In the third chapter of this dissertation we undertook a detailed survey of various Indian 
theological approaches towards political Hinduism. We saw how each approach, taking seriously 
their commitment towards the Church and the nation, addressed various challenges raised by 
Hindutva. Inculturation theologians sought to root the Christian faith within the Hindu traditions 
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and culture with an effort to overcome the accusation of colonial legacy and foreignness of the 
Christian faith.  The secular and inter-religious theologians of the post-independence era 
proposed secularism and inter-religious dialogue. The Dalit theologians confronted and tried to 
expose the Brahminic hegemony of Hindutva while working towards the liberation of Dalits.  
The evangelical theologians responded by noting numerous Christian contributions towards the 
nationhood and tried to dispel Hindutva accusation that conversion to Christianity would weaken 
one’s commitment to the nation. Although these theologians were genuine in their efforts, their 
suggestions were one dimensional in their approach. For example, the secular approach and 
inter-religious approach downplayed the need of proclamation of the Gospel and uniqueness of 
faith in Christ, whereas the liberation approach tends to interpret Gospel and religious conversion 
socio-politically. To many inculturation theologians the doctrine of the Church was scandalous. 
In the theological approaches mentioned above, the contextual concerns determined their 
theological paradigm. In their approach, they seem to operate with an assumption that preserving 
and taking seriously the uniqueness of one’s Christian faith and identity can become an 
impediment to theologizing efforts. The Christian faith and identity mattered within an 
evangelical approach, however, two common criticisms can be levelled against the evangelical 
approach. First, the evangelical approach tends to be withdrawn from the societal realities. 
Second, those evangelical strands which were involved with societal concerns are often criticized 
for an “instrumental mentality” implicit in their operation, building bridges with others with the 
sole concern for evangelizing or Christianizing the other.  
The theological approaches reviewed appear to be one dimensional in their approach, either 
compromising cardinal elements of Christian faith for the sake of social involvement, or 
withdrawn from social realities, solely concerned with the Christian identity. This analysis seems 
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to suggest that it might be difficult to have a theological approach which could remain faithful 
both to our Christian faith (which is exclusive in nature) and at the same time be inclusive of 
others and concerned about the social realities around us. This dissertation proposes that a robust 
understanding of Luther’s Two Realm theology could help address this problem.  In Luther’s 
Two Realm theology, God is actively interested and present in both realms of reality. This 
affirms a holistic Christian anthropology which takes into account the spiritual and secular 
spheres of human life, both distinct yet integrated with all its nuances.  
 The relevant major tenets of the Two Realm frame work can be summed up as following. 
1) Two Realms of God’s activity: Distinct not Separate 2) Two Dimensions of Christian’s 
Identity: Distinct yet Integrated. 3) An Inclusive Paradigm for Common Humanity.    
Two Realms of God’s Activity: Distinct not Separate  
The core of Luther’s Two Realm theology is the distinction between God’s two realms and 
His two modes of governance. In the right-hand realm God deals with us as the Redeemer and 
Sanctifier through the Gospel. In the left-hand realm God deals with us as the Creator and 
preserver through the law. Carl Braaten rightly elaborates Two Realm doctrine thus:  
This doctrine draws a distinction between two ways of God’s working in the world, 
two strategies that God uses to deal with the powers of evil and the reality of sin, two 
approaches to human beings, to mobilize them for active cooperation in two distinctly 
different kinds of institutions. One is created as an instrument of governance seeking 
justice through the administration of law and preservation of order, and the other as 
an instrument of the Gospel and its sacraments announcing and mediating an ultimate 
and everlasting salvation which only Christ can give in an act of unconditional love 
and personal sacrifice.1    
Maintaining such a distinction is fundamental to any theological effort because provides 
precision and clarity with regard to God’s distinct concerns in both realms of life. This 
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distinction allows the theologian to let creation be creation and redemption be redemption.2  
Luther’s distinction between the two realms and God’s two modes of operation in the 
respective realms clearly demonstrates that God is active and interested in both realms of life. 
God is not the God of right-hand/ spiritual realm alone where He rules as the redeemer and 
sanctifier but He is also the God of left-hand/secular realm where He reigns as the creator and 
preserver of His good creation. As Robert Benne notes “God the creator and God the redeemer 
are not separate deities. Likewise the two ways that God reigns are not separate spatially or 
existentially; they interact in creative ways.”3 Thus Luther’s Two Realm theology helps us to 
avoid any dichotomy between two realms but clarifies the unique concerns of one true God in 
both realms of His activity. Luther’s Two Realm theology reminds us that God’s concern in 
relation to right hand realm with regard to human salvation and sanctification, and His concern 
for the left hand realm of preservation of His creation are equally important concerns. Thus in 
“the Lutheran ethical view, Christians live in two realities at the same time. Each reality is under 
the governance of God but in sharply different ways… God’s aim in both modes of rule is the 
same- to overcome evil and recall disobedient creation to himself but God uses very different 
means in each “kingdom.”4 This reminds us that our theology should be able to maintain the 
simultaneity of God’s distinct yet not separate concerns and mode of operation.  
Two Dimensions of Christian’s Identity: Distinct Yet Integrated.   
 We have already noted that in Luther’s definition a person exists in two dimensions. His 
relationship with God (coram Deo) and his relationship with the world (coram mundo) define 
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properly one’s anthropology. In this two dimensional existence, to be a human being as God 
created us to be, "We must be righteous before God and man. Without one or the other we find 
our humanity diminished.”5 Luther’s definition of the two kinds of righteousness is significant in 
this regard. God’s design for us is fulfilled in both the passive righteousness which provides us 
with the identity as God’s children and active righteousness through which we relate and perform 
deeds of faith to other people. Thus we need both kinds of righteousness in order to be 
completely and genuinely human.  
Luther’s understanding of two kinds of righteousness reminds us that in our theological 
deliberation we should hold on to a holistic understanding of Christian anthropology. Our 
theologizing efforts should reject any one dimensional approach or compartmentalizing 
tendencies. It is equally important that we keep the two dimensions of human existence distinct 
so that we may not confuse the concerns of the two realms of human existence. As Arand and 
Biermann rightly put it “Luther insisted that to affirm both dimensions of human existence they 
must be kept distinct. This is our theology, by which we teach a precise distinction between these 
two kinds of righteousness, the active and the passive, so that morality and faith, works and 
grace, secular society and religion may not be confused. Both are necessary, but both must be 
kept within their limits."6 
Luther’s Two Realm doctrine offers a rich resource to Indian theological thinking and a 
corrective vision to various approaches reviewed in our discussion. Luther’s Two Realm 
perspective provides clarity and direction to our inculturation efforts. The Two Realm 
perspective, rich in its theology of creation, helps us to appreciate and cherish various cultures, 
traditions, and languages present in the left hand realm. Natural law and human reason, which 
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governs the left-hand, realm help us to affirm, critique, and at the same, make useful of liberative 
elements implicit in human culture and traditions for the common good. In our inculturation 
efforts, knowing that Gospel belongs to the right hand realm, the Two Realm theology help us to 
preserve the universality and transcultural nature of the Gospel, since there is one Lord, one 
faith, one baptism. It prevents us from the temptation to either add human tradition and culture to 
the Gospel or fall into the trap of syncretism thereby allowing culture to usurp and change the 
Christian message. Luther’s Two Realm theology also encourages us to gladly and critically 
make use of the cultural forms, local language, music, and various art forms, which are God’s 
good gifts in the left hand realm, to better communicate the Gospel contextually and locally. We 
are also called to critique the culture and traditions around us which are not compatible with the 
Gospel. This task occurs not on the basis of the Gospel but through human reason, the natural 
law, and our vocations.  
We saw that inter-religious dialogue and secular approach both were concerned about the 
well-being in the left-hand realm at the cost of compromising the basic tenets of Christian faith 
and identity. These approaches caution that the pre-occupation with faith and identity might lead 
one to withdraw from concerns of the society. However Luther’s understanding of two kinds of 
righteousness provide a corrective vision, as Luther reminds us that passive righteousness 
becomes the source of motivation to serve others in the world. Thus one’s Christian identity and 
faith makes a Christian ever active and mindful towards the concerns in the left-hand realm. In 
this regard two kinds of righteousness also engages the evangelical approach by providing a 
richer vision of embracing a two dimensional understanding of righteousness and a freedom to 
perform good deeds towards our neighbors without a need to instrumentalize our neighbors, 
because the whole purpose of our active righteousness is to meet our neighbor’s need.      
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Luther’s Two Realm perspective provides clarity to secular and inter-religious approach 
and reminds us that inter-religious harmony and task of nation building are legitimate concerns 
in the left-hand realm. Religion, with its insistence on ceremonial righteousness, plays a positive 
role in upholding morality in the left-hand realm. In this regard inter-religious dialogues and 
secular fellowships could explore implications of the natural law for our common good in the left 
hand realm.  
Secularizing the meaning of the Gospel (Secular approach) and superficially lumping 
together the salvific tenets of various religions together (Inter-religious approach) both fail to 
treat with integrity the diversity and nuance implicit in different religious persuasion. As 
Sebastian Kim points out, what is called forth in our theological approaches is 
acknowledgement, mutual respect, and accommodation that “different theological searches for 
the meaning of life and the way to achieve it- a common quest but answered in widely differing 
ways.”7  
Luther’s Two Realm perspective offers a critique to liberation theology which tends to 
reduces salvation into socio-political reality. Although justice and peace are genuine concerns in 
the left-hand realm, turning socio-political liberation as salvific is a confusion and of God’s two 
realms. Robert Benne noting his temptation offers a critique: 
Particularly in the political sphere humans are prone to claim salvific significance to 
their efforts at social or political transformation…The good news of the Gospel is that 
God saves us through his gift of grace in Christ alone. We need do nothing but accept 
the sheer gift of salvation with repentant hearts. The Lutheran insistence on a radical 
doctrine of grace puts all human efforts into proper perspective. They deal with 
penultimate attempts to improve the human condition with relative bads, not with 
salvation. This means that politics is desacralized and relativized, as are education 
and therapy. Salvation is through Christ, not through human political schemes or 
educational or psychological efforts. Lutheran might appropriately speak of liberation 
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ethics but never of liberation theology in the sense that revolutionary praxis is 
synonymous with salvation.8  
Having been freed from the burden of a socio-political liberative understanding of Gospel, 
Benne notes that we are in a better position to engage in our efforts for liberative concerns in the 
society: 
When we are freed from the need to look for salvation in human schemes, our eyes 
should be clearer to make the very important distinctions between the relatively good 
and the relatively bad in the realm of human action. Liberated from the worry about 
our salvation, we can turn unobsessively to the task of building a better world, not by 
prideful claims of transformation, but by determined yet humble attempts to take first 
steps for the better.9  
 
The traditional stereotype that Lutheranism is socially disinterested and quietist in nature 
cannot hold true. As Antti Raunio notes: 
Lutheranism is known for the idea that faith frees the human being to serve the 
neighbor in love. Luther defines the love of neighbor as a striving for the good of 
another. The self is freed from striving for personal good and gain. Luther often 
describes neighborly love as a love that aims solely to fulfill neighbor’s need. The 
neighbor’s need is precisely the point at which Luther determine the good. Luther 
does not start with the person’s effort to attain and guarantee her won good but turn 
attention to the neighbor.10    
 
Luther’s distinction between the two realms and his two dimensional understanding of 
human existence provides us with a conceptual tool to distinguish between the concerns of 
creation and redemption, thereby helping us not to confuse, mix, or compromise between 
concerns relating to our spiritual and temporal realms of existence.  Herbert Hoefer rightly 
summaries, “The two kingdom distinction is an analytical tool. It helps to clarify the various 
issues involved in complex, inter-relating social questions. Using the distinction we do not 
                                                 
8 Benne, “Lutheran Ethics,” 18–19.  
9 Benne, “Lutheran Ethics,” 20.  
10 Raunio Antti, “Luther’s Social Theology in the Contemporary World: Searching for the Neighbor’s Good,” 
in The Global Luther: A Theologian for Modern Times, ed. Christine Helmer (Minneapolis: Fortress, 200), 216.  
 163 
facilely solve our theological and practical problems. However, we do understand our various 
responsibilities better and thus make more balanced decisions in the developing situations of our 
life and work in the society.”11 
An Inclusive Paradigm for Common Humanity: Foundations for our Common Existence   
Luther’s two realm theology provides us with an inclusive paradigm for our common 
human existence, whereby Christians are able to work closely with people of different faiths, or 
no faith, towards the wellbeing of all in our temporal life. In this regard, we shall now discuss 
two foundations for our common existence which serve as the common points of contact with 
others in the temporal realm of life. They are 1) Common Creatureliness and Common Needs 2) 
Common Source of Morality: Natural Law and Human Reason.  
 Common Creatureliness and Common Needs.   
We have already identified that left-hand realm is the realm of creation wherein God reigns 
as the Creator and Preserver. In this temporal realm we share a common Creatureliness with our 
fellow human beings and everything in creation by the fact that we all are created by God. The 
Lutheran Church Missouri—Synod’s document, Together with all Creatures: Caring for God’s 
living world (2010), elaborates the common Creatureliness we share not just with our fellow 
human beings but with entire creation: 
While we share a common Creatureliness with all things “visible and invisible” (the 
latter including angels) we share a particularly close bond with our fellow earth 
formed creatures. God formed us together with them from the soil. Genesis 2:7 makes 
a special point of emphasizing this feature of our Creatureliness: The “Lord God 
formed the man of dust from the ground.” Note how the narrative highlights our 
connection to the ground with very name given to the first human creature. God call 
him Adam because he is created from adamah. Genesis 5 makes the same point: 
“Male and female he created them, and he blessed them and named them man (adam) 
when they were created” (Gen 5:2). Adam here is used as a generic name for humans 
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rather than personal name of a single person. Genesis provides a deliberate play on 
words. Adam is made from the adamah. Humans are made from the humus. 
Earthlings are made from the earth. We are earth creatures.12  
Human beings are also set apart from the rest of creation due to the fact that they are, 
according to Genesis 1:26-28, created in the image of God (imago Dei). To Luther, human 
beings created in God’s image means at least two things. Firstly, “The image of God consists in 
the ability that has been distributed to the human being to ‘re-spond.’”13 In this regard, human 
beings have been given the ability to converse with God and He with them. The image of God 
establishes a special relationship between human beings and God.14 Secondly, “The image of 
God for human beings consists in the fact that the individual is the representative (vicarious) of 
God and is the one responsible for carrying out his mandates on earth.”15 In this regard “humans 
are given the responsibility of protecting and guiding creation in order to maintain shalom.”16 
Created in the Image of God, human beings are created to be in relationship with God and 
towards fellow human being, and even the wider creation. Although the fall did damage the 
image of God in human beings, which only God could restore, Luther held that sinners could, to 
some extent, live outwardly moral lives. They might behave morally for several reasons, 
including fear of punishment, want to justify self before God and/or receive praise, fame, 
advancement, or self-glory in this world. 17 In the left-hand realm we are bound to each other 
because of our common Creatureliness, since all are created by God and are God’s creatures. 
As God’s creatures we are also bound to each other because of the common creaturely 
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needs we have in this world.  All human beings share the same planet and a common pattern of 
life. We need each other for our food, security, belonging, and life to flourish.  In this temporal 
realm, which is affected by sin and evil, we also share a common need for order, peace, justice, 
and harmony, in order for life to exist and grow. We are mutually dependent upon each other 
because God has created us to be social creatures, whereby “As social creatures, we have been 
fashioned by God to live in a social web of mutually constitutive relationships, in which we not 
only receive life and support from others but also contribute to the life and well-being of 
others.”18   
Luther’s understanding of God as the provider and preserver of His creation is significant 
to our ongoing discussion, because in and through our mutually constitutive relationships, it is 
God who uses human beings and non-human creation as His instruments or masks (larvae Dei) 
to meet our common needs.19 Luther’s teaching on divinely ordained intuitions, and people 
acting in and through these structures, in the left hand realm to carry out God’s will for His 
creation is significant in this regard. God has placed not just Christians but all people in these 
places of responsibilities towards the preservation of His creation. Thus in the horizontal realm, 
places of responsibilities, or God ordained created walks of life, provide a common ground for 
Christian and non-Christians to cooperate and  work towards the mutual wellbeing and common 
good.   
Although Luther did not live in a society marked with much cultural and religious 
diversity, still he did not envisage a homogeneous society in terms of a single religion or culture. 
Even in his context Luther always acknowledged that “Christians are always a minority in the 
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midst of non-Christians.”20  And “the world and the masses are and always will be un-
Christian…”21 Thus Luther never envisioned a monolithic society shaped by Christian religion 
and culture. Applying Luther’s principle to our context helps us to recognize and acknowledge 
the plurality and diversity in terms of ethnicity, culture, religion, and language in our midst 
without having the need to eliminate these differences with a notion that homogeneity is desired 
to build a common ground for people to work together for the common good.  
Luther also did not think that the basis of cooperation in the left-hand realm should be 
based on the Gospel.  The Gospel provides identity and motivation for Christians to embrace the 
secular realm as God’s good creation, but the common platform a Christian shares with his non-
Christian neighbor, in a religiously and culturally plural society, is not be based on the Gospel, 
but under God’s law.  As William Lazareth rightly notes, “Especially in our pluralistic culture, 
men and women who cannot worship together under the Gospel are still going to have to find 
more ways in which they can work together under the law.”22  
To conclude, in a religiously plural and culturally diverse context, like India, an affirmation 
of our common Creatureliness carries much relevance. It reminds us that we have more in 
common with each other due to our Creatureliness and are depend upon each other for our 
common needs. Luther’s Two Realm theology helps us also to reject any visioning for a 
theocracy or to seek a homogeneous societal foundation based on culturally, religiously, or 
ethnically monolithic tenets, which aim to obliterate difference under the false pretense to foster 
cooperation and progress. Building upon our common Creatureliness, Luther’s Two Realm 
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theology introduces us to another creative and solid foundation, under which our common 
Creatureliness function and grow, namely under God’s gift of Natural Law and Human 
Reason/Wisdom.         
Common Morality: Natural Law and Human Reason.  
The left-hand realm is a place where sin and evil reigns in order to destroy and thwart 
God’s creation. Nevertheless, God is ever active in this fallen realm to prevent it from falling 
apart and dissolving to nothing.  Luther’s doctrine of the “orders of creation” reminds us that 
Christians, along with all other human beings, are placed in a frame work of universal structures 
to carry out the divine task of curbing sin and its effects and to promote life and human 
fellowship for the wellbeing of all in the left-hand realm. In this temporal realm of life, God has 
gifted humans with natural law and reason to foster our creaturely life and to check evil.  
Luther affirmed natural law to be fundamental towards ordering, guiding, and regulating 
morality and ethical conduct in the left hand realm, for it defined the basic obligation a person 
owed to God, neighbor, and to self. To Luther, “God’s natural law, set at the creation, continued 
to operate after the fall into sin, and that it provided the foundation for all positive law and public 
morality in the earthly kingdom.”23 Luther thus notes “Natural law is a practical first principle in 
the sphere of morality; it forbids evil and commands good. Positive law is a decision that takes 
circumstances into account and conforms to natural law on credible grounds. The basis of natural 
law is God, who has created this light, but the basis of positive law is civil authority.”24 
Fundamental to Luther’s affirmation of natural law was its universal nature and the revelation of 
the same in the creation apart from the Bible and the Christian faith.  
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Along with Natural law, to Luther, the temporal world is subject to reason and imagination. 
Luther affirmed clearly that God has provided the ability to reason to everyone regardless 
whether they are Christians or not. He also believed that some are more gifted with wisdom than 
others regardless of their religious persuasion. Luther noted that the basic teachings of the natural 
law “lives and shines in all human reason, and if people would only pay attention to it, what need 
would they have of books, teachers, or of law? For they carry with them more than enough about 
what they ought to do, judge, accept, and reject.”25 Luther was, however, also skeptical whether 
sinful persons would on their accord use their reason to “pay attention” to the natural law written 
in their hearts. Luther always thought that the coercive power of the legal system, parents, 
preachers, and magistrates had a positive role to play in enforcement of the natural law.    
Luther’s affirmation of the universality of natural law and reason carries much significance 
to our discussion. Firstly as Christians who seek to work with others in the left hand realm for 
the common good, we are not required to introduce God and His law to the world for the first 
time.26 There is no such realm of life from which God is absent, because “God is always present 
in the world beforehand through the law engraved in the nature of the things He creates. God is 
universally present as the authority that drives people to do what they must do to sustain life, to 
administer justice, to play by the rules, and to care for their families and communities.”27 Thus 
“the universality of law provides a common ground for us to cooperate with all those who share 
respect of law, regardless of their theological conviction.”28  
Secondly a positive affirmation of the natural law and of human reason in Luther’s thought 
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presents possibilities for work towards strengthening human fellowship and finding solutions in 
dealing with various problems the society faces which disrupts peace and justice. Through the 
use of reason, human fellowship is sustained and deepened. Knut Alfsvág points out “Fellowship 
based on reason as an important (but not the ultimate) goal of human activity is the proper role 
for the political estate according to Lutheran understanding.”29  
 Finally, in a religiously plural and culturally diverse public square, the universality of 
natural law and human reason provide a common foundation to argue for the reasonableness and 
ethicality of our positions without having to resort to the Bible or the Christian faith. Although 
our core convictions are shaped by our faith, our position statements can be made persuasive to 
“non-Christians solely on the condition that they are backed by reasonable arguments intelligible 
to those who do not happen to believe in Christ and the Bible.”30 Thus humanity’s common 
foundation, based on universality of natural law and human reason, provides us with a common 
ground to carry out our conversation.  
In an age of moral relativism the task of making intelligible arguments in the public square 
is not with a challenge, because of pervasive of human sin and its distortion of natural law and 
human reason.  Luther reminds us that due to the fall and corruption of human person and human 
reason, human beings no longer are able to understand fully the requirement of the natural law 
except in a dim way. This then tempts humans to imagine and add his own content to the natural 
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law according to his sinful nature. Thus a sinful person is ever tempted to recreate the natural 
law, “as he does God, in the image of himself. The Golden Rule: ‘Whatever you wish that others 
would do to you, do also to them” (Mathew 7:12), apart from spiritual insight, has an egoistic 
perspective.”31 Thus in our engagement with people with differing worldviews, we should not 
assume that a set of universally acceptable precepts will immediately and naturally emerge. This 
so because sometimes others might understand good differently from the Christian. “In fact the 
non-Christian will be influenced by his own traditions, values, and concepts, just as the 
Christians is influenced by his.”32 
The above observation highlights the need to recognize always the intrinsic link that exists 
between natural law and the Decalogue. In this way we should be careful not to treat natural law 
as something autonomous to the law of the Lord revealed in the Decalogue. Luther always 
affirmed that natural law finds its clear expression in the Decalogue and relied on the Decalogue 
to ensure the true understanding of the natural law.  Complexities and nuances present in the 
perception and application of natural law should not dishearten our efforts to establish a common 
ground with those do not share our beliefs. Regardless of religious, cultural and moral diversities 
which exist in our society, the fact remain that the “Decalogue summarizes enduring moral 
principles that exist, even if suppressed, denied, or obscured. These principles will always 
influence, to some degree, every moral system. The law written on the heart is consistent, even 
though man’s heart, corrupted by sin, is not. This means that while the law written on our heart 
may be suppressed, it may not be erased.”33  Thus no matter how persuasive the effect of sin in 
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the temporal realm, people are always confronted with the ought, due to the presence of the 
natural law. Our careful engagement and persuasively intelligible moral reasoning carries much 
significance in finding common moral ground with each other in the left-hand realm.  
A Critique of Hindutva Understanding of the State from Luther’s Two Ream Perspective   
Hindutva ideology, as we have noted, is a politicalized form of Brahmanical Hinduism 
which promotes an ethnic nationalism in India. In recent years, Hindutva is taking every effort to 
make itself known as the true representative of various sects and traditions in the Hindu fold, but 
it is a well-known fact that it stands for the political, cultural, and religious supremacy of 
Brahmanical Hinduism. In the Hindutva configuration, the State has an important role to play in 
its political project to create a Hindu Rashtra (nation). The purpose of this section is to offer a 
critique of the Hindutva conception of State and its function in the society. Since we have 
already noted several critiques made to Hindutva ideology by secular and theological writers of 
various persuasions, I will limit my critique to the Hindutva conception of State under two 
headings, namely, Hindutva conception of nature and purpose of the State, and Hindutva State 
and Religious Toleration.   
Critique of Nature and Purpose of State in Hindutva   
In the Hindutva imagination of the nationhood, the role of the state holds a significant 
place. Driving on the wheels of a monistic religio-cultural world view, to the Hindutva 
ideologues, the Hindu nation is a manifestation of the Almighty.34 The soul (chitti) of the Hindu 
nation is made visible through the “five unities” namely,  Sacred Hindu land, Hindu Race, Hindu 
Culture, Hindu Language (Sanskrit and its derivatives), all shaped by Hindu Religion. To the 
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Hindutva ideologues, Hindu Dharma, or the innate law (similar to natural law), is the supreme 
and eternal law to which even God is subject. By upholding and observing these laws the nation 
will exist and function. The Dharma of every Individual in relation to his country is to serve the 
nation and work towards the visible manifestation of a Hindu nation. Since the Hindu society 
itself is the manifestation of the ultimate reality, one’s religious devotion to the country is one of 
the paths for moksha/salvation.  
The Hindutva understanding of the State is then to be placed against this backdrop of 
selective monistic religio-cultural reading of the nationhood. The state, from this view point, is a 
political institution formed through a social contract for the purpose of the realization of the 
Hindu nation. In this way, the State is committed to promote Hindu Dharma and foster those 
conditions conducive for the Hindu nation to manifest, function, and grow as guided by the 
parameters of “five unities.” 
The Hindutva understanding of the nationhood and state is problematic on several levels. 
Firstly, from a Hindu religious perspective the representation of Hindu Dharma in the political 
project of Hindutva is a grave distortion and materialistic reductionism. Chetan Bhatt 
substantiates this criticism:  
Upadhyaya’s assertion that his ‘dharma’ was based on Hindu precepts is highly 
problematic. Leaving aside the caste and gender supremacist strictures of 
varnashramadharma or stri-dharma, for solemn devotees, the dharma within Hindu 
metaphysics is nothing less than the universal arrangement of the cosmos (!), whereas 
for Upadhyaya dharma is redacted to the soul (chiti) of the densely parochial Hindu 
Rashtra. This also reflects the unsophisticated curtailment, diminishing and 
simplification of Hinduism and Buddhism in Hindu nationalism. Upadhyaya’s 
‘integralism’ was an elementary reduction, legitimized through advaitin language, of 
the totality of Hinduism and the diversity of its philosophies and beliefs into a 
materialist concern with ‘man’, ‘society’ and exclusive nationalism. Religious 
commitment becomes a matter of nationalist affiliation (or conversely, nationalism 
becomes the sole measurement for religious commitment). Dharma is arguably 
productive for Hindu metaphysics because it is an empty transcendental signified. In 
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Upadhyaya’s philosophy, it was instead filled with material, temporal concerns of 
land and nation.35  
Secondly, a monolithic, homogeneous, and hegemonic political project of a Hindu 
nationhood is not a true representation of the different traditions present within the fold of 
Hinduism. Hinduism is indeed a collection and synthesis of various Indian cultures and traditions 
having different roots. Hinduism does not have a single text, creed, or founder but an umbrella of 
terms which accommodate various faith persuasions or non-faith persuasion.36 As we have 
already noted, Hindutva ideology, in this regard, is a politicized form of elitist Brahmanical 
tradition in the Hindu fold. Liberation theologians have brought to our attention how Dalit, tribal, 
and other ethno- cultural groups inside the Hindu fold run counter to the hegemonic stance of 
Brahminic tradition.    
Thirdly the purpose of the State in Hindutva ideology is problematic, since it views the 
main purpose of the Hindu state as the establishment of a monolithic and homogenous Hindu 
nation excluding religious and ethnic minorities from its configuration. Thus the State is 
mandated to look after the wellbeing of only those who belong to the Hindu fold.   
Hindutva’s parochial cultural and religious nationhood runs counter to the constitutional 
interpretation of Indian nationhood. As already noted, Prof. Gurpreet Mahajan notes that at the 
time of independence the framers of the Indian constitution were ever mindful of the religious 
and cultural diversity of the Indian populace and thus “they deliberated on a framework that 
would provide for a unified but culturally diverse nation state.”37  This constitutional orientation 
of the Indian nation can be best encapsulated in the slogan Unity in Diversity. “Unity in 
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Diversity articulates the sentiment that India can be a strong and unified country while 
simultaneously affirming its cultural diversity. Cultural homogeneity is not, in other words, seen 
as a necessary condition for forging a political identity as a nation state.”38 Due to the 
commitment to treat all religions and communities as equal, India chose not to have a state 
religion, although Hinduism was the majority religion.39 Gurpreet summaries for us the complex 
constitutional framework of India’s approach towards accommodating different kinds of 
diversities:  
Religious communities enjoy extensive cultural rights but no separate political rights. 
Identified linguistic communities enjoy cultural rights as well political rights. In 
many regions they form the federal units which have some degree of political 
autonomy to govern themselves. Tribal communities, particularly in the Hill regions, 
have special cultural rights, political rights of separate representation and the right to 
govern themselves. There is a lingering mistrust, or liberal anxiety, about granting 
political rights to religious communities. In any case, most religious communities are 
scattered through the country. Linguistic communities and tribal populations, 
particularly when they are concentrated in a given region, enjoy some political rights. 
These rights have promoted diversity while simultaneously deepening democracy.40 
In the Indian constitutional framework, the state and its institutions are committed to 
formulate policies and take necessary measures to foster conditions conducive for a multi-
cultural ethos to prevail. The state is also committed to protect the life and property of its citizens 
from communal violence and to simultaneously punish the guilty who discriminate and disturb 
the public peace and harmony on communal lines.41  
Our reflections about the State, from the Luther’s Two Realm perspective, help us to affirm 
and support the Indian political and judicial understanding of the role and purpose of the State. 
Because State in Luther’s Two Realm perspective rests not on a theocratic or homogenizing 
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ethnic/cultural foundation, but, as an instrument of God, functions to protect and foster human 
fellowship, irrespective of one’s cultural, lingual, ethnic or religious background. Thus Luther’s 
Two Realm perspective helps us to critique and reject the homogenizing and parochial political 
paradigm of Hindutva, which seeks to work towards the wellbeing of its carefully chosen people.  
Luther’s Two Realm paradigm helps us also to recognize the lack of distinction, which 
secular democratic governments usually affirm, regarding the religious and secular realms of life. 
However Hindutva, with its reductionist approach towards Hinduism, rests its societal 
foundation on a monistic frame work, where religion, society, and state is reduced to a single 
reality, in which  the concerns of both realms of human life are  confused, mixed, and politicized 
for its political project of a Hindu Rashtra (nation).  Such a lack of distinction (not separation) is 
not conducive for a vision of society in which people with different cultural and religious 
persuasion coexist and work together for common good.  
Critique of Hindutva State on Religious Toleration  
As in Chapter 3, one of the claims made by Hindutva is that Hinduism stands apart from 
Christianity in terms of religious tolerance, since Hinduism believes in plurality of truths and 
multiple paths to salvation. But it is interesting to note that the Hindu notion of tolerance has its 
own limitation when it confronts the issue of conversion. As Sebastian Kim points out, although 
Hinduism maintains doctrinal tolerance, when it confronts world views which do not fit into its 
mold, the practice of Hindu differs.42 Further clarifying Hindu notion of religious tolerance and 
its limitation, Sebastian Kim summarizes:   
This paradox of ‘tolerant’ Hinduism was well explained by P.D Devanandan, first 
director of the Christian Institute for Religion and Society in Bangalore, who saw that 
the tolerance of Hinduism had developed and was mainly operational within 
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Hinduism. However, during the course of its encounter with other religions, he 
argued, the tolerance that was manifested within its geographical and ideological 
sphere of influence was not exhibited to other religions unless they also conformed to 
its frame work. Similarly, Ainslie T. Embree, writing on the ‘the question of Hindu 
tolerance’, provides a convincing argument that Hindu civilization has grown self-
content through the centuries of development and has established its own distinctive 
‘endurance and persistence of its style and its patterns’, and that the Hindu approach 
is not best described as ‘absorptive, synthesizing, or tolerant’ but it ‘encapsulates’ 
other cultural and religious traditions. It is evident that the Hindu politcy of 
toleration, which had developed over centuries within its geographical and 
philosophical sphere, was not equipped to accommodate the challenge of the 
‘intolerant’ doctrine and practice of conversion brought by Christianity.43  
Although Hinduism cannot inherently accommodate exclusive truth claims, it is not 
generally violent like political Hindutva. As previously noted, Hinduism should be distinguished 
from Hindutva, because Hindutva does not represent the various strands of traditions which form 
Hinduism; it is only a politicized version of Brahmanical Hinduism.  
The Hindutva agenda becomes inherently intolerant because of its insistence of citizenship 
based on Hindu religion.  The criterion for a person’s standing in the Hindu nation is based on 
his Hindu religion and his commitment towards the ideals of Hindutva nationhood.  Chetan Bhatt 
notes, in the “Hindutva nationhood, citizenship is made conditional on Hindu racial, cultural and 
religious affiliation.”44 Anyone who stands outside the interest of Hindutva nationhood is treated 
as the “other,” unpatriotic, and as an enemy of the nation.  Christians, Muslims, and other 
religious minorities must return to the Hindu fold and prove their allegiance by accepting 
Hindutva ideals.  Chetan Bhat rightly notes that through these demands:   
 Savarkar initiated a vicious and regressive logic that could never reach fulfilment to 
the satisfaction of the Hindu nationalist imaginary. The mere fact of their existence 
meant that Indian Muslims and Christians were inherently treacherous and had the 
overwhelming and perpetually unfinished burden of demonstrating their love and 
loyalty to the Hindu nation in a manner that could only reach completion, if at all, 
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with the abandonment of their faiths and the adoption of an Hindutva ideology that 
considered them enemies.45 
In addition, Hindutva is due to an infatuation towards militarization, which is built into the 
very philosophy of Hindutva itself. Savarkar’s famous slogan “Hinduise all politics and 
Militarise Hindudom” best captures this sentiment.46 To Hindutva ideologues non-violence is 
weakness, which made India vulnerable to numerous invasions. Aggressive militarization of all 
Hindus is the optimal way to protect itself from threats from within and without. In this regard 
Bhatt notes the rejection of Gandhi’s nonviolence proposal for common living, “Savarkar stated 
that against ‘useless, impotent and coward’ rulers who represented democracy in India, he would 
prefer the ‘great leader’ Hitler.”47   
Hindutva ideologues’ fascination towards militarization manifests itself as a dangerous 
proposition in two arenas, namely their approach towards containing issues of religious 
conversions and their perspective towards an ideal State machinery. Since religious conversion 
and people different faith orientations pose threats to national unity, it is pertinent that the Hindu 
be alert and aggressive in protecting their interests and bringing people back to their original 
fold. Chetan Bhatt notes this particular orientation in Golwalkar: 
Golwalkar proposed that all minorities had to become Hindus not through a 
conscientious and voluntary choice that accompanies religious affiliation but against 
their will and conviction and under an explicit and palpable threat of violence. 
Indeed, Golwalkar articulated the expansion of his imagined ancient Aryan-Hindu 
empire not as a mission of religious education or even persuasion, but as one of 
military conquest: ‘Obviously we did not expand into Central Asia and South-East 
Asia by sermons alone. It is significant that every Hindu god is armed’48 
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To Hindutva ideologues this means that India needs an aggressive reorientation of the state. And 
“a new Hindu and Hindustan needs to be carved out wherein the re-engineered Hindu is 
aggressive and on a bit of a high. This should be reflected in the nature of the Indian state and 
this would in the final analysis eliminate the sediments that have piled up on the Hindu 
psyche.” 49 
The Hindutva attitude towards tolerance is problematic on several fronts. Hindutva clearly 
rejects the Indian secular democratic version of nationhood which embraces all the citizens of 
India irrespective of one’s religious or cultural standing. In the Hindutva view point, the State 
does not represent all the people living in its territory, but identifies itself with and is concerned 
only towards those who follow the dominant creed of the country, namely Hinduism. The 
Hindutva paradigm runs counter to the constitutional provision for religious freedom and 
practice. An extract from relevant portions of the Article 25 of the Indian constitution attests to 
this.  
Article 25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of 
religion.  
1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, 
all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to profess, 
practice and propagate religion.  
2)  Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the 
State from making any law— 
a. Regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity 
which may be associated with religious practice;50  
While article 25 of the Indian constitution guarantees religious freedom, article 29 seeks to 
protect the culture and unique ethnic identities of the minority communities. This article confers 
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the freedom to all its citizens, to conserve their distinct languages, scripts, or cultures. It also 
ensures that the state shall not impose upon it any culture other than the community’s own 
culture.51 The above mentioned articles also serve to allay any fears of the minority communities 
from the cultural and religious hegemonic tendencies of the dominant creed. 
Approaching Hindutva from a Two Realm theology, we are called to reject it as paradigm. 
The Two Realm perspective calls us to treat with suspicion any ideology which seeks to divide 
people and disrupt peace and justice in the temporal realm of life. Luther rejected the notion that 
citizenship should be based on a person’s faith. The common ground towards progress and 
prosperity in the temporal realm is based on the common foundation of human Creatureliness 
and the natural law. To Luther, the task of the State is limited to keep order, protect property, 
enforce the laws of the land, punish the wicked, and foster an environment conducive for the 
common good and wellbeing of all irrespective of one’s cultural, religious or ethnic standing. If 
the government engages in the religious realm to dictate and enforce religious beliefs, it is  
overstepping its God ordained realm of activity.  Thus the Two Realm perspective helps us to 
affirm that faith should not be coerced. Militancy to contain people’s faith through violence, fear, 
and intimidation is against God’s will. Luther’s Two Realm perspective helps us to affirm that 
religious tolerance and freedom is fundamental to human survival in the left-hand realm.  
The two-realms perspective’s proper identification of the jurisdiction of the state over 
temporal affairs and the self-limiting ordinance of the state’s power in the matters of religious 
beliefs provides space for Christians to talk about religious freedom and religious toleration over 
against Hindutva ideology in a religiously pluralistic context such as India. William Schumacher 
notes, that “government could well encourage religious practice generally for the sake of public 
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order and morality, and thus might urge its citizens to worship in the Church, synagogue, or 
mosque of their choice.”52 However, such a view does not warrant the state’s use of power to 
promote religious nationalism (in our case Hindu nationalism) or the creation of a theocratic 
state. The state also should not take away the freedom of its citizens to propagate their faith or 
their right to choose or change their religious faith. This then offers a critique to Hindutva 
ideology, which tries to combat religious freedom in general and evangelization activities of the 
Church in specific, with threats, violence, and judicial powers. As George Weigel observes, 
Religious freedom is the first of human rights precisely because it is the juridical 
acknowledgement (in constitutional/or positive law) that within every human person 
is a privileged sanctuary of conviction and conscience where state power may not 
tread; … In defending religious freedom, therefore, the Church defends both the truth 
about man and the conditions for the possibility of civil society.53  
The theological insights presented to us through Luther’s two kingdom perspective provide 
Christians in India with an ethical rationale to critique and repudiate Hindutva as a paradigm. In 
making such an appeal we are not only backed by our Christian faith but also by the 
reasonableness of human wisdom as enshrined in the constitutional understanding of religious 
tolerance and freedom. 54  
God’s Calling in the Public Square in the Context of Hindutva 
An important question which emerges is, how can Christians confront Hindutva in the 
public square and work together with others for the common good for all? To answer this 
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question we shall discuss briefly the significance of our vocation as citizens and/or as political 
authority, and the calling of the Church in the public sphere.  
Call to be a Citizen in the Public Square  
To a Christian, their vocational spaces are the places where God’s two fold rule creatively 
come together in the world. Passive righteousness brings a new identity and regeneration which 
kindles faith, love, and hope in each Christian. Through their God given vocations, these virtues 
embedded in active righteousness finds a space to operate in the world. These vocational spaces 
provide opportunities for a Christian to leaven the world as they seriously carry out their 
responsibilities in the world. Christians, well informed to keep concerns of God’s Two Realms 
distinct, are called to influence the temporal realm, strengthened by their identity as God’s 
children and knowing the nature, concerns and, modus operandi of that realm.            
The call to be a citizen is important for Indian Christians in the context of Hindutva 
nationalism. The democratic ideals which shape the model political process were relatively less 
developed during Luther’s time, but it does not mean that a call to be a subject was passive in 
nature.  This call involves an active participation in the political life, whereby a person carries 
out his obedience to his authorities (for e.g., paying their taxes, obeying the laws, praying for the 
authorities) in an intentional and proactive way. In this way political structures which were 
meant to facilitate good for the subjects are strengthened and carry out their God given task. 
Although Luther did not envisage subjects to overthrow their wicked political authorities he did 
not encourage them towards a blind obedience either. The subjects were called to actively 
discern and disobey (not through violence) when the authorities departs from God’s will. This 
disobedience could mean inviting punishment and subsequent suffering which is not all 
‘passive’. The notion of ‘passivity’ being attached to the understanding of a subject and 
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‘activeness’ being attached to a notion of a ‘citizen’ is a not a true representation of the reality. In 
this regard Prof. Berndt Wannenwetsch,55 in his analysis of Romans 13, stating the ‘active’ 
nature of ‘subjects’ notes: 
Obedience, then, embraces the act of attentive listening to a command and consenting 
to the authority behind it which is completely different from being subject to dumb or 
silent forces. In the same vein, the Greek notion hypotasseste (usually translated as 
"be subject") carries the tone of a pro-active positioning of oneself within the realm 
of political authority instead of a mere being placed or even being forced there. It 
means to make oneself serviceable instead of being a merely reactive servant.56 
The subject in Luther’s thought is proactive and responsible in carrying out their 
responsibilities in the political arena. This principle is valid and operative in the modern political 
conception of citizenship. The citizen is called to proactively participate in the political realm 
through their active obedience towards established rules and policies of the government so that 
the common good may prevail.  
Although these fundamentals remain the same, the modern democratic conception of 
citizenship adds additional responsibilities and privileges. The modern sense of citizenship 
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encourages, requires, and provides opportunities to its subjects to choose the right leaders, shape 
good polices, and creatively make known their dissent through appropriate forums and methods. 
In democracy people are called to be active participants in the political machinery and decision 
making. In this sense, citizenship demands basic knowledge and social commitment towards the 
common good, justice, civic responsibilities, rights and the like.57 Citizenship also means active 
involvement in the life of the nation and its government through voting, debating issues, grass 
root politics, and civic activism.58 Robert Kolb rightly draws our attention to the active nature of 
our call to be a citizen as thus: 
Citizens are called upon to do more than think about their societies, however. They 
are also called to act. With the calls for justice in the city, which the prophets send 
ringing through our ears in the pericopes for the end of the Church year, we proceed 
into daily living. We do so conscious of our calling to call for justice in forms 
appropriate for our day and place—and to work for its execution. Even—or perhaps 
especially—in a society standing clearly under God's judgment, we take most 
seriously our calling to work for the peace of the city, for justice and well-being for 
all its inhabitants.59 
As citizens called to be active in the public square, we should also be aware of the 
penultimate nature of the horizontal realm of our lives. Such an awareness help us avoid utopian 
estimates for the society but help us realistically work towards the betterment of life in the left-
hand realm without getting frustrated. Robert Kolb offers the following caution and advice in 
this regard. 
 Whatever form our obligations as Christian citizens may take, whatever forms of 
action we choose to adopt as we exercise our vocations as citizens in the land in 
which God has called us to serve, we remember that we are first of all people of His 
Gospel. That means that we exercise these callings in Christian freedom. That means 
we recognize the penultimate nature of our goals and our strivings for our society and 
its members. Everything in the horizontal dimension of our lives is haunted by its 
penultimate character. We recognize that our wills are bound as fallen creatures of 
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God, and therefore, we will sometimes find ourselves locked into situations in which 
the choices lie not between good and evil but between two or more evils. We will 
more often find ourselves in situations in which callings conflict, in which two or 
three good tasks lie before us, but we have time to carry out only one. We will less 
often face a situation in which no ¡pod choices offer themselves, and we must choose 
the lesser of two evils. Even inaction can be an evil. But in Christ we are freed to 
serve and to make such choices.60 
In light of this study, the call of citizenship in the context of Hindutva carries with it some 
implications. In our exercise of citizenship we are called to be ‘knowledgeable and educated’ so 
that we are able to make informed decisions and advocacy in the public square. In this regard, 
Christians must know the distinct concerns and modus operandi of God’s both realms of life, the 
purpose of state in Christian understanding and, at the same time, knowledge about democratic 
ideals and provisions of the nation, especially the specific philosophy and challenges Hindutva 
ideology brings about. The purpose of this dissertation has been to help Christians in India in this 
regard, with the result that as well informed citizens of the country we make the best use of the 
constitutional provisions provided to respond to Hindutva, not just for the sake of Christians, but 
for sake of all. This includes making use of the voting franchise carefully and engaging in 
debates, forums, and formal structures which are meant keep justice and order intact in the 
country. This also includes joining hands with like-mined people belonging to different walks of 
life in order to work towards a common good and exposing true nature of Hindutva. In the public 
square Christians may not present their case against Hindutva on the basis of  scriptures or 
Christian faith (though our convictions for sure are shaped by it), but on the reasonableness of 
natural law as reflected in the constitution and democratic policies which support the cause of 
justice and common good.       
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Call to be a Political Authority for Common Good  
In the chapter five, we discussed in detail the nature and purpose of the State from a 
Christian perspective, as elaborated by Luther. The State/government is entrusted with the 
responsibility to protect all people from the effects of sin and foster human fellowship for justice, 
peace, and the common good for all.  A Two Realm perspective helps to affirm the role of a the 
State to be concerned about the welfare of all its subjects irrespective one’s religious, cultural, 
ethic, linguistic, racial, or caste background. This role is important in a multi-cultural and 
religious context like India, the need for the state machinery to promote and maintain an 
atmosphere conducive to religious freedom and tolerance.      
To Luther, because they are masks and instruments through which God carries out His 
purpose in the political arena those called to a political office bear an important and sacred 
responsibility. Luther affirmed that an emperor need not to be a Christian or saint. Heathen 
governments are under God’s ordinance and creation. Regardless of their faith every ruler and 
government is subject to the natural law and human reason/wisdom in the exercise of their 
respective responsibilities.  
Although Christians form a minority in India, their presence in socio-political realm is 
significant. The presence of Christians in the places of service such as medicine, education, and 
science is commendable. Especially in the states like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, 
Andrapradesh, and Goa, the Christian presence in the political structure is significant. In the 
context of Hindutva politics in India, a discussion about the vocation of Christians in political 
life carries much significance. To Luther the capabilities, wisdom, and responsibilities for a 
political ruler remains the same for a believer and unbeliever. Still a Christian ruler, who is truly 
a believer, in light of his two kinds of righteousness, will be anxious to devote himself to the 
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service of his neighbor and to treat his vocation as a true calling from God.61  
 Luther wrote significant things regarding the political responsibilities of a Christian prince 
since they are baptized members of the church. Luther elaborated his advice with biblical 
examples. For our purpose we shall briefly discuss four such themes in Luther.  Firstly, a 
Christian prince should devote himself fully to the welfare and good of his subjects, without 
being preoccupied with desire to dominate or Lord:  
First. He must give consideration and attention to his subjects, and really devote 
himself to it. This he does when he directs his every thought to making himself useful 
and beneficial to them; when instead of thinking, “The land and people belong to me, 
I will do what best pleases me,” he thinks rather, “I belong to the land and the people, 
I shall do what is useful and good for them. My concern will be not how to lord it 
over them and dominate them, but how to protect and maintain them in peace and 
plenty.” He should picture Christ to himself, and say, “Behold, Christ, the supreme 
ruler, came to serve me; he did not seek to gain power, estate, and honor from me, but 
considered only my need, and directed all things to the end that I should gain power, 
estate, and honor from him and through him. I will do likewise, seeking from my 
subjects not my own advantage but theirs. I will use my office to serve and protect 
them, listen to their problems and defend them, and govern to the sole end that they, 
not I, may benefit and profit from my rule.” In such manner should a prince in his 
heart empty himself of his power and authority, and take unto himself the needs of his 
subjects, dealing with them as though they were his own needs. For this is what 
Christ did to us [Phil. 2:7]; and these are the proper works of Christian love.62 
Secondly, temporal authorities are to be concerned about the poor, needy, orphans, and the 
widows in the society. This virtue “includes the tasks that range from establishing good laws and 
customs so that people live peacefully, to endowing hospitals and filling community chests.”63 
The third advice includes rulers exercising their authority to protect and guard people against 
violence and crime in order to provide peace, order, and good will in the society. Kolb and Arand 
note, “For all these reasons, Luther in explaining petition of the Lord’s prayer suggested that 
princes ought to emblazon on their coat of arms a loaf of bread instead of a lion in order to 
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remind everyone that their office is one of providing peace and protection, without which bread 
could not be baked or eaten in peace.”64 Finally, Luther advised the political leaders to secure 
justice to all those who fear God.65 Through this religious freedom is protected and no one is 
coerced towards faith. This religious tolerance allows God’s word to be preached and 
flourished.66   
As people vested with authority, political leaders who are Christians have a challenging role to 
play in a Hinduised public square. Luther’s principles provide them a perspective in which they 
exist as true servants of God, fully committed to serve the interest of not just their fellow 
Christians but of everyone, resulting in the wellbeing and common good of all. The Two Realm 
perspective also helps Christian leaders not to use the powers vested in their office to establish a 
Christian government or to allow any other theocratic tendencies to prevail.  This, then, is a 
challenging task for a Christian political leader in a political context where Hindutva regime is in 
power. A Two Realm perspective also equips leaders in the political arena with necessary 
conceptual tools to analyze and distinguish between the concerns of both realms of life without 
separating the dynamic inter-play between both realms. This teaches leaders not to confuse or 
mix the concerns of religion and the state, but to be equally concerned about various moral and 
ethical issues equally by natural law and through Christian faith. A Two kinds of righteousness 
frame work also helps a Christian in political office realize that they are freed from the need to 
justify oneself before God and that they are thereby well positioned to “seek justice for the city 
and for all its inhabitants—for their own sake…”67 As leaders in a political office, their faith also 
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reminds them that they may not fully succeed in establishing ideal conditions in the world. But 
as Kolb and Arand note: 
Through their lives and through the “civil righteousness” of those outside the faith, 
the world may become somewhat better for some and for a time. But Christians know 
that their struggle on behalf of justice and the welfare of all human beings and all of 
creation will never end, for sin and evil will continue to intrude in the midst of their 
best efforts. But rather than being discouraged by this recurrence of evil and the 
undermining of the good, believers simply proceed with love and service, assisting as 
God has called us to assist with the care of his creation.68  
Call of the Church in the Public Square 
 We have already noted that the Church is a unique creation of God having a two 
dimensional existence, Coram Deo and Coram Mundo. The church, Coram Deo lives in the 
presence of God as an assembly of all believers gathered together by the Holy Spirit through the 
Gospel. Whereas the church, Coram Mundo, has its existence in this world as a God ordained 
institution in the left-hand realm. In this world, Church carries an important call in relation to the 
right hand realm of God. The primary purpose of the Church in this regard is to be an instrument 
of God, whereby through the ministry of word and sacraments God saves people from sin and 
the devil. Robert Benne rightly summaries this unique purpose and call of the church:  
That calling is to proclaim the Word of God as law and Gospel and to enact that 
Gospel in the proper administration of the sacraments. God has directly called the 
Church to be that earthen vessel through which he reaches out in Word and 
sacraments to retrieve all his lost and erring creatures. No other institution on earth 
has that calling and none will carry it out if the Church fails in its essential mission. It 
is sacred calling. It deals with ultimate things: the earthly destinies of all created but 
fallen human beings.69  
The primary call for the Church in the world is to remain as Church by being faithful to the 
ministry of word and sacraments. Although the Church might engage itself in the public square 
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for the cause of justice and the common good, the “Church is not political actor, a social 
reformer, or an aggressive interest group. If it acts as one of these, it is identified and treated as 
one more contentious worldly group. Furthermore it loses its own integrity and reason for 
being.”70  This does not mean that Church should not engage itself in the public square. The 
church, existing as institution in the left-hand realm, has a genuine concern for the welfare in that 
realm. The Church should engage in a way that would not lead to neglect the cardinal truth to 
which it is called to exist and its primary duty of preaching the Gospel and administering the 
sacraments.  
The church’s vision for the political realm is not to establish a Christian hegemony, but to 
cooperate with other institutions in the society towards the wellbeing of all under the law. The 
Church does have a responsibility towards the state and its authorities to help uphold the law and 
to call them to repentance, when they depart from God’s design for them. In this way Luther 
notes: 
Now, if a preacher in his official capacity says to kings and princes and to all the 
world, “Thank and fear God, and keep His commandments,” he is not meddling in 
the affairs of secular government. On the contrary, he is thereby serving and being 
obedient to the highest government. Thus the entire spiritual government really does 
nothing else than serve the divine authority, which is why they are called servants of 
God and ministers of Christ in the Scriptures. Indeed, St. Paul even calls it a service 
to the Church and to all heathen (Rom. 15:16). 71     
Luther  affirmed that when a government departs God’s calling to keep order, peace, and 
justice for all, it is indeed forfeiting  its claim to be instruments of God’s will.72  In those 
instances the Church does have a responsibility as an institution in the left-hand realm to call the 
state to repentance through orderly means. The church, in this case, does not have a coercive 
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power to enforce its views, but must persuasively present their case with sound knowledge and 
wisdom, appealing to the conscience of the society. Kolb offers a wise caution:   
the Church often is tempted to make moral comment without competent command of 
the facts. Being fools for Christ is not the same as being ignorant and thereby 
shaming Him. Perhaps worse than making the faith look foolish, ignorant expressions 
of pious emotion in the political realm can make it look irrelevant to the world that 
God does hold in His hands. Government officials are not impressed by ignorance, 
even when it is pious, or incompetence, even when it is religious.73 
In a Hinduised public square, the task of the Church is challenging, because the Church 
itself is a target of violence under the Hindutva regime. In this context, the question of how the 
Church can practically carry out its prophetic ministry deserves special attention.  Robert 
Benne’s four “possible connections” help the Church connect with the public square. This 
provides a good starting point for faithfulness to God’s call to be a voice heard in the political 
realm, keeping the Two Realm theological rubric intact. Benne organizes his life connections 
under indirect and unintentional influence, indirect and intentional influence, direct and 
intentional influence and direct and intentional action.74  
Indirect and Unintentional Influence.  
This model suggests that Church does not get involved in the public square directly. The 
Church is to be concerned with the preaching and teaching of God’s word, and thereby seeks to 
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shape the perspective and character of its members. These individuals, through their vocational 
calling, serve God in the political arena. This is perhaps a commonly practiced model among 
Christian churches. The Church operates indirectly and trusts that people who are shaped by the 
values of the Church consciously take initiative to interact and engage with the paradigms in the 
public square. Benne notes that although this model looks less radical, this approach has its own 
possibilities, 
But even if this approach leads to a less radical posture, it has the promise, if done 
well, of having a far-reaching, pervasive, and long-term effect on public life. The 
laity can affect a complex and secular world much more than Church can. There are 
far more of them than clergy, and they have access to a far wider array of public roles 
that the Church or its clergy.75    
One of the weaknesses inherent in this approach is that the lack of a conscious effort by the 
Church to connect with issues of the society, which might lead its members to dichotomize their 
religious and secular lives. In the context of Hindutva, this approach is too long-term and general 
which might not help Church nor its members to engage the world in a timely and relevant 
manner.76 
Indirect and Intentional Influence.  
In this approach, the Church still remains indirect in its engagement in the political realm, 
by not coming out publically. It does not formulate and issue public statements. The Church is 
intentional to mobilize its biblical and confessional resources to help and shape the conscience 
and moral convictions of its own people. In this way the Church intentionally engages itself to 
train and even challenge people to address moral and ethical concerns in the political realm 
through their vocations and areas of influence. But the Church approaches its members non-
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coercively and seeks to influence through the reasonableness of its position. However such an 
approach could raise a well knowledge laity who can make “creative connections between 
religion and public life.”77 This model holds much promise in the context of Hindutva 
nationalism in India, because the Church assumes more intentionality to equip and help people to 
understand Hindutva and formulate their response in light of their faith affirmation to work 
towards common good for all.78 At this point it’s worth noting here that such action would take a 
shift in the thinking and self-understanding of pastors who are to equip and teach their people. 
Because many pastors seems to have an attitude of detachment from social and political 
concerns. But a re-orientation and re-education from Two Realm perspective could assist pastors 
to be genuinely interested in concerns of the left-hand realm. In our case, pastors are to be well 
equipped to prepare the congregation members to face those challenges raised by Hindutva.   
Direct and Intentional Influence.  
Through this approach the institutional Church becomes a visible public actor in the public 
square. Along with its ministry of intentional influence to equip its members for the public tasks 
through their vocations, the Church makes its position known. In this regard Church might issue 
public statement documents to appeal to and change the public conscience to work towards a 
common good. Benne recommends that this approach should be carried out with great discretion 
and possibly infrequently. As Richard Neuhaus puts it “when it not necessary for the Church to 
speak, it is necessary that the Church not speak.”79 There is always a risk of the Church getting 
polarized and politicized in this approach. However, whenever the common good is at immediate 
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risk and social or governmental practice directly run counter to core religious and/or moral 
convictions, the Church cannot remain in obscurity. In these instances, the Church must openly 
let its voice heard for the sake of order, peace, and justice for the life in the left-hand realm. 
Benne suggests that when the Church chooses this route, it should give special care to credibility 
and intelligibility in their articulation. Benne notes that to gain credibility, the Church focus on 
knowledge and expertise in the preparation of its documents.  The lack of credible arguments, 
backed up with facts and reasonability, leads to embarrassment in the church’s position although 
the cause might be the right one. Similarly, Benne notes that “Church should speak only when it 
is has something unique to offer from its own theological-ethical heritage. It should be convinced 
that its vision has a fresh or incisive interpretation to offer or some unique judgement to make.”80  
To Benne, intelligibility assumes that our core arguments and moral visions shaped by our 
tradition be made thoroughly understandable and clear to people in the public square, who may 
possess different worldviews and religious persuasions. In the context of Hindutva nationalism in 
India, where public interest is clearly at stake, this approach requires our serious attention.81  
Direct and Intentional Action.  
This method radically differs from all other approaches in terms of use of power. All the 
other approaches discussed so far rely on moral and persuasive reasoning without any coercive 
power. Direct and intentional action to materialize when the Church resorts to the use of power 
to change policy or move society to a particular direction. Benne understands power to mean “all 
those levels of pressure ranging from threat to force that get people to do what one want them to 
                                                 
80 Benne, The Paradoxical Vision, 207.  
81 For more discussion, Benne, The Paradoxical Vision, 201–14. 
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do, whether or not they really want to do it.”82 In this regard the Church channels funds, people 
power, and political weight to be a political force in the secular realm. To a great extent this 
method might not be compatible in a Hinduised public square wrought with communal violence 
in India. Moreover to a great extent this is the methodology consistently practiced by Hindutva 
proponents to change the political configuration in India.83    
In shaping a Christian response to Hindutva, this dissertation recommends and promotes 
the “indirect and intentional influence” and “direct and intentional influence” approaches. Both 
approaches carry intentionality towards the concerns of the left-hand realm. The institutional 
Church is also serious about engaging its theological resources to equip and shape Christian 
individuals to better carry out their responsibilities through their respective callings in the 
society. In this regard, the modus operandi of both these methods aligns itself with the 
theological tenets of Luther’s Two Realm theology. The church, without  directly meddling with 
the power process and structures in the political realm, but still having a voice and concern about 
the same, allow its members to effect change in the society through their vocations as citizens 
and/or political authorities. The members, through their rightful space, use the democratic 
structures, processes, opportunities, and avenues available to them to confront and engage, in our 
case, the Hindutva challenge to the common good. This also helps Church to be Church without 
having to resort to the coercive power, but to be a responsible catalyst for social change through 
its members. The great advantage of approaches having intentional influence is that it has the 
strength to develop a knowledge laity to engage the public sphere. “The church’s ministry 
through its laity and institutions has the capacity to reach the deepest level of human society— 
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the hearts and minds of its people.”84 Bene rightly notes that in the modern society these 
approaches tend to function so well. 
Modern Society, with its penchant for autonomy, will also be more inclined to listen 
to articulate Christian lay persons than it will the church. Laity will be able to speak 
with the authority of their own disciplines and practices behind them and will more 
likely be able to translate the Christian vision into a language that is intelligible to the 
public spheres in which they exercise their responsibilities.85   
At times the institutional Church needs to speak up for the cause of justice and peace. This 
task then is amply envisaged when the Church chooses to be prophetic through its direct and 
intentional influence in the public realm. Thus, far from quietism and indifference, the Church in 
India is called to confront Hindutva to foster the common good. For this, the Church will be 
greatly benefited by distinguishing between God’s two realm, its concerns, limits and modus 
operandi. This encourages the Church to be the Church and the state the state, both not separate 
but distinct in carrying out the one true God’s creative rule in the world.  
Conclusion   
This chapter has offered a critique to Hindutva nationalism with the help of the theological 
principles learned from Luther’s Two Realm perspective. In this regard we clearly identified the 
Hindutva conception of the state to be incompatible to the common good and wellbeing of all in 
the temporal realm in India. The Hindutva conception of a hegemonic cultural and religious 
nationalism poses a threat to life, safety, and religious freedom for the religious and ethno 
cultural minorities in India. In formulating our response, Luther’s rich theology of creation helps 
us to develop an inclusive paradigm for our common humanity based on our common 
Creatureliness and human reason. We noted that such a paradigm provides us with a common 
                                                 
84 Benne, The Paradoxical Vision, 199. 
85 Benne, The Paradoxical Vision, 200. 
 196 
space to talk about and work towards the common good. We also discussed in detail how 
specifically we could respond to Hindutva in the public square through our vocational call to be a 
citizen or political authority. This chapter also discussed and suggested possible approaches 
through which the Church as an institution may influence the public square for the welfare of all 
in that realm. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
CONCLUSION  
This dissertation has offered a theological response to Hindutva nationalism and its 
challenges to Christians in India.  The particular focus was to understand and critique Hindutva 
conception of the State and its failure to work towards the common good of all. Towards that end 
this dissertation explicated a theological frame work to help Christians take their Christian faith 
seriously while embracing an inclusive paradigm which enables Christians to work together with 
people of different faiths or no faiths for the common good. For this purpose this dissertation 
explored the relevance of theological resources available to us from Luther’s Two Realm 
perspective. This dissertation affirmed that, fundamental to any theology of engagement in the 
world, is to understand and distinguish between the concerns, activities, and mode of God’s rule 
in relation to God’s Two Realms of life. This teaches us not to confuse concerns of creation with 
that of redemption, nor compartmentalize or separate between God’s activities in both realms of 
life. This dissertation pointed out clearly the distinction between God rule through Gospel in the 
right-hand realm and His rule in the temporal realm through the law. Luther’s Two Realm 
theology was introduced as an analytical tool for Christians in their efforts to distinguish between 
God’s distinct concerns to formulate appropriate and concrete responses when confronted with 
various moral and ethical issues.  
 God’s concern for the left-hand or temporal realm is to restrain the effects of evil and sin, 
and to foster human fellowship so that life might flourish. God’s purpose is to establish and 
maintain external peace, order, and justice not just to believers but towards the entire creation 
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over against the schemes of the devil. In this regard we noted the special role entrusted to the 
State/Civil government. In Luther’s Two Realm thought, the state and worldly governments are 
instruments or masks of God towards the wellbeing and service of all, irrespective of one 
religious, cultural, or ethnic persuasion. Towards that end the state is entrusted with its coercive 
power (“law grounded on the power of punishment”   or “the just, orderly use of power”), which 
is set to run on the wheels of natural law and human wisdom. In this regard we noted that a ruler 
need not to a Christian nor a government Christian, since God can use a pagan ruler in the same 
way as he gives wisdom to a Christian ruler. This does not suggest the autonomy of secular 
realm from the Laws of God. The secular realm belongs to God and is accountable to operate 
through the natural law as revealed to everyone in and through creation and conscience.  
God’s provision of the state in the left-hand realm for the maintenance of external peace, 
justice, and the common good, in the context of a multi-religious, multicultural, multiethnic, and 
multilinguistic fabric is a very challenging task. The Indian constitution envisages a nation and 
government that represents all the people who live in its territories and rejects a majoritarian, 
religious, or cultural nationalistic agenda. This dissertation affirmed that Luther’s two-realm 
perspective helps Christians in India to affirm the constitutional version of the state and 
government over against the Hindutva vision of a monolithic Hindu state where religious and 
ethnocultural minorities do not have a legitimate space in the nationhood.  
The two-realm perspective identified the proper jurisdiction of the state over temporal 
affairs and provides a self-limiting ordinance in the matters of religious beliefs. In this regard, we 
noted that the concern of the state is not to establish a theocracy or establish religious hegemony 
over its population. The purpose of the state is to provide protection and security to life and 
property for all its members and to maintain a conducive atmosphere for religious freedom and 
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tolerance. This then provides space for Christians to discuss religious freedom and religious 
toleration over against Hindutva ideology in a religiously pluralistic context such as India.  
 In our deliberation we noted that one of the strengths of Luther’s realm theology is its 
ability to help us take our Christian identity (exclusive in nature) seriously and, at the same time, 
embrace an inclusive paradigm which enables us to find a common ground to work towards good 
for all.  This dissertation demonstrated that two kinds of righteousness rejects any one-
dimensional understanding of Christian anthropology, and affirms the indispensable nature of the 
simultaneity of two kinds of righteousness operating in a Christian, who lives out his calling in 
this world. We cannot conceive of a compartmentalization and/or separation of the Christian’s 
identity from the Christian’s action in the world. Thus any talk about the Christian’s performance 
in this world, is  talk about his faith and identity. At the same time our discussion of active 
righteousness and the Christian’s vocation in the world also pointed out that a Christian, in his 
practice of good deeds, is neither motivated nor is required to objectify his neighbor to use him 
as means to a self-serving end. The purpose of good deeds in the left-hand realm is motivated by 
the love of Christ in meeting the neighbor’s need. Luther’s Two Realm perspective helps us to 
reject any instrumental mentality attached to our practice of good deeds in the society.  
In our attempt to find a common ground with people of different faiths or no faiths, this 
dissertation proposed two foundations for our common existence. This forms a bridge or a 
common point of contact with others in our temporal life. Firstly , we noted that human beings 
and the rest of the creation are bound to each other as creatures of God’s creation, having 
common needs, sharing a common space, and mutually dependent upon each other for survival 
and existence. Secondly, apart from our common Creatureliness, we are also bound to each other 
through a common morality as revealed through natural law and human reason. Although this 
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dissertation noted the difficulty and complexity involved in appealing towards common good on 
the basis of natural law1 still in a limited sense, on a foundational level, it provides Christians a 
space to carry out our conversation with others with regard to issues of justice, morality, and the 
common good. We noted the appropriateness of basing and relating our critique of Hindutva 
through appeal to human wisdom as reflected in the Indian constitution. Here we noted that the 
Hindutva conception of the State and nationhood, with its vision of hegemonic and 
homogenizing approach, departs from and rejects the constitutional understanding of Indian 
nationhood, which is committed to all its citizens regardless of their religious, cultural, or ethnic 
backgrounds and is committed to the ideals of religious tolerance and peace.     
Finally, this dissertation explored the significance of a Christian’s social engagement in the 
public square, taking seriously one’s call to be a citizen and/or as political authority. In this 
regard this dissertation affirmed that as a responsible citizen in his vocation, a Christian is called 
to be proactive and actively concerned about the proper functioning of the civil government 
making good use of the democratic provisions available to them. As a political authority, a 
Christian is committed to the common good for all through obedience to God and use of the 
authority and power vested to him. This dissertation also affirmed that the Church as an 
institution in the left-hand should not run way from its responsibility towards the extension and 
welfare of all under law in the temporal realm. The Church does carry a divine mandate to 
challenge and preach God’s law to the civil government when the government clearly walks 
away from God’s design. To guide the church’s social engagement his dissertation also 
considered Robert Benne’s four “possible connections” in making church’s voice heard in the 
public square. In shaping a Christian response to Hindutva, we proposed the “indirect and 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 7 on “Common Morality: Natural Law and Human Reason.” 
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intentional influence” and “direct and intentional influence” approach, because both these 
approaches teach intentionality and a commitment to engage its theological resources to equip 
and shape Christian individuals to better carry out their responsibilities. In the direct and 
intentional approach, the Church no longer stands in obscurity, but is committed to directly 
engage the world non-coercively but persuasively and convincingly. Unfortunately many 
churches in India, including the Lutheran church, lack such an intentionality or are ill-equipped 
towards undertaking this important task. This might be due to the lack of expertise and/or the 
inability of the Church to engage its own theological resources and to make its voice heard 
convincingly and persuasively to its own members and also in the public square. This 
dissertation fills this void and equips the church, and Christians in India, with a theological 
perspective to continue to be a part of God’s creatio continua in this temporal world as they 
engage Hindutva challenges in the public square.     
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